

Documenti Libri

(atti in eselle Aric, URSS, distens.)

MADRID — Alla prima settimana introdotta, la Conferenza madrileña per la sicurezza e la collaborazione europea, ha fatto seguito una settimana di monologhi privi di spettacolarità dialettica. Il regolamento, infatti, vietava le repliche, per cui ogni delegazione ha potuto esprimere i propri punti di vista, a porte chiuse, e nel silenzio generale. La prima parte della settimana è stata dedicata ai temi militari e della sicurezza, ed ha avuto spunti di interesse. La seconda parte, in cui sono stati affrontati i temi della cooperazione tecnica ed economica, praticamente non ha avuto storia.

L'intervento più duro, nella discussione sugli armamenti e sulla sicurezza, è stato dell'americano Kampelmann. «Noi e i sovietici — ha detto — abbiamo molte cose in comune, però divergiamo nella nostra maniera di intendere il mondo, di considerare l'uomo». È stato il preambolo di una serie di accuse, prima fra tutte l'invasione dell'Afghanistan, poi il mancato rispetto dei diritti umani. **Kampelmann** ha accusato l'URSS di aver dato il via alla nuova corsa alle armi, affermando che Mosca spende centocinquanta miliardi di dollari all'anno in ordigni micidiali, ciò che rappresenta fra il 15 e il 20 per cento in più degli Stati Uniti. Nel suo fervore, **Kampelmann** è giunto a dire che gli Stati Uniti mai hanno ricono-

Il rito ne t gia, solo van ne a men sorv So. litari stess nega le ca prima ravan gratif sional la qua misur li, sen fattor pareri o, qua priati profes ed un snecle

13 maggio 1980 L'Espresso

Nato: difesa globale

(Segue dalla 1ª pagina)

di inviare unità della Marina al di fuori del Mediterraneo». La Francia e l'Inghilterra, aggiunge il comunicato, potrebbero farlo, ma il contributo dell'Italia si concretizzerà meglio nel potenziamento delle difese nella sua regione. L'America, conclude Brown nella sua nota, è pienamente soddisfatta degli sforzi dell'Italia nella difesa e considera il nostro Paese «un alleato saldissimo nella Nato».

Il ministro Lello Lagorio, che l'altro ieri aveva escluso l'invio di unità navali italiane nell'Oceano Indiano, ha confermato che l'Italia accrescerà le sue spese militari del 3 per cento l'anno e ha ribadito l'impegno italiano di aiutare economicamente la Turchia, sulle cui frontiere, ha rivelato il presidente del comitato militare della Nato, le forze so-

vietiche sono state rafforzate.

Oggi i ministri degli Esteri, presente Edmund Muskie, si uniranno ai ministri della Difesa per una discussione sui maggiori temi di politica internazionale. Muskie vuole la solidarietà europea non solo nei confronti della «minaccia sovietica», ma anche sull'Iran, contro il quale conta che gli europei, il 17 maggio a Napoli, decideranno le massime misure di sanzioni economiche.

Il generale Gundersen ha detto che siamo entrati in «un'epoca di rischi elevati», ha negato che la pressione dell'Urss in Europa sia diminuita e si è detto convinto che i sovietici sono pronti a utilizzare la loro forza militare se i loro interessi lo richiedono e se i rischi non sono grandi.

Nel suo rapporto ai ministri della Difesa, Gundersen ha sostenuto che l'Urss è impe-

gnata tuttora a diventare la maggiore potenza militare del mondo; che le truppe del Patto di Varsavia sono aumentate in dieci anni del 20 per cento; che Mosca dispone di cinquemila testate atomiche; che sono stati dislocati 150 missili nucleari SS-20 (cento contro bersagli europei, si ritiene); che il numero dei sottomarini sovietici capaci di lanciare missili atomici è ora di 70; che le navi da guerra di superficie sono 275.

Il Patto di Varsavia, inoltre, dispone di 225 divisioni in servizio (di cui 170 sono sovietiche), di 55 mila carri armati, di un numero di aviogetti superiore del 40 per cento rispetto a dieci anni fa. Per rendere più efficace il suo rapporto, Gundersen ha mostrato ai ministri una serie di diapositive sugli armamenti sovietici fornite dai servizi segreti.

Renato Proni

presidente è stato molto cortese. Sarà una transizione facile ed efficiente. e.c.

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L'Urss respinge risoluzione Onu a ritirare truppe dall'Afghanistan

NEW YORK — L'assemblea generale dell'Onu ha approvato con 111 «sì», 22 «no» e 12 astensioni una risoluzione che invita l'Unione Sovietica a ritirare immediatamente le sue truppe dall'Afghanistan. La risoluzione ricalca sostanzialmente quella approvata il 14 gennaio scorso con 104 voti favorevoli, diciotto contrari ed altrettante astensioni.

Parlando prima del voto l'ambasciatore sovietico all'Onu, Oleg Troyanovski, ha definito la risoluzione «una interferenza inammissibile nelle questioni interne dell'Afghanistan ed una smaccata violazione della carta delle Nazioni Unite».

'78

(P.N. H. Gub)

VJA 2112 *whak. dlihi* / 213 *itni*

Jun. 1053 ~

100 *itni*

Jan. 707 ~

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NUOVA YORK — Il recentissimo varo di un nuovo sommergibile nucleare lanciamissili nei cantieri sovietici di Archangel, nel Mar Bianco, ha accentuato la dichiarata preoccupazione degli esperti navali americani e della NATO per la crescente espansione della potenza marittima dell'URSS, scrive l'esperto militare del *New York Times* Drew Middleton citando alte fonti dell'Alleanza Atlantica.

L'aggiunta del nuovo sommergibile (che stazza 30000 tonnellate, è in grado di lanciare 20 missili balistici nucleari SS-N-18 fino a 5200 miglia nautiche, e cui gli esperti occidentali hanno attribuito il no-

nel mondo dalla fine del secondo conflitto.

Il varo del «Tifone», che dopo essere stato fotografato da satelliti americani ha visto ufficialmente confermata la sua esistenza quattro giorni fa dal segretario generale della NATO Joseph Luns, ha accentuato la preoccupazione degli esperti navali atlantici, sempre più convinti — rileva l'esperto del *New York Times* — che per controbilanciare questa continua e crescente espansione della flotta sovietica i paesi della NATO dovrebbero ampliare le rispettive flotte per essere soprattutto in grado di proteggere le vie marittime, in particolare quella

EMAIN - ON EN PARLE

*Je ne suis pas sûr
L'histoire*

Michel Okschew 12 sept 80

Du sang et des jeux

PAR ANDRÉ GLUCKSMANN

Si les troupes américaines avaient tué soixante-cinq étudiants manifestant à Saïgon voilà dix ans, on en parlerait encore. L'armée Rouge l'a fait voilà dix jours, à Kaboul; le monde reste silencieux.

Des Afghans résistent, calloux et vieilles pétoires aidant, dans une solitude qu'aucun combattant de la liberté n'eut à affronter depuis le ghetto de Varsovie. Visages de femmes phosphorises, toute la population mâle de Kerala, enfants, adultes, vieillards exécutés par représailles... Et toujours cet obscur silence. Au regard de ces nouveaux Oradour, les années 80 s'annoncent dures et peu favorables aux autriches. Contrairement aux gros titres, le sort du monde se joue bien moins à Téhéran autour de cinquante otages malheureux qu'à Kaboul avec dix-sept millions d'Afghans écrasés par

la première armée du monde. On n'y risquons pas seulement la paix, pas simplement le prestige de cette âme que certains ont inventé à Varsovie et que nous pensâmes sauver et contre les « B 52 ». Juste notre olympienne, olympienne mitieuse indifférence ? Dans une mare de sang, le langage des I.O. est plus nécessaire, même s'il est

Conférence-débat, avec le soutien de Mike Barry, et le retour d'Afghanistan avec Victor Fainberg, Leonid Pliouchtch, Emr Ladurie, Bernard-Henry Parmelin, Jean-Christophe S.G.E.N., le Cobom (boycottage)... Mutualité,credi 14 mai à 20 he

depuis que les Cubains désertent leur révolution par milliers, pour ral-

plus répandue
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Special drawing rights

Fewer eggs to market

2/11/80

In the most significant fillip to date to the commercial use of special drawing rights (SDRs), the IMF has decided to take 11 eggs out of its 16-currency SDR basket. From January 1, 1981, SDRs will be valued with a 42% weighting for the dollar (compared with its 30.4% at the end of August), 19% for the D-mark (13.5%), 13% for sterling (9.1%), 13% for the French franc (7.6%) and 13% for the Japanese yen (7.3%). The more exotic components of SDR, eg, the Norwegian krone and the Iranian rial, will be ditched.

The slimmed-down SDR will have several advantages. It will be easier for both borrowers and investors to understand, simpler for commercial banks to handle in calculating interest rates, and easier for them to cover in the forward exchange markets. One disadvantage: it will not provide such a wide hedge against currency movements. But the total return (interest and foreign exchange gain or loss) on the 16-currency SDR over the past two and a half years has varied only slightly from what the return would have been over the same period for the new five-currency SDR at today's exchange rates (39.7% as against 37.7%).

Les difficultés économiques de l'U.R.S.S.

Le bilan économique de l'U.R.S.S. pour l'année écoulée, publié le vendredi 25 janvier par l'Office central de statistiques, confirme que l'économie soviétique traverse une crise de langueur. Contrairement aux prévisions et aux espoirs des autorités, 1979 n'a pas été l'année du redressement après deux exercices médiocres : les tendances négatives se sont poursuivies, et parfois même aggravées.

Le revenu national n'a augmenté que de 2 %, contre 4,3 % prévus par le plan annuel ; la croissance de la production industrielle est également en retard sur les objectifs : 3,4 % contre un objectif de 5,7 % ; la production agricole a diminué de 4 %, en grande partie pour des raisons climatiques. La récolte de céréales, avec 179 millions de tonnes, est inférieure de 40 millions de tonnes à l'objectif annuel. Certes, la récolte moyenne de ce quinquennat, avec 209 millions de tonnes, est supérieure de 27 millions au résultat du quinquennat précédent ; mais l'approvisionnement de la population en produits alimentaires va s'aggraver, d'autant plus que la situation est également mauvaise pour la viande et les produits laitiers.

Les maux dont souffre le système sont bien connus, et ils ont été souvent dénoncés par les responsables : faible productivité du travail, dispersion et mauvais rendement des investissements, retard dans les constructions d'ensembles industriels désorganisation des transports (notamment ferroviaires), gaspillages, irresponsabilité et corruption, etc. Mais les dirigeants soviétiques ne paraissent pas en mesure d'y porter remède, soit par manque d'imagination — les solutions proposées font souvent appel aux vieilles recettes du renforcement de la discipline et du travail idéologique, — soit par incapacité à faire appliquer les réformes décidées. Le discours de M. Brejnev prononcé en novembre dernier devant le comité central est, de ce point de vue, un document de base puisqu'il énumère toutes les résolutions du comité central restées lettre morte...

La productivité du travail demeure l'un des principaux goulets d'étranglement ; dans l'industrie, elle n'a progressé que de 2,4 % contre un objectif annuel de 4,7 % ; dans l'agriculture et les transports, elle est même en baisse. Les rémunérations moyennes des ouvriers et des employés ont augmenté de 2,2 % pour atteindre 163,5 roubles par mois, soit un peu plus de 1 000 francs français, et la construction de logements est en baisse de 4 %, alors que la crise est loin d'être résorbée, surtout dans les grandes villes. Non seulement le plan n'a pas été accompli dans de nombreux secteurs-clés, mais la production a même diminué en valeur absolue en ce qui concerne le charbon, la métallurgie, l'industrie du bois et du papier, l'industrie des métaux de construction.

On voit mal, en l'état actuel des choses, comment l'équipe dirigeante pourrait redresser la barre : plus encore qu'avant, les dépenses militaires vont avoir la priorité, non seulement à cause de l'invasion de l'Afghanistan — une opération qui est à la mesure des moyens financiers de l'U.R.S.S., — mais surtout à cause de la probable reprise de la course aux armements les plus coûteux si l'accord SALT 2 n'est pas ratifié et si cette course s'étend aux engins eurostratégiques. Les sanctions économiques et commerciales décrétées par les Etats-Unis vont également accentuer à moyen terme les difficultés alimentaires d'un pays où, certes, on ne meurt pas de faim, mais où la nourriture pose un problème quotidien.

L'arrêt possible, enfin, des apports de technologie occidentale n'aidera pas non plus Moscou à éviter une dégradation de la situation actuelle, même s'il est vrai que l'on a beaucoup exagéré les capacités de l'U.R.S.S. à « digérer » et à profiter de ces « greffes ».

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Non si vive di sola Coca-Cola

colloquio con FELIX ROHATYN

L'economista che ha salvato New York dalla bancarotta critica pesantemente la politica economica degli Usa: troppe risorse bruciate per il petrolio, scelte miopi che stroncano l'apparato industriale. E così...

New York. « Gli Stati Uniti devono cambiare radicalmente la propria politica economica. Altrimenti, il pauroso declino degli ultimi venti anni continuerà a precipizio. Fra il 1945 e il 1960 nessuno dubitava che gli Stati Uniti fossero la nazione-guida del mondo industriale, militare, economico e spirituale. Ma nessuna nazione al mondo ha mai dissipato la propria egemonia con tanta rapidità e quasi con un segreto piacere ». Felix Rohatyn, l'economista che ha salvato la città di New York dalla bancarotta con un piano che potrebbe portare alla rinascita della città, sa di dire cose molto scomode. Sa di essere considerato una Cassandra, un inascoltato profeta di sventure. Negli anni '60 era un "fusionista d'assalto", uno dei più geniali maestri nell'arte di creare e far crescere le conglomerates che tanto hanno contribuito al boom di quel periodo. Ma in questi vent'anni la situazione è radicalmente cambiata. « Interi settori industriali sono scomparsi », spiega Rohatyn: « scarpe, apparecchi radio, televisori. Altri, strategicamente essenziali (come l'acciaio, i mezzi di trasporto pubblico, l'auto) corrono il rischio di far presto la stessa fine ».

E, parlando di questi argomenti, Rohatyn si accalora, cominciando a passeggiare su e giù per il suo ufficio al trentaduesimo piano del Rockefeller Center. « E' una tendenza inammissibile. Continuando di questo passo, gli Stati Uniti finiranno col produrre soltanto calcolatori e Coca-Cola. Si sta sperperando tutto il resto. Pensiamo al petrolio: continuiamo a spendere più di 100 miliardi di dollari l'anno per importare petrolio. Una cifra enorme; tutte le compagnie quotate alla Borsa

di Nuova York hanno, insieme, un valore di 900 miliardi. E' pensabile di liquidare in meno di un decennio sull'altare del petrolio una ricchezza costata due secoli di sacrifici e di lavoro? ».

Per Rohatyn l'alto livello di disoccupazione e la forte inflazione croniche, nonché il pauroso calo del dollaro sono già i frutti percepibili del declino in atto. La redistribuzione della ricchezza causata dalla crisi energetica impone misure radicali.

Ma quali? Rohatyn, benché nato in Austria nel 1928 ed emigrato negli Stati Uniti soltanto alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, si rifà alla migliore tradizione del New Deal. I capisaldi di qualsiasi politica industriale devono essere: 1. Una commissio-

Gianni Agnelli con Felix Rohatyn

ne economica temporanea che pensi strategicamente e faccia dei piani per i prossimi due decenni; 2. Una banca per lo sviluppo e la ricostruzione; 3. Un patto sociale che leghi datori di lavoro, lavoratori e governo. Ma la prima misura deve essere la riduzione con qualsiasi mezzo delle importazioni di grezzo. La formula preferita da Rohatyn è una tassa di mezzo dollaro a barile di grezzo. I 15 miliardi di dollari di gettito fornirebbero almeno una parte del capitale per la banca.

« Quelli che da tanti anni parlano di civiltà post industriale non sanno quel che dicono », afferma Rohatyn.

Quanto del petrolio?



« Che senso ha parlare di economia dei servizi quando non c'è più industria a cui fornire i servizi? Si fa oggi un gran parlare se dare la priorità a incoraggiare i vincenti (incanalare cioè le risorse verso i settori a tecnologia avanzata che promettono di crescere più rapidamente) oppure se cercare di salvare i perdenti. Non sono un fautore dell'una o dell'altra alternativa. La mia formula è: trasformare i perdenti in vincenti ».

Invece di teorizzare, insomma, Rohatyn preferisce parlare di problemi concreti: « Una politica di reindustrializzazione a mio parere dovrebbe pun-

tare su pochi settori-chiave. E, sulla base di quel che so, i due settori in America che dovrebbero avere la assoluta priorità sono: acciaio e auto. Prendiamo l'auto. E' insensato dire che il miglior modo di salvare l'industria automobilistica è di ridurre le imposte, perché le compagnie che sono in difficoltà non pagano tasse. Ma il modo di curare una compagnia come la Chrysler non è neppure darle tutti i crediti che ha ottenuto e lasciarla libera di continuare sulla sua strada verso la rovina. Se a fare il negoziato fosse stata una banca di sviluppo e ricostruzione indipendente, invece di una commissione del Senato, sarebbe stato possibile esigere dai manager della Chrysler di studiare e mettere in atto programmi di coproduzione o comunque collaborazione con la Volkswagen, oppure di impegnarsi in parte nei settori dei trasporti pubblici. Ai sindacati avrebbe dovuto essere imposto il congelamento dei salari. In un piano più vasto per tutto il settore automobilistico, io vedo, in cambio di precisi impegni di riorganizzazione da mettere in atto entro tre,

quattro o cinque anni, l'utilità di quote o barriere doganali ben limitate nel tempo. Ha ragione il sindacato dell'auto quando dice che un piano serio di ristrutturazione richiede la sospensione dell'offensiva espansionistica della concorrenza straniera ».

Chiediamo a Rohatyn se la politica non assomigli molto a quella impiegata in Gran Bretagna e in Italia con risultati così poco soddisfacenti, che qualcuno a Washington chiama "lemon socialism", socializzazione delle imprese perdenti...

« Tutto dipende dalla


struttura che si dà agli organismi di intervento e del clima politico prevalente. E' estremamente difficile trasformare imprese malate in imprese sane e concorrenziali quando l'incarico è affidato ad enti governativi di un governo laborista o, comunque sia, a un governo soggetto alle continue pressioni dei sindacati e quando i sindacati sono decisi ad avversare le riforme passo dopo passo. Però », continua l'economista, « il successo avuto nel risanamento finanziario di New York indica che è possibile mettere in atto una politica di riorganizzazione anche laddove ci sono sindacati potentissimi ».

Coloro che negli ultimi cinque anni hanno avuto a che fare col piano di salvataggio di New York, dicono che il fattore determinante in quell'operazione è stata l'indipendenza assoluta di Rohatyn, come capo dello Emergency Financial Control Board...

« Poiché non ho mai smesso di lavorare qui alla Lazard Frères e dalla città come dallo Stato di New York non ho mai accettato neppure il rimborso di un biglietto dell'autobus, ai sindacalisti come alle banche, al sindaco come al governatore potevo dire in qualsiasi momento che se non era possibile trovare un accordo, io ero l'unico a beneficiarne, perché avrei riavuto un po' di tempo libero ».

Secondo Rohatyn, la Germania, la Francia o il Giappone oggi appaiono paesi ben governati perché hanno saputo fare scelte dolorose, soprattutto nel campo energetico, e le hanno applicate con coerenza ed impegno. I francesi, per esempio, hanno portato la benzina a circa tre dollari il gallone e poi hanno investito metà di quel prezzo nello sviluppo dell'energia atomica, mentre la Germania ha puntato sul carbone... « L'importante », aggiunge Rohatyn, « è che abbiano scelto tempestivamente una fonte di energia alternativa. Negli Stati Uniti si comincia a parlare ora dei carburanti sintetici che non diverranno realtà per almeno un altro decennio. Gli Stati Uniti danno l'impressione di una nazione non solo senza pilota, ma addirittura senza timone. Eppure, probabilmente, dovrà arrivare qualche nuovo disastro, come un nuovo embargo petrolifero, un colpo di Stato in Arabia Saudita, il panico che travolge il dollaro e lo rende inutilizzabile, prima che la nazione si svegli. Questo paese è troppo abituato a credere nella sua onnipotenza ».

MAURO CALAMANDREI



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DA ZUCCONI: CORSERA/MOSCA
PER ALBERTO RONCHEY: CORSERA/ ROMA

(DA TRASMETTERE ALLA RED.ROMANA)

CARO ALBERTO,

IL PROBLEMA E' PROPRIO QUESTO: 15 O 14? NON E'
UNA QUESTIONE DI ARITMETICA ELEMENTARE, MA DI SAPERE SE, COME
DICONO I SOVIETICI UFFICIALI, KOSSIGHIN E' ANCORA MEMBRO
(DIMISSIONARIO) DEL POLITBURO, O SE INVECE, COME INDICANO
TUTTI I SEGNI ESTERIORI, NON LO E' PIU'. DI CERTO SI PUO' DIRE
CHE LA NOTIZIA DELL'ACCETTAZIONE DELLE DIMISSIONI DA PARTE
DELL'ORGANO COMPETENTE, IL CC, NON E' MAI STATA DATA. DA QUI
NASCONO ANCHE LE INTERPRETAZIONI CHE VOGLIONO KOSSIGHIN IN
DIGRAZIA E TENUTO DENTRO MAGARI FINO AL CONGRESSO, CHE E'
SEMPRE PRECEDUTO DA UN CC, PER USARLO COME CAPRO ESPIATORIO
DI UNA IMMACABILE DENUNCIA DELLE DIFFICOLTA' ECONOMICHE. E SOLO

IN

QUELLA OCCASIONE DIMISSIONATO. AL «PLERUM» DEL 22 OTTOBRE
SCORSO, TRA I MOVIMENTI DI VERTICE FU ANNUNCIATO L'INGRESSO
DI GORBACHEV E NON L'USCITA DI KOSSIGHIN. SOLO IL GIORNO DOPO, AL SO
VIET, BREZNEV DISSE CHE EGLI AVEVA CHIESTO LE DIMISSIONI DAL
POLITBURO E DALLA PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO, FACENDO APPROVARE
QUESTE ULTIME E LA SOSTITUZIONE CON TIMONOV DA SOVIET, MA NON DICENDO
NULLA SULLA PRIME. ANCORA MOLTI CARI SALUTI, TUO

VITTORIO ZUCCONI

MSK 16 NOV 82

BUON GIORNO. HO UNA NOTA PER LA REDAZIONE ROMANA OK?RRRR

OK

DA ZUCCONI/CORSERA MOSCA
PER ALBERTO RONCHEY / CORSERA ROMA

14 NOV 1980

CARISSIMO ALBERTO,

HO SAPUTO DAL DIRETTORE CHE STAI CERCANDO DI

APPUNTO IL NUMERO DEI MEMBRI DEL POLITBURO. TI DO QUINDI LA
LISTA COMPLETA:

BREZNEV, ANDROPOV, GORBACHEV, GRISHIN, GROMYKO, KIRILENKO, KOSSIGHIN,
KUNAIEV, PELSHE, ROMANOV, SUSLOV, TIKHONOV, USTINOV, CERNENKO, SHERBITSKY.

SONO DUNQUE 15, ELENCATI SECONDO L'ORDINE UFFICIALE IN USO ORA
(BREZNEV IN TESTA, GLI ALTRI IN ORDINE ALFABETICO RUSSO CHE QUINDI
METTE CERNENKO E SHERBITSKY IN FONDO). CON KOSSIGHIN DIMISSIONA
RIO, MA NON ANCORA DIMISSIONATO, E IL GIOVANE GORBACHEV ELEVATO
ALLA FULL MEMBERSHIP DAL PLENUM DI FINE OTTOBRE, CHE AVRAI
VISTO NELLE NOSTRE CORRISPONDENZE.

HO NOTATO POI CHE IN UN TUO RECENTE FONDO HAI PARLATO DEL SALARIO
MEDIO IN URSS GRADUCENDO LA PARTITA' DEL RUBLO UFFICIALE. QUALCUNO
DEVE AVERTI DATO UN'INFORMAZIONE INCORRETTA AL PROPOSITO: IL
RUBLO VALE (.....) OGGI SECONDO LE TABELLE DELLA VNESHTORGBANK
1.333 LIRE RPT 1.333 LIRE. INOLTRE, IL SALARIO MEDIO UFFICIALE
A PARTIRE DAL 1 GENNAIO S'ARA' CONVENZIONALMENTE FISSATO
IN 170 RUBLI.

SE IN FUTURO TI CAPITERA' DI AVERE BISOGNO DI QUALCHE DETTAGLIO
DI QUESTO TIPO, NON ESITARE A FARMI UNA NOTA. SAI CHE SONO LIETO
DI AIUTARTI, SE E COME POSSO. UN CARO SALUTO, TUO

VITTORIO ZUCCONI

END

Congress allowed a two-year grace period so exports could continue to nations that did not meet the safeguards requirement. That period expired on March 10. However, in

proliferation policy. What is Mr. Carter waiting for — another Indian bomb?

THE WASHINGTON POST.

credibility

Facing Up to a Gasoline Tax

*address under a credit of exp. which
has been used. After that, no
bet. before*

In a shortsighted effort to save his beleaguered oil import fee, the president has linked the fee to a balanced budget. Reducing oil imports and balancing the budget are vital national goals, but if either is to succeed, they must be individually designed and kept completely separate.

The confusion arises from the structure of the fee itself, ambiguous from the start. If its purpose was to lower gasoline use substantially, and also to reduce the country's dependence on foreign oil and the resulting dollar drain, the proposed 10-cent-a-gallon fee was much too small. At a minimum, a 50-cent fee — as candidate John Anderson has proposed — is needed. [Mr. Carter proposed a 50-cent fee in 1977, but it was killed by the House Ways and Means Committee.] To contribute to deeper changes in automobile use and adjustments in the large portions of the economy that are tied to the auto, the fee should quickly rise to the levels found in all other industrialized nations: between \$1 and \$2 a gallon. But if the fee was designed to raise revenue and help balance the budget, it was much too big.

With the import fee now tied up in court and with large majorities of both houses of Congress strongly opposed to it, what options are left for the president? The bold move would be to withdraw the import fee and end the complex but irrelevant arguments over whether it is or isn't a violation of the Trade Expansion Act. The president could then send to Congress a 50-cent, fully rebatable, gasoline tax proposal and explain to the country that this is what the national security demands.

The need for the United States to lower its

oil imports — not because there isn't enough oil right now, but in order to avert further OPEC price increases by creating a buyers' market — is now beyond dispute. Nor should it be arguable that gasoline use is the largest available pool of conservable oil. Automobiles and light trucks consume an amount of gasoline equal to more than 80 percent of oil imports. Recent experience has demonstrated, furthermore, that gasoline price increases cause much larger decreases in gasoline use than economists have confidently predicted.

The key to making a gasoline tax politically acceptable is that it must be simply and fully rebated. If it is not, Congress will get embroiled in an endless debate over which interests get what proportion of its revenues. Some interests will win, more will lose, and the proposal will finally be defeated. More important, a direct rebate to all adults should be not just acceptable — but even attractive — to a majority of Americans who will be able to use it as they individually choose: either to pay for more gasoline or as a source of additional income.

The president and his administration seem to have understood the need to lower imports and gasoline use long ago. Where they have erred is in not making that need clear to the American public. Knowing Congress' resistance to the idea, the administration has tried to finesse each proposal to lower imports — this time hoping that Congress couldn't resist the \$10 billion bonus to help balance the budget. This approach has not worked — and will not work. The gasoline tax needs to be faced head-on.

THE WASHINGTON POST.

*Coro dell'uni
per.*

biologia che può formarsi una certa idea dell'uomo. È invece a partire da una certa idea dell'uomo che si può utilizzare la biologia al suo servizio. Da sola, la biologia non può far nulla. Da sola, non risolverà alcuno dei problemi con i quali si confronta la nostra società. Se può avere un ruolo, se può portare un contributo alla ricerca di certe soluzioni, è in funzione di una volontà politica. Ed è anche in funzione di un consenso sociale. »

m. m.

S. NORA, A. MINC, *L'informatisation de la société*, Ed. du Seuil, 1978 (trad. it. *Convivere con il calcolatore*, Bompiani, 1979); Commissione delle Comunità europee, *La società europea di fronte alle nuove tecnologie dell'informazione. Una risposta comunitaria*, Bruxelles, 1979.

Il primo di questi due rapporti è stato redatto su invito del presidente della repubblica francese e costituisce il primo studio sistematico sul problema dell'informatica e delle sue conseguenze economiche e sociali.

I progressi spettacolari dell'informatica in questi ultimi anni sono stati resi possibili da una eccezionale riduzione dei costi. « Se il prezzo delle automobili avesse conosciuto una simile evoluzione, la più lussuosa delle Rolls-Royce costerebbe oggi un franco. Le conseguenze di questo cambiamento sono dello stesso ordine di grandezza. È stata resa possibile la produzione di calcolatori di piccole dimensioni, potenti e poco costosi, che sono ormai alla portata anche dell'operatore economico medio piccolo. D'altra parte tale evoluzione dei componenti ha portato a una riduzione del costo delle unità centrali degli elaboratori tradizionali tale che la loro produzione costa oggi mille volte meno di dieci anni fa » (p. 34).

Grazie a questi risultati, diventa ora possibile l'impiego di processi automatizzati praticamente in ogni settore e in ogni attività umana. L'intero settore dei servizi può venire rivoluzionato dai nuovi processi. Le banche, le assicurazioni, i servizi postali, i telefoni e il lavoro d'ufficio in generale sono tutti interessati alle nuove tecnologie dell'informazione. Ad esempio, « lo sviluppo sempre più rapido della telecopiatura e della stampa a distanza, prevedibile ormai a breve scadenza, e l'avvento a più lungo termine dell'edizione dei giornali a domicilio rappresentano altrettante cause di diminuzione dell'attività postale. In un primo periodo le poste vedranno contrarsi il traffico interno delle amministrazioni e delle aziende che rappresenta oggi il 60% della cor-

Washington déme

Crise transatlantique

S'il n'est pas exagéré de qualifier de « crise » l'état présent des relations transatlantiques, on aurait tort d'y voir un phénomène nouveau. Les diverses et récentes crises internationales n'ont fait que raviver un malaise latent depuis les origines, aggravé progressivement ces dernières années par les changements survenus sur la scène mondiale.

Le pacte atlantique avait été fondé, il y a plus de trente ans, sur la constatation d'une situation de fait — la supériorité écrasante des Etats-Unis dans un monde qui venait de se diviser en deux blocs — et dans un but élémentaire : empêcher une attaque frontale de l'U.R.S.S. contre l'Europe occidentale. Les relations à l'intérieur de cette alliance restaient profondément déséquilibrées, mais l'Europe, en échange de la protection offerte, n'avait guère d'autre ressource que d'accepter les faits accomplis — généralement militaires — imposés par les Américains : facilement en Corée, plus difficilement au Vietnam, cette dernière guerre étant un argument de plus pour le général de Gaulle pour prendre ses distances par rapport à l'Organisation atlantique.

L'affaiblissement des positions américaines a modifié profondément ce paysage. : sur le plan économique, le renouveau européen, contrastant avec la faiblesse du dollar et la baisse de productivité aux Etats-Unis, a conduit à un accroissement du poids politique du Vieux Continent et à la diversification de ses intérêts dans un monde devenu multipolaire. Sur le plan militaire, le renforcement de la puissance soviétique dissuade de plus en plus les Etats-Unis de réagir avec autant de force que par le passé, même là où leurs intérêts sont directement menacés. Washington a jusqu'à présent remplacé la diplomatie de la canonnière d'autrefois par les sanctions économiques et diplomatiques, mais cette approche ne peut avoir quelque efficacité que si d'autres pays s'y rallient. Le paradoxe actuel est que l'Amérique a davantage besoin de ses alliés à un moment où ceux-ci ont toutes raisons de trouver sa politique moins « crédible ».

Ainsi, les gouvernements européens, à commencer par celui de Paris, auraient très probablement fermé les yeux, au début de l'affaire, devant une action de force entreprise unilatéralement par les Américains pour récupérer leurs otages de Téhéran. Cette action n'ayant pas eu lieu, leurs alliés se voient présenter de façon de plus en plus péremptoire des demandes de sanctions à l'efficacité desquelles ils ne croient guère et qui en outre lésent leurs intérêts. Face à leurs réticences, M. Carter est allé jusqu'à s'adresser directement aux opinions publiques par-dessus la tête des gouvernements européens, qui, de surcroît, se voient imputer indirectement la responsabilité d'une éventuelle intervention militaire américaine ! Mais il est douteux que l'Européen moyen, malgré la sympathie légitime qu'il éprouve pour le sort des otages américains, soit prêt à se montrer « plus Américain que l'Américain moyen », ni même autant que lui.

La crise afghane a démontré un phénomène analogue : les Européens s'étaient habitués à faire reposer leur sécurité sur une combinaison de défense dissuasive — essentiellement américaine — et de détente politique — largement nationale. Ils s'inquiètent à l'idée de voir ce second élément en danger, alors que les Américains recherchent précisément leur appui pour « punir » Moscou par des moyens non militaires. Les bruyantes protestations de solidarité pro-américaines entendues dans les capitales les plus fidèles, comme Londres et Bonn, peuvent contraster avec les arguties politico-juridiques avancées à Paris. Mais elles ne sauraient remplacer, elles non plus, les actions décisives demandées par Washington ni éclipser ce problème fondamental : l'édifice atlantique fondé pour remédier aux tensions de l'après-guerre résiste mal aux tensions des années 80.

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Syngma, K.E.

RUSSIA IN THE 1980s

The giant grows sluggish

Under the tried and tested leadership of the Communist party, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet people have built socialism. Under the leadership of the party, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet people will build communism. The party solemnly proclaims: the present generation of Soviet people shall live in communism.

The 1961 programme of the Soviet Communist party, from which that paragraph comes, laid down a precise timetable. The 1970s were to be the time when the basis of communism was created, with plenty of material and cultural spin-off for the population at large. The 1980s were to witness the Soviet Union's transition to full communism.

But the timetable has gone wrong. The 1970s have failed to deliver a socialist cornucopia to the Soviet Union, and the 1980s look uncomfortably like being a period of growing stress for the Soviet economy and Soviet society. The utopian vision of full communism in the 1980s, it should be no surprise, is not much mentioned by Soviet leaders these days.

No recipes for change

After several decades of diminishingly rapid growth, Soviet industry is now running into serious difficulties. Rising raw material costs, impending energy shortages, slower growth in the supply of labour and capital and sluggish productivity are all pointers to a limping industry in the 1980s.

The agricultural outlook is equally bleak. More than 340 billion roubles (over \$500 billion) have been pumped into Soviet agriculture in the past 15 years, yet Russia still has to import grain. In the past 15 years these imports have cost about \$15 billion—very close to the estimated figure for Russia's entire hard-currency debt. After this year's disappointing 179m-tonne grain harvest, Russia is expected to import nearly 30m tonnes of grain from the west.

Even by its own standards of measurement, the Soviet Union's economy will probably have grown by less than 2% in 1979, the lowest peacetime rate since the

1930s. And in the 1980s it faces a major problem—as do other communist countries—in trying to meet the pervasive need for change. Its system may simply be too rigid for modern economic conditions.

Take the problem of technical modernisation, which absorbs so much of the attention of Soviet leaders. Stalin tackled the problem in the early 1930s by taking over the technology western Europe and North America had used in the late 1920s.

A large stock of industrial investment embodying that technology was built up. Managers and workers were trained to operate it. The purpose was to churn out, under centralised direction and by known methods, the largest possible quantities of high-priority goods. For a time, it worked. But now the system has got stuck in a rut.


Change is needed for several reasons. The increase in the number of units of production, and the broadening of the range of products, have made planning and control less effective. More important, Russia now needs a second industrial revolution of the kind western Europe, North America and Japan have undertaken since 1945. Although official policy in the Soviet Union favours industrial innovation, in practice the system protects the status quo. It has always been the proud claim of Soviet leaders that socialism helps modernisation while capitalism represses it. Experience suggests the opposite.

The Soviet Union employs some 3.5m scientists and technicians in research and development. The R&D sector claimed about 20 billion roubles in 1977, some 4% of the Soviet gnp, far more than most non-communist countries' spending. Yet Russia is well behind in putting its ideas into practice. In the grey language of figures, the United States and West Germany put more than 50% of their inventions into practice within a year or so, whereas Russia takes more than three years to get that far. The difference takes its toll.

Some of the blame lies with red tape. But the main reason is that nobody has a direct interest in bringing about change. Soviet scientists who work in specialised institutes far from the factories get paid, and new contracts for R&D work keep on arriving, whether their inventions are put into production or not. Even when Soviet managers are willing to innovate, they rarely have the time, the energy or the facilities to enable them to think about improving their products. The planners are always urging them to throw all their reserves into the battle for plan-fulfilment.

Who needs innovation?

Since most incentives are designed to encourage current production, managers have little reason to replace their obsolescent machines with modern ones. In a survey of Soviet machine-tool factories, it emerged that 80% of all decisions to



replace equipment were taken because the machine was physically worn out and only a seventh because it was obsolete. Replacement investment in Russia amounts to less than 30% of total investment; in the United States it runs at twice that rate.

The penalty for hanging on to assets until they are worn out comes in the form of huge repair bills. Capital repairs in Soviet industry add up to about a quarter of all gross investment and occupy a tenth of the entire industrial workforce. Since spare parts are hard to come by, most buyers of capital equipment have to maintain their own repair shops. But the



A low-productivity sector

cost per spare part produced in such shops is thought to be three to five times that in plants specialising in spare parts.

Wanted: more Russians

Until recently, Russia had enough men and resources to achieve its planned growth, however wastefully. No longer. Labour is becoming scarce and will get scarcer still in the 1980s. The population of the Soviet Union as a whole is expected to grow at just under 1% a year, but growth in the number of people of working age (16-60 for men and 16-55 for women) will be only 0.3-0.4% a year between 1980 and 1995.

The birth-rate in the European part of the Soviet Union is lower than average, so the growth in the labour force will be in Soviet central Asia, where the bulk of the Moslem population lives—still a predominantly farming area. There is no question of shifting large numbers of these non-Russians to European Russia or Siberia to supplement the labour force there. (Instead, the government is trying to persuade pensioners to come out of retirement and go back to work.) This matters, because much of the Soviet Union's huge mineral wealth is where the surplus labour is not. It is becoming harder to get at and therefore more expensive to exploit.

So far, the Soviet Union's oil production has rested on hardy pioneers, as in the Tyumen area in western Siberia. Oil was discovered in that remote, cold, desolate region in 1959. Production began in 1964, at the rate of 4,000 barrels a day. By 1977 production was above 4m b/d, mosquitoes, swamps and permafrost notwithstanding.

The development of gas fields has been equally rapid. The technique used—pioneered under Stalin—was that of "storming" (*shturnovshchina*): pouring men and resources into the priority sector of

the day at the expense of other sectors. Russia owes many of its past successes—in rocketry and military hardware—to storming. The current beneficiary is the Baykal-Amur railway in the Soviet far east, which has been dubbed "the project of the century".

But storming has its drawbacks. The concentration on short-term success means that longer-term aspects, such as depletion policy, are ignored. The raw materials come free, so Soviet mine operators or oilmen have little incentive to extract the last drop or morsel and avoid waste.

For oil, the emphasis has therefore been on development rather than exploration, so that new discoveries have not been keeping pace with the growth in output. And the methods of exploitation, designed to maximise output quickly, ensure that less of the oil is ultimately recovered. This spells trouble in the 1980s.

Look east for oil

Russia has vast potential oil reserves in the Arctic, in eastern Siberia and offshore, but the exploitation of these is at least a decade away. Most of the oil for the 1980s will have to come from existing fields and from new fields in areas already under production. Since output from the western Soviet Union is declining, and becoming steadily more expensive, any future growth in production must come from western Siberia. Since 1975 more than a half of west Siberian oil has come from the giant Samotlor field. Nothing else of comparable size has yet been found.


Moreover, the Soviet oil industry does not have enough drilling capacity to develop existing fields and explore for new areas at the same time. As resources become depleted, more and more rigs have had to be allocated to drilling new

wells in existing oil fields.

Exports of energy, especially of oil and oil products, are vital to the Soviet foreign trade balance. In 1973, oil and oil products provided 24% of Soviet hard-currency earnings. By 1977 this share had risen to more than half. Gas exports are growing, but in 1977 still accounted for only 6% of all energy-based hard-currency earnings.

The growth in oil production has already slowed down. The target for 1979 is unlikely to be reached and the 1980 one has been scaled down to 12.1m b/d from the original 12.7m. If by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union does find itself obliged to import oil from Opec countries to keep its Comecon allies supplied—as the CIA predicts—it might face a huge oil import bill estimated (at 1977 prices) at anything from \$18 billion to \$24 billion. Even if Russia charged the east Europeans a good deal more for their oil, and boosted its gas and machinery exports to the west, it would still be landed with a large trade gap. Oil may face the Soviet leaders with a choice between economic and political stability in eastern Europe and Russia's continued ability to import western grain and western technology.

The 1980s would be easier to face if Russia could break out of the system bequeathed to it by Stalin; and indeed Russia under Mr Brezhnev has launched a series of "reforms" in the past 15 years to get more out of Russia's natural resources and industry and its 135m work-



EUROPE



Nine years was enough for Lynch

There'll be some changes made now Jack Lynch has gone

FROM OUR DUBLIN CORRESPONDENT

The possibility of a hardening of the Irish government's attitude on the northern question was one of the unhappy prospects opened up by Mr Jack Lynch's resignation on Wednesday. However, it was the timing rather than the fact of his resignation, both as prime minister and as leader of the Fianna Fail party, which threw Dublin politics into turmoil that day. He had been expected to wait at least until January, after the end of Ireland's six-month EEC presidency, although the contest over the succession to him was already starting to shift into top gear.

What forced him out was loss of nerve rather than loss of support. There was no need for him to resign. Although his party's "republican" hawks had been trying for months to undermine him, he would have had two thirds of his Dail deputies behind him if he had firmly

decided to keep going. But at the age of 62, after holding the office of prime minister for nine of the past 13 turbulent years, with the republic's economy worsening and the Northern Ireland problem unresolved (see page 18), he was unwilling to struggle on with an increasingly divided party and an unpromising future.

He had been bitterly disappointed by Fianna Fail's disastrous decline in popularity since the June, 1977, election which restored it to office with 84 Dail seats, providing a record 20-seat overall majority. The party suffered heavy losses in last June's local and European elections. Last month it was ignominiously defeated in two by-elections in Cork, Mr Lynch's own bailiwick.

The Fianna Fail parliamentary members were due to elect a new leader at a meeting on Friday. The two front runners were Mr George Colley, the deputy

prime minister and minister for finance, and Mr Charles Haughey, the minister for health and social welfare. These two men had already been declared rivals for the leadership as long ago as 1966. Mr Lynch then came forward as a compromise candidate and beat them both.

Mr Colley was Mr Lynch's own favourite as successor, but he has lost much popularity this year because of his mishandling of the successive protests about taxation that came first from the farmers and then, when they had been appeased, from the wage-earners who resented the way the farmers—the main beneficiaries of Ireland's EEC membership—were being let off lightly.

Mr Haughey's camp was claiming before Friday's meeting, to have the vote "all sewn up". He is regarded as the party's leading "republican" sympathiser; that is to say, the least concerned about the northern Protestants' antagonism to the idea of Irish unification. In 1970 Mr Lynch sacked Mr Haughey from his cabinet when he was suspected of being involved in a conspiracy to smuggle arms. But he has held office as a minister again since 1977 and he enjoys support in business circles. Many people in the republic might be prepared to accept the risks that his Northern Ireland policies may involve if they think he will be able to improve their living standards.

Mr Michael O'Kennedy, the minister for foreign affairs, and Mr Des O'Malley, the minister for industry and commerce, were also expected to throw their hats into the ring. At his final press conference, Mr Lynch said he did not expect any change in Fianna Fail policies in regard to either Northern Ireland or the economy. Mr Lynch has often proved a shrewd political prophet; but this particular prediction is most unlikely to be fulfilled.

Russia

Five-year creak

This year will go down as the year of Russia's worst peacetime economic performance. An industrial slowdown has combined with a bad harvest to reduce the growth of national income to less than 3%. It is now clear that the targets of the current five-year plan (1976-80) will not be met. Production is growing more slowly



The production line is grinding slowly to a halt

ly than before. Russia seems headed towards economic stagnation—with its accompanying political dangers.

Gross industrial output, it is claimed, rose this year by 3.7%. That is 2% less than planned. Fuel production is not expanding on schedule. Steel, engineering and petrochemicals are falling behind. Some consumer goods are in short supply. At a meeting of the Russian Communist party's central committee last week, Mr Brezhnev deplored the "irregular appearance" of a very mixed bag of goods: medicines, soap, washing powder, toothbrushes and toothpaste, needles, thread, nappies and other products of light industry.

Mr Brezhnev deplored the state of Russia's transport system and urged his countrymen to save both fuel and metals. He also personally scolded 11 Russian ministers—although, surprisingly, none of them has been sacked.

Big variations in harvests due to bad weather are common in Russia. But this year's fall in the grain crop—to 179m tons from last year's record of 235m tons—is particularly sharp and will be expensive to make up. Still, the Soviet leaders can argue that the average grain harvest gathered in the first four years of the current plan is, at 209m tons, 26m tons higher than in the first half of the decade. In the past four years alone 1.5m tractors, 426,000 combine harvesters and 317m tons of fertilisers have been pushed into the countryside. In Stalin's time, agriculture absorbed 12% of total investment. Its share now is over 25%. The yield, so far, does not match the outlay. Meat and dairy farming is still inefficient, and Russia will continue to have to import fodder for a long time to come.

Assuming that the targets for next year are fulfilled, national income will have risen over the five years of the plan by 20.8% instead of the projected 26%. Gross industrial output will have risen by 26% instead of 36%. Even production of basic goods, which usually enjoys top

priority, is lagging behind. Of all the fuels, only natural gas has come up to the expectations of the planners. There is now talk of a shock programme to expand Siberia's fuel base.

The Soviet authorities behave as if their promises to the consumers will still be kept. But real income per head, which was scheduled to grow at an annual rate of 4% has risen, if the figures are to be believed, by only 3%. Food and light industries' output will fall short of targets. Living standards will be difficult to improve if the rate of growth of the economy keeps falling.

The slackening pace of growth is the major worry for Russia's leaders. Both gross national product and industrial production are now increasing at roughly a third of their pace in the 1950s. The rate has been falling steadily and almost without interruption. Only when Mr Khrushchev got the push and Mr Kosygin introduced his economic reform in 1965 giving greater freedom to industrial managers was the downward trend arrested for a time. But the reform was half-hearted. After the experience in Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed where liberalisation of both the political system and the economy could lead, it was virtually abandoned. In the 1970s the curve resumed its inexorable course downwards.

Mr Brezhnev proposed no new remedies in his speech last week. Yet he and his colleagues must approve the new economic blueprint for the 1980s before the next party congress in 1981. Mr Brezhnev urged the state planning bureau, the Gosplan, to produce several preliminary economic models by next January. In doing their sums, the planners have two major hurdles to jump: the growing cost of raw materials from distant Siberia and the declining supply of labour. A rapid rise in productivity has now become essential.

But Mr Brezhnev's formula for political survival may prove his economic undoing. Mr Brezhnev has held on for 15

years by respecting the rules and privileges of the hierarchy. He thus has the confidence of the apparatchiks. But, by the same token, any genuine reform of the economic machine is ruled out. The figures revealed last week could threaten the post-Stalinist system he has painstakingly consolidated over the years. In his unhappy birthday month of December he must be brooding about the creaking joints of Russia's arthritic economy.

France

Decree nisi

FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT

President Giscard d'Estaing's government has had to start ruling by decree: that is, without giving parliament a chance to vote on important legislation. If that sounds dictatorial, the blame lies less with the president than with the Gaullist movement led by his capricious rival, Mr Jacques Chirac. The parliamentary system seems headed for an impasse.

Twice in the past two weeks the government has effectively bypassed parliament. This became necessary when Mr Raymond Barre, the prime minister, was denied the support of Mr Chirac's *Rassemblement pour la République*, which is one half of the ruling majority. Rather than climb down on key financial bills—France's 1980 budget presented late last month and new social security legislation tabled on Tuesday—Mr Barre wriggled through a constitutional escape hatch created by General de Gaulle.

The trick is to transform disputed bills into questions of confidence in the government. No vote is required for these to pass; they are adopted automatically. The opposition can table a motion of censure, but this needs the backing of a majority of the national assembly. Mr Chirac will not take his vendetta to the extreme of censuring and toppling a government he ever more hesitantly underpins.

Mr Chirac's motives for this cantankerous conduct are obscure. If he continues it, the prime minister will be forced to govern by artifice. Mr Chirac has been stung by personal criticism from Mr Barre recently, so the Gaullists may be out for revenge. They may also be trying to make the government look besieged and encourage charges that the president is disdainful of parliament (a charge better suited to General de Gaulle).

Mr Chirac's real intention is probably to dramatise the distinction between the Gaullists and the Giscardists, a distinction he needs to preserve if he is to be a plausible candidate against Mr Giscard d'Estaing in the presidential election in

Books

Sell out

VICTIMS OF YALTA

By Nikolai Tolstoy.
Hodder and Stoughton.
 496 pages. £9.95.

When Germany surrendered in May, 1945, some 5m "Russians" found themselves stranded in western Europe. Their immediate wants and their long-term future posed awkward problems for their new overseers. Of these the majority were British, from senior statesmen, civil servants and commanding officers down to junior subalterns and nurses in the field. Among the host classified as Russian were not only conventional prisoners of war and unconventional anti-communist volunteers wearing German uniform but also a hungry multitude of displaced men, women, and children that had been forced to work, often as slave labourers, all over the Reich. Each of these three main categories could be subdivided into other acutely conscious groups, such as Balts, Poles, Cossacks, Georgians, Armenians, and the like. (There were even two mysteriously strayed Tibetans who could communicate only with each other.)

All but the hardest were dispirited. Many were physically ill. Yet in the

relatively short period between the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944 and the end of 1945 the western Allies returned over 2m of them directly to the Soviet Union. Many, perhaps even the majority, went against their will. Some, already branded as traitors, were executed summarily on arrival at Murmansk or Odessa. Others were sent straightaway, without a hearing, into the remote prison camps of the far north.

Nikolai Tolstoy lays the blame for so tragic a disregard of human rights largely on the casuistry of the British foreign office, whose rulings could never be challenged by an uninformed British public. He accuses in particular the foreign secretary, Eden, and the prime minister (in that order) who at Yalta in February, 1945, together conceded virtually all Stalin's sweeping demands.

At first Moscow had denied the existence of any repatriation problem: the Soviet Union did not breed defectors, nor the Red Army soldiers who surrendered. But ineluctable realities quickly moved Moscow to take notice. Undiscriminating repatriation of all Soviet citizens was then demanded, for which transport, victuals and winter clothing were to be provided gratuitously by the western Allies. Soviet motives were in part humane. But they were also harshly political, for the regime

feared the results of allowing so many one-time subjects the liberty of airing disillusionment outside Russia. Further, there was the Communist party's congenial itch to punish, if not to destroy, deserters and incorrigible opponents.

One overriding consideration impelled Churchill and Eden to accept Stalin's principle of total repatriation even though they knew that hundreds and thousands justifiably dreaded the prospect of going back. The Wehrmacht was holding most of its British prisoners of war in camps situated in the path of the Red Army's advance westwards. Their prompt release and return home would depend upon Soviet co-operation. Might not this be withheld, Eden conjectured, should Soviet plans be frustrated? There were other factors at work: for one, Eden had come to have a new respect for Stalin in the course of their brief encounter; for another, an impatient Churchill ordered his subordinates to stop quibbling and get things done. So the deal was signed and hastily implemented, to the distress of the British soldiers detailed to form the guards and escorts of the visibly despairing.

Making use of contemporary documents newly available by the lapse of the 30-year embargo (though one file is suspiciously missing), Mr Tolstoy has written a full and profoundly disturbing account of this traffic in people trapped willy-nilly by the tides of international conflict. It is an intricate story, going further than Lord Bethell's three years ago and telling, as the author puts it, of "ponderous exchanges which resemble a game of poker played by blindfolded antagonists". He seems to have inherited a gift from Leo Tolstoy for depicting the sweep of world history as it affects the destinies not only of nations but also of individuals both great and small. The surviving antagonists of 1945 will not like this exposure of their failings. Some of them today are Whitehall knights. It is a timely story.

The price of passivity

NAZI LADY

By Elisabeth von Stahlenberg.
Blond and Briggs. 256 pages.
 £4.95.

There were all too many Nazi ladies, but few so outspoken as this chatty scribbler, few so advantageously placed as she for watching the salient persons and happenings of the Third Reich. Married unexpectedly into the lesser aristocracy, Frau von Stahlenberg effusively acclaimed Hitler's masterful takeover on January 30, 1933. (Her first son Michael was born the same day.) And she was beside herself with pleasurable perturbation when the



Yalta: where it began to go wrong

note AA-VV.

Eastern Europe

The gap in technology

Are the Russians catching up with the west in the field of technology? The debate has been going on ever since Russia astonished the world by launching its sputnik into space in 1957. Some believe that Russia may indeed overtake the west one day. Look at Japan, they say, and how it turned the technological tables on the United States after the second world war. Not a chance, argue the others. Russia will forever lag behind the west, especially if the west keeps Russia dependent by providing it with powerful injections of the west's knowhow and its machines.

This debate is now going to be better informed thanks to *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (Yale University Press, £20), an excellent new work by a team of specialists in Soviet technology and society from five British universities under the editorship of Professor Robert Davies, Mr Julian Cooper and Mr Ronald Amman, all from Birmingham University's centre for Russian and east European Studies. Their book, the first of its kind, is a study of a number of Soviet industries, from chemicals to computers, over the past 15-20 years. The authors conclude that in most of the technologies studied no substantial diminution of the technological gap between the Soviet Union and the west has occurred during the period under review, either at the prototype stage, in commercial application or in the diffusion of advanced technology.

The picture the Birmingham study paints is, of course, a varied one. A considerable advance has been achieved in numerically controlled machine tools, while the chemical industry has failed to generate any really important innovations that could be scaled up to mass production and had to import two thirds of its new plant in the 1960s from the west. As for the important military sector, that too, according to the authors, exhibits typical Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Good welding accounts for the Soviet Union's good tank technology but weaknesses in electronics and in the computer industry have had an adverse effect on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

What lies behind this state of affairs in Soviet industry? The fact that the interests of all those cohorts of scientists beavering away in the country's numerous and well funded research institutes do not at all coincide with the interests of the industries they are supposed to be servicing. This is the thesis advanced by Professor Mark Perakh, for many years a leading Soviet electrochemist, now teaching at the University of Jerusalem, in a paper which he has contributed to a

Nato-sponsored volume called *East-West Technological Co-operation* (distributed by Nato's directorate of economic affairs in Brussels). In the Soviet Union, argues Professor Perakh, theoretical research advances those scientists' careers; successful industrial development of those ideas, on the other hand, may make the scientists redundant. That is why, in his view, the bulk of the several billions of roubles' worth paid each year to research institutes for specific research contracts has no impact whatsoever on Soviet industrial development. And that also is why the Soviet Union has to resort to technological imports from the west. Not all of those are obtained by legal means and Professor Perakh claims that the Soviet authorities' fear of detection of such unauthorised "borrowings" is a major reason for banning western visitors from many Soviet factories.

Soviet imports of western machines do not look big on paper: they represented only 4% of total Soviet investment in machinery in 1970. Yet such imports are a major source of Soviet economic growth, according to Mr Philip Hanson of Birmingham University, also a contributor to this volume. No less than 74% of the total Soviet output of complex fertilisers and 84% of the output of high-pressure polyethylene in 1973 came, for example, from imported western plant.

How these technology transfers actually occur is the subject of *East-West Co-operation in Business: Interfirm Studies* (Springer Verlag, Vienna and New York, for the Vienna Institute of Comparative Economic Studies; \$21.20). This is another collective work, by nearly 40 experts from 12 countries of eastern and western Europe and north America, edited by Professor Christopher Saunders. These interesting case-studies cover a wide range of transactions from licence sales by American and West German firms to Hungarian state farms to the more complicated deals involving transfers of motor car technology and knowhow to countries like Poland and Yugoslavia.

But transfers of advanced technology require a lot of adaptation between machines and knowhow on the one hand and economic and social requirements, labour skills and working conditions on the other. This interplay is the theme of *Industrial Policies and Technology Transfers between East and West* (Springer Verlag; \$24.80), also edited by Professor Saunders. This volume reveals numerous obstacles that stand in the way of east-west transfers. Yet these east-west hurdles are nothing when compared with the east-east ones.

Führer himself came to a supper party at her home in 1942. Yet on February 2, 1945, she was writing of her young husband: "My darling Hugo was hanged this morning, I wish I were dead". He had been implicated in the plot against Hitler. Three months later, on April 30th, she records how the baby of 1933, by now a uniformed lad of 13, called her husband, his father, a traitor while she tried to prevent him dashing out of the house bent on defending Berlin against the encircling Russian army. Her entry for May 1st runs: "I dare not turn off the radio. I have just heard of Hitler's heroic death. My Michael hasn't come home".

Daughter of the proprietor of the *Goldener Hirsch*, a modest hotel in an unidentified small town in southern Germany, Elisabeth Stofen was a pretty, spirited, and good-natured teenager. She was also scantily educated and rather gullible. After becoming pregnant in 1932 she married the father of her child, Hugo von Stahlenberg, to the unconcealed disappointment of his ambitious parents. Yet the two seem to have lived together afterwards as happily as could be expected in the circumstances. Stahlenberg, a hesitant Nazi, contrived to get an interesting job in Goebbels's ministry of propaganda. This was in a sub-section of the films department that had been set up specially to form a lending library of newsreels depicting party activities. The work led him wherever Nazi bigwigs were presentably at large, his attractive wife often accompanying him, abroad as well as at home.

With a professional gossip columnist's gusto she relates as an eye-witness the goings-on at Goering's wedding, the Nuremberg rallies, the Olympic games in Berlin, Hitler's receptions on the Obersalzberg and other such occasions. She lunches alone with the neglected Eva Braun. She notes Field Marshal von Blomberg's furtive rendezvous with the obscure woman whom he eventually wed at the cost of his job. She confesses even to giving herself to the lecherous Goebbels in order to save her husband from serving a penance on the eastern front. The more the Stahlenbergs saw of Nazidom—the savage anti-semitism, the ubiquitous Gestapo—the keener their disenchantment. But, like so many contemporary, essentially well-meaning Germans they did practically nothing about it and paid terribly for their passivity.

The diaries come to an abrupt end with two entries made in Frankfurt in 1948. The publishers add a brief note to the effect that in the autumn of the same year the authoress married an American businessman and today lives in Texas. "Her former identity is not generally known

LETTERA DA MOSCA

Adriano Aldomoreschi

*Nella ricerca
ricca
della*



Non ci sono soltanto i fatti di 600 anni fa

MOSCA, settembre - Da alcune settimane, le riviste e i giornali sovietici sono pieni di rievocazioni della battaglia di Kulikovo. Se ne scrive e se ne parla (alla radio, alla TV, nelle scuole) come se si trattasse di un fatto vicino e non di un evento che emerge da grandi lontananze storiche. La battaglia si svolse seicento anni fa (l'8 settembre 1380) lungo il corso superiore del fiume Don e segnò la sconfitta della secolare dominazione «tatarica» e l'avvio del processo di unità e di indipendenza nazionale del popolo russo. Quell'8 settembre di seicento anni fa, sul campo di Kulikovo si trovarono di fronte due immensi eserciti: le schiere dell'Orda d'Oro, capeggiate da Mamaj, e le schiere dei russi, uniti per la prima volta sotto la guida di Dmitri, principe di Mosca. Gli annalisti raccontano che Mamaj era sicuro della vittoria, tanto da aver esortato i suoi a non seminare grano perché in autunno avrebbero mangiato pane russo. Dmitri, invece, temeva il peggio e prima dello scontro, per spronare i suoi soldati, si presentò di fianco al proprio esercito, si spogliò degli abiti principeschi e indossò quelli di un semplice soldato.

La battaglia durò l'intera giornata e la vittoria arrise ai russi, che però lasciarono sul campo 250.000 morti. I «tatarici» subirono un massacro ancora maggiore. Il seppellimento dei caduti durò dalla sera dell'8 settembre fino al 16 settembre. Sul luogo della battaglia, nel 1913, fu eretta una chiesa-monumento che è stata ricostruita, rinnovata ed adattata a museo in occasione di questo seicentesimo. Due domeniche fa, il 7 settembre, una grande manifestazione (cui hanno partecipato oltre 30.000 persone) si è svolta sul campo di Kulikovo. L'anniversario della battaglia è stato celebrato anche in numerose altre città dell'URSS. Alla Galleria Tretiakov di Mosca è stata allestita una bellissima mostra

di icone e miniature dell'epoca. Il «Kommunist», la rivista ideologica del PCUS, ha dedicato all'avvenimento un lungo saggio storico-politico.

Perché una celebrazione così ampia e solenne per una ricorrenza, certo importante, ma pur così lontana? La motivazione politica, i propositi di «attualizzazione» del significato di quella data storica, traspaiono chiaramente da molti discorsi e molti scritti celebrativi (alcuni dei quali non privi di fastidiosi accenti slavofili e patriottardi). Questa «attualizzazione» è stata esplicita nel discorso che l'accademico Boris Rybakov ha pronunciato nel corso della serata moscovita dedicata alla celebrazione della battaglia di Kulikovo. Questo storico ha ricordato che la vittoria del principe di Mosca Dmitri (passato alla storia col nome di principe Donskoi), ha affrancato dal giogo straniero, non solo il popolo russo, ma anche altri popoli. Rybakov ha detto che «oggettivamente, la Russia, sbarrando il cammino agli invasori dell'Orda d'Oro, ha salvato l'Europa, e ha dato la possibilità agli stati europei occidentali di proseguire il loro cammino storico, di sviluppare la loro cultura». L'accademico sovietico ha inoltre ricordato che durante la seconda Guerra Mondiale l'impresa di Kulikovo era ben presente nella mente e nel cuore dei soldati sovietici, e che nel 1941, proprio dove fu sconfitto Mamaj, la strada è stata sbarata ad un'altra orda, quella

nazista, poiché proprio qui fu fermata e liquidata la armata corazzata di Guderian. Il riferimento alla minaccia attuale che viene nuovamente dall'oriente (ogni giorno la stampa sovietica denuncia la politica estera cinese «che punta ad una nuova guerra mondiale») e all'inganno in cui può cadere l'Occidente (l'URSS, l'America di Carter e di Brzezinski è già caduta in quest'inganno come dimostra la politica di aiuti a Pechino) è chiaro anche in altri scritti.

Sulla battaglia di Kulikovo non mancano però riflessioni meno legate alla attualità politica e volte a scandagliare il significato e la portata storica e culturale di quell'evento. Tra queste riflessioni, la più interessante è certamente quella di uno storico sovietico di fama mondiale, Dmitri Licaciov. Nel suo bel saggio pubblicato sulla rivista «Zvezda» di Leningrado (intitolato «La cultura russa e la battaglia di Kulikovo») non c'è ombra di complacimento, non c'è nessuna caduta retorica. Licaciov spiega le ragioni della vittoria del principe di Mosca affermando che è stata «non solo una vittoria delle armi, ma una vittoria delle nuove idee, delle nuove forze morali»: con quella battaglia «si cominciò ad apprezzare un uomo non solo per il suo posto nella gerarchia feudale, ma per la sua onestà, per il suo coraggio». Quella vittoria fu possibile poiché si era diffuso «un atteggiamento nuovo ver-

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Interessante è anche l'articolo di Juri Trifonov scritto per la «Literaturnaja Gazeta». Il noto scrittore sovietico traccia un quadro non olografico della battaglia di Kulikovo e ricorda, tra l'altro, che molti scienziati hanno scritto che la schiavitù portata dai tatarici, insieme alle imposizioni insopportabili, ebbe anche lati non negativi: la costruzione di strade, l'introduzione del censimento, l'avversione ed il divieto del «giudizi spontaneo». Di fronte ad analisi così serie e profonde, di un passato tanto lontano (analisi utilissime e necessarie per comprenderlo e per agire nel presente), perché — ci ha chiesto un dissidente che si definisce marxista, alludendo non solo all'epoca staliniana, ma allo stato degli studi storici sovietici sul secolo scorso e sull'inizio del nostro secolo — non «rivedere» periodi storici a noi più vicini, per metterci meglio in grado di leggere e superare le nostre contraddizioni?

su sua indicazione, gli organismi sindacali superiori possono persino proibire il lavoro del reparto o anche dell'intera impresa.

Anche la chiusura o la riduzione della produzione in una azienda non comporta problemi di ricerca del lavoro da parte degli operai e degli impiegati. Infatti al momento attuale nell'Unione Sovietica, Azerbajdzhan compreso, si contano circa due milioni di posti di lavoro vacanti da affidare a personale qualificato. Questa riserva facilita i compiti delle amministrazioni e dei sindacati. Essi si preoccupano di trovare tempestivamente a ciascun candidato alla perdita del posto di lavoro per riduzione della produzione un altro posto, tenendo conto della sua specializzazione e delle sue esigenze. Inoltre gli fanno frequentare dei corsi di qualificazione, durante i quali egli riceve regolarmente il salario medio mensile e contemporaneamente acquisisce una qualifica più elevata o addirittura una nuova specializzazione.

Perché nell'URSS aumentano i matrimoni misti

professor Maksud Giunusov

Il censimento nazionale della popolazione dell'URSS nel 1979 ha registrato più di 120 popoli che contano da meno di mille persone (aleuti, nganasani, neghidali, jucagiri) sino a 137 milioni (russi).

La legislazione dell'impero russo vietava i matrimoni fra ortodossi e non cristiani. Del resto, qualsiasi religione, attribuendosi il monopolio della verità, finiva per promuovere la separazione. I matrimoni misti erano esplicitamente condannati dalla religione israelitica: chi contravveniva al veto veniva espulso dalla comunità e per lui si celebrava una cerimonia funebre, come se fosse morto. Persino l'Islam, relativamente tollerante nei confronti dei meticci, vietava alle donne di sposare persone di diversa confessione religiosa, permettendolo soltanto agli uomini (ovviamente, dopo la conversione della sposa all'islamismo).

Lo sradicamento di questo isolazionismo etnico e religioso non era facile, ma si compì in un brevissimo periodo storico grazie alla rivoluzione socialista. Il potere dei Soviet, favorendo la fioritura delle culture dei vari popoli, faceva di tutto per il rafforzamento dei loro legami reciproci. Le ex periferie semicoloniali uscivano dall'arretratezza ed acquisivano un proprio assetto statale; si formava un unico sistema politico ed economico-sociale sulla base completamente nuova dei rapporti socialisti.

Uno dei risultati fu l'aumento dei matrimoni misti. Dal 1925 al 1927 nella RSFSR essi aumentarono del 300-500% fra i bielorussi e di sei volte fra i baskiri. Negli anni trenta si diffusero anche nel Kazachstan e nell'Asia centrale: la liberazione della donna fece raddoppiare la portata del fenomeno, malgrado i divieti dell'Islam. Si avviò l'unione di tutte le nazioni e le popolazioni in una nuova comunità storica, il popolo sovietico.

Dalla fine degli anni cinquanta, all'inizio degli anni settanta il numero delle famiglie nell'URSS è aumentato di un sesto, passando da 50 a poco meno di 59 milioni. Contemporaneamente i matrimoni misti sono aumentati di più della metà, passando da cinque a otto milioni, ossia dal 10 al 14% del totale delle famiglie. Questo maggiore incremento è continuato anche in seguito. Qual è il suo significato?

Il moltiplicarsi dei matrimoni misti è di per sé una testimonianza dell'avvicinamento fra i popoli. Essi contribuiscono sempre di più alla scomparsa delle vecchie barriere e prevenzioni nazionali. Le indagini sociologiche attestano che nell'URSS i matrimoni misti sono di solito più stabili di quelli etnicamente omogenei. Ciò smentisce l'opinione, largamente diffusa in Occidente, per cui il reciproco adattamento e l'armonia sono più difficili fra coniugi diversi per nazionalità e a maggior ragione per razza.

La conclusione è ovvia. I matrimoni misti contribuiscono al crescente processo d'integrazione dei popoli dell'URSS in una comunità unitaria. Non si tratta, ovviamente, di un'unica nazione, nella quale si cancellano le differenze, ma non è neppure una semplice somma di gruppi etnici. Siamo di fronte non a un coacervo, ma a una fusione di economie sviluppate e di culture originali, a una naturale unione volontaria di tutte le repubbliche dell'URSS.

RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

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The good earth stubbornly refuses to deliver the goods

President-elect Ronald Reagan promised during his election campaign to end America's partial embargo of grain shipments to Russia. The irony is that he will take office just when the Soviet harvest has failed dismally again and the embargo is beginning to hurt. Food shortages are worse than usual in the shops of Moscow and will become acute in many provincial towns. President Brezhnev has recognised publicly that Russia's inability to feed itself is its most serious political problem. A case for Mr Reagan to change his mind? A look at what has gone wrong, and why.

"Collective farmers and state farm workers! Increase the efficiency of production! Make better use of land, machinery and fertilisers! Maximum care and attention to the future harvests!"

Thus reads one of the slogans issued by the Soviet Communist party last week, celebrating the anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. Such useless exhortations, penned by party men in the Kremlin, have not been going down well on the farm. The Soviet Union has just harvested 181m tonnes of grain, only 2m tonnes above last year's disastrous harvest, and 54m tonnes short of the target set by the planners. To make up the shortfall, Russia will have to import at least 30m tonnes from the west in the year beginning last July.

The price of importing food would nevertheless be well worth paying if Russia could rely on uninterrupted supplies from the west, and particularly from the United States. Much of its grainland is too far north to provide it with large harvests at an acceptable cost and if it aims for self-sufficiency in grains it will, like the EEC, be misusing resources to grow at home crops that are produced much more efficiently abroad.

Russia's leaders, though, feel they cannot depend on the outside world for food and animal feedstuffs. After their armies invaded Afghanistan, President Carter imposed a partial embargo on American grain exports to the Soviet Union last January and forced Russian buyers to scurry around the world seeking, with large but not total success, alternative suppliers.

Mr Reagan, in the Republican party primary elections in the farm state of Iowa, came out promptly, and unequivocally, against agricultural sanctions of any

kind on the Soviet Union. The major western grain exporters met in Adelaide, in Australia, this week to review the stuttering progress of the grain embargo. Two countries which originally agreed to restrain their Russian grain exports, Canada and Australia have strongly attacked the way the embargo has worked.

The Russians obviously hope Mr Reagan will keep his election promise to lift the embargo. But agricultural planning is necessarily long term and the Russians are unwilling to allow their economy again to be vulnerable to American sanctions.

Greater self-sufficiency in agriculture will, though, be hard for Russia to achieve. An indication of how severe the country's farm problem has become is that, after years of putting on a brave face and blaming nature for the poor crops,

the Kremlin has stopped trying to gloss over the difficulties. At the central committee meeting on October 21st, President Brezhnev admitted that there was a critical shortage not just of meat but of food in general.

Mr Brezhnev has cause to be particularly exasperated since he has made investment in farming a priority. In the decade after his accession to power in 1964 the state invested twice as much in agriculture as it had done during the preceding 50 years of communist rule. According to largely pre-planned "statistics", the average annual rate of growth of investment in agriculture was about 9% from 1966 to 1975: since then it has slowed, however, to 3.5%, as investment has dried up throughout the economy.

Even so, agriculture has done well in getting its share of money. The 37 billion roubles (\$24.3 billion) of state money that farming will get this year represents 27% of all new Soviet investment, a level consistently adhered to for several years. Yet the average annual rate of growth in farm output has been slowing down from about 4.9% in the 1950s, to 3% in the 1960s, to just over 2% in the last four years. Altogether about four fifths of the increase in farm output has come from heavy new capital investment programmes, not increased efficiency. Productivity in Soviet agriculture, which grew at the annual rate of 2.2% in the 1950s slowed down to a 1% average rate in the 1960s, and has actually been declin-




For what we are about to receive

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Little to reap from so much land



ing in the 1970s.

Russia has still not managed to repair the damage done to its farms by Stalin. After the brutal period of forced "collectivisation" of farms in the 1930s, Stalin starved Russia's farms of investment. At the time of his death in 1953, Russia's grain output was averaging only 88m tonnes, 49% of today's level. Generally, food production per head of population, was no higher in 1953 than it had been in 1928. The bad practices established then continue to blight Russian farming.

In an attempt to break away from the years of failure, Mr Brezhnev has tried to tilt the farm economy away from its bureaucracy. It will probably be the task of Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, who has just been promoted to full politburo membership at (for Russia) the tender age of 49, to administer this more relaxed policy in his capacity as agriculture's overlord. But as he comes to grapple with the problem, he will probably become as frustrated as his predecessors.

Collective misery

The harvested area in the Soviet Union in 1974 was about two thirds more than in America. And yet the estimated value of Soviet net farm output was only about four fifths that of the United States.

Most of the production is on state-run farms. There are 18,000 state farms (*sobkhoz*s). These have a vast and unmanageable average size of 40,000 acres. They are run along the lines of state-operated factories. Related to these are 29,000 collective farms or *kolkhoz*s with an average area of 13,000 acres of each and

run, at least in theory, as producers' co-operatives. The performance of these huge blocks of farmland has been so bad that, in June, Pravda suggested that further rises in farmers' incomes should be halted and any further increases made dependent on improvements in agricultural productivity.

Soviet agriculture is under-capitalised. Fixed capital per worker in the United States, for example, is higher in agriculture than in industry. Not so in the Soviet Union. But throwing roubles at collectives is, as the Soviet leaders now realise, no answer. Last month, Mr Brezhnev spoke bitterly of collective and state farms and whole regions where capital investments are being increased while output stagnates. The expansion of areas under cultivation is not the answer either: Russia has run out of virgin lands and investment in reclamation and restoration of arable land has also reached its useful limits.

Some collectives work. Soviet farming has its success stories as well as its failures. Cotton is one of them. This year's harvest looks like surpassing the record 9.2m-tonne crop of last year. Some areas consistently produce excellent grain harvests—Kazakhstan, for example, one of the virgin lands ploughed up on Nikita Khrushchev's orders.

But with its economic growth slowing down already (and likely to slow down still further throughout the 1980s), the Soviet Union cannot afford large injections of capital into agriculture like those in the 1960s and early 1970s. National income grew by 2% last year—the lowest increase since the 1930s. At 3.4%, industrial output's increase was the lowest since the second world war. Last year

investment in agriculture grew by 2%—a half of the 1978 rate and a fifth of the annual average in the 1971-75 period. Further growth in farm output will have to come predominately from higher yields and a more productive use of capital stock and land.

But how is this possible when no farmer has any real idea of true costs and profits? Procurement prices, those paid by the state to the farms for the produce they sell to it, prices charged for produce in state retail shops—none of these bear any relation to actual scarcities. Payments to the countryside have risen under Mr Brezhnev, but the cost of those payments has not been passed on to the Soviet consumer. After what happened in Poland in the summer, it is not likely to be. Any reform of the Soviet food price system that would entail burdening the consumer with part of the food subsidy now borne by the state is not easy to imagine.

What a workforce

In Russia, about a fifth of the total labour force is still employed on the farm (compared with only about 4% in the United States). But even that is not quite enough: every autumn hundreds of thousands of students, old-age pensioners, and industrial workers are drafted in to help gather the harvest.

The lads left down on the Soviet farm are not the best talent in the country. Russia's rural population contains a much higher proportion of people of non-working age than the urban one. This is no accident. The able-bodied male young go

off to the cities to escape the awful drabness of country life on the steppes. The women, left behind, form about 65% of the population, and most of them have to farm for a living. But women of child-bearing age have their hands full looking after their children and doing work on the half-acre private plots which families are allowed to keep. As a result, farms are short of labour able to handle a tractor, keep accounts, or apply chemical herbicides and fertilisers.

The farms in the poorer *podzol* areas of northern, western and central European Russia and the Volga region are particularly affected by manpower shortages. In the past four years, 426,000 combine-harvester and tractor drivers have been trained, but only 50,000 have stayed on the farm. Of every 100 specialists with higher or secondary education, only 26 remain in the countryside.

The number of farmworkers is certain to dwindle still further, except in Soviet Central Asia; this would be following the European pattern—if only farm efficiency was improving in tandem. In Russian society the *muzhik* (peasant) has always enjoyed a low social status. One of the great promises made by Lenin that under communism the vast difference in living standards between town and country would be abolished remains unfulfilled.

It can sometimes be risky in a communist state to be seen to be doing too much for the farmer. When in the early 1970s Hungarian industrial workers got the idea that, under Mr Kadar's economic reforms, farmers were living higher off the hog than they were, there was a political backlash in the unions and the party. Mr Kadar's reform was very nearly wrecked.

Anybody who tries to help the Soviet farmer will have to tread carefully. Nevertheless, Mr Brezhnev did promise in his speech last month better amenities for the rural areas: more housing, recreation centres, creches for the children, shops and so on. Housing is a particular prob-

lem: Mr Brezhnev revealed that 20% of Soviet families still lack their own dwellings.

What is bad in the city, is worse in the country. With few cars and bad roads, the rural population is dependent, like the peasants of merry England, on what is provided locally in the way of services and entertainments. And there is precious little. Unsurprisingly, drunkenness is even more of a headache in the rural areas that it is in the cities.

Do it in private

The soviet leaders are slowly shedding their ideological inhibitions in an effort to improve farm efficiency. The idea that a collective farmer should work a small plot of up to half an acre or that an industrial worker should keep a small private allotment is now thoroughly accepted. It was Mr Brezhnev who, back in 1965, ended the restrictions imposed on private plots by Mr Khrushchev. The right to have such a plot is now enshrined in article 13 of the Soviet 1977 constitution.

And what began as mere toleration of farming entrepreneurs, now looks like turning into all-out encouragement. Last month, the central committee of Komsomol, the Soviet youth organisation, issued an appeal to young communists and young people in general "for broad enlistment into rearing livestock and poultry on private subsidiary farms" (official name for private plots). They need little encouragement. The importance of private-sector farming is great, and rapidly growing. The 50m or so of them already produce on an area no bigger than 3% of the total cultivated land nearly a third of all the meat and milk consumed in Russia, a third of all vegetables, more than a third of the eggs and almost a fifth of the wool. Since the land is intensively cultivated (unlike grainland) the value of its yield per acre is far higher than on collective farms.

The private sector is now seen by the Kremlin as essential to the battle to overcome the present food shortages. But although this shift in policy is popular with Russian farmers, many soviets (local councils) are less enthusiastic, fearing that it will divert attention and work from their collectives. So these soviets make life difficult. Pasture and feed are sometimes withheld from privately owned cattle. Regulations by local soviets can prohibit the sale of meat on *kolkhoz* markets (open markets where collective farm members sell produce grown by them on their plots at free market prices). Farmers are denied better-quality seed, transport or opportunities to buy young rear-

ing stock from collective herds by many conservative soviets. To resist such assaults on the *kolkhoz* markets by overzealous local party managers, Moscow has just issued a decree officially giving its blessing to the growing status of these markets.

In the longer term private plots, even with full official blessing, cannot produce enough food. There is a limit to what hard-working women can do on a private plot even with the help of her menfolk (once they had done their stint for the state *kolkhoz*). Only a small number of animals can be raised on a private plot of half an acre. Any serious encouragement of private plots would have to involve further injections of equipment from the state sector.


There is a lot to recommend various other forms of help that the state is now encouraging. In the Odessa region, for example, the *kolkhozes*—emulating Hungary's co-operatives—provide the private farmer with three piglets, supply the feed and pay for the care of the animals. In return, the private farmer undertakes to return two of the pigs to the *kolkhoz* when they reach the minimum weight of 110 kilograms. The third he can keep himself.

But party leaders will eventually have to face up to the fact that they must do more. They are unlikely in the foreseeable future to contemplate de-collectivisation under any name. But they may agree to give the *kolkhoz* or *sovkhos* chairmen more freedom from bureaucratic interference by local soviets, the ministries in the republican capitals and Moscow.

Getting it on the shelf

The average Soviet working woman (most women in the Soviet Union work) spends more than four and a half hours on domestic chores each day, according to a recent study. This is only half an hour less than in the 1920s. But shopping, which then took only 12 minutes a day, now takes her an hour. In Moscow, at least, the supplies are normally available (and shoppers from the provinces flock in to buy them). But in the farther-flung towns of the empire the shelves get quickly bare.

The Soviet government is acutely aware of the discontent caused by endless queues: the problem of inefficient distribution and retailing is compounded by an antiquated system of food processing. Mr Voldemar Lein, the Soviet food industry minister, said in an interview on October



RUSSIAN AGRICULTURE

17th that his industry is expanding fast. It consists of 6,200 factories; in the past four years alone nearly 2,000 canneries, sugar refineries, dairies and meat-packing plants have come into operation and 29,000 mechanised and automated production lines have been installed in food processing factories.

But still the Soviet shopper waits. New factories can cope with production but not distribution. Russia is terribly short of food shops. True, for fresh food, there are the 6,500 or so free *kolkhoz* markets dotted around the country but even they are too few for the task.

Deliveries to food shops are irregular. That is why so many Soviet citizens carry shopping bags. They want to be prepared to join a queue when something worth buying turns up. On the shelves, the amount of pre-packed foodstuffs is still small, which makes serving that much longer.

There are few processed foods. In Denmark, for example, the average annual per capita consumption of processed potato products is about 40 kilograms, in Britain 20 kilograms; it is only 500 grams in the Soviet Union.

Yet processing and distribution is essential in the Soviet Union. Large distances between the farmlands and the cities together with bad weather and disorganised transport rule out peasant-to-city consumer sales. Much of the fresh food simply gets stuck on the farm or at railway sidings. A large part of the much heralded bumper grain crop of 1978, for example, was stored "under the Russian skies", and that part of it which was not eaten by rats, insects and birds went rotten.

This year's shortage of grain will translate into a shortage of livestock (much of it will have to be slaughtered prematurely because of the lack of feedgrains) and then into shortages of meat and eggs. Flour and even vodka will also be in short

supply. President Brezhnev's hope of filling Russia's shops with ample stocks has once again had to recede. This year's output of meat will be lower than 1979's. Last year the average Russian ate 58 kilograms of meat—a figure well up on the 41 kilograms eaten on average in 1965, the first year of the Brezhnev era, but still only about a half of what the average American eats in a year. Also the Russians get much less meat than the Poles. Improving the supply of food has been made a top priority for the Soviet party.

Intractable problems

The Soviet Union is the largest producer of tractors in the world. In 1975, its output was 13% larger than the combined production of the United States, Britain and West Germany. The tractors are not, though, durable. The average age of American tractors is twice that of Soviet ones. Russian tractors need a big overhaul after 4,500 hours in the fields; American tractors after 6,000 hours.

In consequence the Soviet tractor industry is geared to produce large quantities of spare parts. In 1974 it produced one billion roubles' (\$660m) worth of parts, two thirds of the value of new tractor output. Yet even this volume of spares is not enough to meet demand. The 800m-rouble output in 1970 was only 70% of what farm managers insisted they needed.

The shortage is so great that new machines are sometimes stripped at farms to supply spare parts. In 1979, the farms in the Altai region received 236 cars, 232 tractors and 142 combines that had been stripped during shipment.

These and other inefficiencies put farm

equipment out of action when it is most needed—during sowing and reaping. At ploughing, up to 35% of working time, and during harvesting up to 50% of working time, are sometimes lost because of breakdowns and repairs. Crops are often put in too late and taken out after they have been caught by bad autumn weather.

The bias in Soviet planning toward supplying the huge state farms also militates against improvements in productivity. Very little machinery is produced that is suitable for the more efficient private sector which Mr Brezhnev is tentatively trying to encourage.


Buying farm implements for work on private plots is sometimes next to impossible. The system is not geared for it. According to official estimates, some 840m man-days could be saved by mechanisation on private potato plots alone. Yet no suitable small tractor is available. A factory in Sverdlovsk wanted to produce hoes for the small private farmer. It was obliged to abandon the idea when it learnt that no Soviet standard for hoes existed. The idea could not be included in the production plan.

Though 236 factories produce garden implements in the Soviet Union they are buffeted by often conflicting instructions from 36 different ministries and official bodies. And since this type of production has low priority, the implements they produce are often made of poor metal and rapidly wear out.

Only one small tractor—Rioni-2—is being produced, at the rate of 2,000 units a year. It is expensive—but insulated from competition. When a small enterprise in Pskov designed an alternative small tractor it could not get permission to start production. Reason: it was not classified as a producer of agricultural machinery. According to one Soviet newspaper, blueprints were sent to a specialised institute for examination and never heard of again.

Transport is another bottleneck and this hits collective farms more seriously than the private plots. The expansion of grain production into the steppe regions of southeast Russia, western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan has increased the average distances to market and the cost of railway hauls.

Russian agriculture also suffers from an inadequate network of hard-surfaced roads (in 1978 they accounted for only half of the 1,423,500 kilometres of Soviet roads) and the dirt roads become mud roads when rain falls at harvest time. The government is, of course, aware of the importance of better rural roads. But whether it can do anything quickly to solve this, and other big farm problems, remains a 64,000 rouble question.



that America should handle its problems around the world by political foresight and nimble diplomacy but not—except in rare cases perhaps only for the defence of western Europe and Japan—by armed force. Mr Reagan's election shows how that pendulum has swung. Since there is a danger of its swinging too far, the proper borderline between political and military foreign policy needs drawing again.

The primacy, it should go without saying, remains with the political side. That means spotting new political trends before they reach explosion-point; being implacable in defence of American interests; but trying to make friends with the popular new men, not getting stuck with the unpopular old ones. That balance will never be easy to keep, but must be achieved if, for example, Castroism is not to make its way into such vital countries as Mexico. It is uncomfortably clear that sometimes the new men will (a) close their eyes to the extended hand of western friendship—especially when they already have a Russian hand behind them—and (b) do things that threaten western interests. The question is when a combination of (a) and (b) will justify the risks of military action. The answer is seldom, but not never. The Gulf is an example of a region in which the west has so huge an interest—60% of its oil imports—that the military safety-net has to be made ready. Mr Reagan is an enthusiastic weaver of safety-nets. He should accept that they need to be used only when the threat to use them has been ignored and when the nimblest of tightrope-walking has failed.

The task at home

The other crisis to face Mr Reagan will be America's inability to get its economy going without inflation: and the social crisis in its cities and factories that four more years of failure could easily create. If America's economy fails, then so will the reliance of others on America to uphold freedom or maintain peace.

When President Reagan moves into the White House on January 20th he will find himself confronted by an unemployment rate (now around 7½%) and an underlying inflation rate (around 10%) that are too high, and a business investment rate (about 11% of gnp) that is far too low. The economy will have to grow fast if, during his first and only (?) term, it is to employ a working population that is quickly expanding as children of the final years of the baby boom and still more women come into the labour market.

The president's room for manoeuvre will be cramped. Federal government spending represents only about one fifth of the country's gnp. The heights of the economy, including even the utilities, remain in private hands—an often overlooked reason why America's political chief executive has less scope for economic fine tuning than European politicians managing mixed economies. Even were Mr Reagan to wish to become the activist economic president his rhetoric has precluded; he would not find it easy to do so.

His influence will be limited above all by the way congress is reasserting its constitutional primacy on

taxes and spending. As for monetary policy, it is possible for a determined president to jawbone the quasi independent Federal Reserve into changing course, but Mr Reagan (we hope) will be reluctant to push for a loosening of the monetary noose at a time when the economy is coming out of a recession. His best advisers are blessedly free of any early-Thatcherite belief that money supply can somehow be controlled independently of fiscal policy, and of Lafferesque beliefs that tax cuts automatically beget more tax revenue. But, these days, no congress will necessarily pass even obvious common sense into law.

Guns mean less butter

Mr Reagan's economic options are narrowed farther by his commitment to increase defence spending. Federal budget projections published by the senate budget committee indicate that, on the basis of senate budget proposals closer to Mr Reagan's way of thinking than Mr Carter's, the Pentagon budget will grow in real terms in the next five fiscal years by an average of around 5% a year, while non-defence spending declines by an average of nearly 1% a year. And Mr Reagan wishes to do yet more for defence. So, even if the overall economy expands by 4% a year, an ambition that is unlikely to be achieved, there will be little room for tax cuts, none if a balanced budget is to be secured.

Where Mr Reagan does need to concentrate his economic attention is on improving America's productive investment and its lousy productivity performance. These will require a substantial shift from consumption to savings, and a reduction in business taxes relative to taxes on individuals. If he does not succeed in this, American living standards will continue to be overtaken by countries far less well-endowed with natural resources; and America's economic clout in the world will diminish throughout the decade.

Increased productivity should be Mr Reagan's theme for all government programmes, even in the very necessary efforts to give a chance in life to youngsters in America's scandalous inner-city slums. Why not, for example; give tax credits to businesses that hire teenagers rather than paying for public-works programmes, such as leaf raking and tree chopping, that do not provide them with marketable skills?

Mr Reagan can be grateful that ~~energy~~ energy prices, has at last been tackled by the retreating figure of President Carter. All price controls on crude oil and petrol will disappear next autumn. It then remains to hurry the dismantling of price controls on natural gas (due to go, too late, in 1985) to wave goodbye to a misconceived effort to keep domestic fuel prices below world prices.

What would remain after that, and what Mr Reagan must be persuaded not to funk, is the need to increase gas-pump taxes by enough to bring the cost of American motoring up to levels elsewhere in the free world. This, more than anything else, would begin to give Mr Reagan the freedom from kow-towing to Arab producers that he would doubtless like to enjoy.

The Reagan administration will be confronted by demands for economic nationalism that it is in the

credit to Mr. Reagan's critics

national and international interest to resist. It is no longer possible, even were it desirable, for America unilaterally to lay down the law to the rest of the western world as President Nixon did in August, 1971, when he severed the link between the dollar and gold and imposed a 15% surcharge on import duties. If America again tries to wield a big stick it risks being hit back with a bigger one. Its international trade last year was around \$400 billion, or less than the external (ie, non-intra EEC) trade of the common market and far less than the combined external trade of the EEC and Japan.

The first test could be disconcertingly unambiguous. Washington's International Trade Commission is poised to rule on whether quotas should be imposed on Japanese cars. If the administration enforces such a move it will kick over a hornet's nest. Charges of dumping, on everything from nuts and bolts from India to tomatoes from Mexico, will flood in. The Tokyo Round agreement, a main achievement of one of Mr Carter's few good appointees, Mr Robert Strauss, will be put in peril. Indeed, America must learn to kick its dangerous habit, once dubbed "light-switch diplomacy" by Mr George Shultz, of using trade (and aid) to get other countries into line. There are moments of

great international bargaining when America's trade weapons can be legitimately used as part of a range of policy cudgels or carrots—most notably in dealings with Russia and the communist world. But such occasions should be invoked sparingly, and almost never in relations with America's allies. Mr Reagan cannot expect realistically to get the co-operation of these allies if he decides, as Mr Carter did, that what was permissible to export yesterday is impermissible today and then permissible again tomorrow.

Another one-term failure?

No president of the United States elected in 1980 can count on success in his first term. Mr Reagan certainly cannot. The odds are that he will be judged by 1984 to have failed—such are the odds against America rediscovering itself and its place in the world. It will be little consolation then, and unprovable, that Mr Carter would have failed even more dangerously had he been re-elected. Mr Reagan is not a young man. He will need to find all the decisiveness and all the help that is available to him from the Nixon-Ford era if he is to pass the almost insurmountable tests that lie ahead.

Right turn in Jamaica

Deserves a generous good turn by the west to Mr Seaga



As Jamaica's prime minister for eight years, Mr Michael Manley, fan of Fidel Castro and scourge of the International Monetary Fund, built himself a reputation abroad out of all proportion to his country's size—and his own achievements at home. His defeat may be a setback for the overblown rhetoric of the "new international economic order". But that does not make it a victory for the old order. Not yet, not by a long way.

Politically, Jamaica remains explosive. The guns that have killed 500 people this year were not handed in with the ballot papers. Mr Edward Seaga's election victory qualifies as a "landslide" only by the peculiar standards of Westminster's first-past-the-post electoral legacy: his party won 85% of the seats but only 57% of the votes. Uncomfortably many of the other 43% do not share Mr Manley's respect for electoral democracy.

Economically, Jamaica faces a steep climb back. Gross domestic product has fallen by 15-20% since 1973; agriculture has been knocked by bad weather and even worse mismanagement into a sharp decline. Foreign exchange reserves have dwindled to nothing, external debt risen to \$1.5 billion. The island has been caught in the vice of oil prices and debt servicing, which have this year absorbed about 80% of its export earnings.

Easing that squeeze is the first task of the new government—and of all those who wish it well. The west can lend Jamaica the means of recovery, because a

shortage of foreign exchange—not skills and resources—is the main reason why the economy is on its knees. In the short term, that lending will increase the island's debt burden. But it is the only way to ensure that, two years or so hence, a revived economy will start to pay its bills. And because empty shelves in the shops were a major factor in Mr Manley's defeat, the Seaga government will need to import a lot of consumer goods as well. The race between economic recovery and renewed political disillusion will be close: foreign exchange will decide the result.

That gives a special significance to the IMF. Three years of politically charged wrangling with the Manley government cast it as a baddie in the eyes of the developing world. In March this year, Jamaica broke off negotiations with the IMF. It had already borrowed \$250m, and stood to get about \$225m more; it could not accept the IMF's conditions. Since then, the IMF has changed its policies, partly because of pressure from other poor countries. It plans to lend more, for longer periods and on easier terms. It would doubtless welcome another application from Jamaica; the stakes for both are even higher than before.

An IMF rapprochement will need to be bolstered by aid from governments, bank loans and private investment (not least by returning Jamaicans). In the longer term, Jamaica will look to its markets in the industrial countries to maintain the momentum of recovery. That

Sole

di ANDREA C. APARO

SPS: Solar Power Satellite, ovvero Satellite di potenza solare. Un satellite per convertire nello spazio la radiazione solare, facendo uso di dispositivi fotovoltaici, in energia elettrica, per trasmetterla poi a terra, dove verrà utilizzata. Fino a pochi anni fa parlarne era pura fantascienza. Negli ultimi tre anni gli Stati Uniti hanno speso 20 milioni di dollari, circa 16 miliardi di lire, per studiarne la fattibilità tecnica, l'economicità, l'impatto sociale e ambientale. Dire cos'è un SPS è molto semplice. Immaginate un oggetto lungo 10 chilometri, largo un mezzo chilometro,

che ruota equatorialmente attorno al sole, in modo che sia geosincrono. Geosincrono vuol dire che si muove lungo l'orbita con una velocità tale da risultare fermo rispetto alla terra.

In questo modo l'antenna del SPS, di circa 1 km di diametro e con una superficie superiore ai 7 km², potrà trasmettere sotto forma di micro-onda radio l'energia elettrica prodotta dai 50 milioni di m² di celle fotovoltaiche ad un ricevitore posto sulla terra. Il ricevitore sarà anch'esso un'antenna, lunga 13 chilometri e larga 10, 130 km² in tutto.

nologie attuali così da poterle applicare nello spazio. Dal punto di vista economico, il suo costo è confrontabile con quello di centrali convenzionali. Un SPS di 50 km² potrebbe produrre 5 milioni di kw elettrici all'anno.

Lo sfruttamento a terra dell'energia solare è molto più difficile. A parte i problemi ambientali che possono sorgere, si dipende troppo dai capricci del tempo. Se piove o è nuvoloso di energia solare ce n'è poca. Di notte poi non se ne parla. Nello spazio il sole non tramonta mai, non esistono nuvole o stagioni. Il mondo ha fame di energia e le sue risorse sono limitate. Ogni giorno, ogni tre ore si bruciano sulla terra quattro milioni

La République américaine relevait le défi soviétique, elle démontrerait en actes qu'elle ne faillirait pas à la mission que l'Histoire lui avait confiée. Dans la campagne récente de Ted Kennedy, le dernier des frères de cette famille tragique, nul ne perçut le moindre écho du message du président assassiné.

John avait dénoncé un missile gap, une disparité en fait de missiles aux dépens des Etats-Unis, qui d'ailleurs existait pas, il lança le projet « Un homme sur la Lune avant 1970 », le projet fut réalisé avant le délai fixé. Aujourd'hui, Ted ne dit rien de l'actuel missile gap, des SS 18, les missiles géants « mirvés » dont les têtes nucléaires pourraient détruire tous les Minuteman (les missiles intercontinentaux terrestres), il approuva par ses votes toutes les propositions de Carter tendant à réduire les dépenses militaires, il ne s'engagea en

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U.S. Budget Deficit for '80 Was 2d-Largest in History

By John M. Berry
Washington Post Service

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WASHINGTON — The federal budget deficit for fiscal 1980, estimated by President Carter to be \$29 billion when he presented it in January, 1979, was instead \$59 billion, the Treasury Department has announced.

It was the second-largest deficit in history, surpassed only by the \$66.4-billion deficit for 1976, the last year of the Ford administration. The deficit for fiscal 1980, which ended Sept. 30, was \$1.9 billion less than the administration's last public estimate made in July.

sharply the growth of federal spending if he is elected.

Administration budget officials question whether Mr. Reagan or anyone else could have produced a different result in 1980. Except in the defense area, they said they had little choice but to let outlay rise. In defense, Mr. Carter has pledged that spending would go up in real terms, that is, after a fee allowance for inflation.

The original budget estimate assumed a far better performance by the economy than occurred, but it mildly. Inflation was forecast to be 7.5 percent in calendar 1979 and 6.4 percent in 1980.

The sharp budget deficit...

que l'administration, qui abandonnait dans le même temps les grands programmes spatiaux et réduisait ses dépenses militaires, ait vraiment pris le relais. D'autant que les transferts sociaux (le welfare state) ont absorbé une part croissante du budget fédéral: 47% en 1979 contre 20% en 1960.

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inscrit en taux contre-procure études occidentales, et notamment un rapport publié en 1979 par la C.I.A. qui prévoyait un tassement relatif des gisements soviétiques. L'Union soviétique, qui a produit 596 millions de tonnes de brut en 1979, éprouve depuis quelques années des difficultés pour atteindre les objectifs du plan. Cela l'a notamment obligée à fournir 279 millions de tonnes par an ses fournitures aux autres pays du Comecon. — (A.F.P.)

seduta. A Milano il prezzo è sceso da 18.500 a 18.300 lire l'grammo. Quali i motivi di questo improvviso cedimento? Innanzitutto, le notizie sempre più insistenti, sulla possibile liberazione a giorni degli ostaggi americani in Iran e, in secondo luogo, le forti vendite di oro da parte dell'Unione Sovietica (da settembre ad oggi l'Urss avrebbe immesso sul mercato di Zurigo ben 25 tonnellate di questo metallo), per finanziare gli acquisti di cereali e le spese militari in Afghanistan. Comunque, se rispondesse al vero la voce circa la liberazione degli ostaggi, gli esperti ritengono che nelle

An Interview with Ronald Reagan

The President-elect talks about how he will set the U.S. on a new course

In the first broad-ranging interview that he has given specifically to discuss plans for his new Administration, Ronald Reagan talked with TIME Senior Correspondent Laurence I. Barrett, who has been with him for ten months of the campaign. Here are the plans and hopes of the next President.

Q. You are the first certified conservative sent to the White House in more than 50 years. Do you think this represents a basic political change in the country?

A. I have to believe there has been a change. I think it was a change based on the discovery that some of the nostrums that were administered under the name of liberalism were not doing the job.

Q. Do you think you can achieve a fundamental change in direction of the Government?

A. Yes, I do. The people have made it evident that they want that change. And when that happens, I think that even Congressmen of the other party sense it from their constituents back home, and they themselves are in the market for new approaches to solve problems. Basically, I want to change the course we've been on in which Washington was seen as the answer to all the problems. I want to restore the balance between the different levels of government that has been so distorted in these recent decades. I would like to restore functions that properly belong at different levels of government to those levels; and restore also the taxing authority that has been pre-empted, turn much of it back to local government and state government.

Q. What will be your top priorities once you are in office?

A. I have appointed a number of task forces that are working right now to carry out the transition. But I would like immediately to get into the things that I think could begin to turn the economic situation around, such as elimination of excessive and unnecessary regulations. I would like to offer some legislative proposals principally aimed at the economy—including tax proposals. And start work on reducing the size of Government. One of the first things I want to do is issue an Executive order putting a freeze on the hiring of employees to replace those who leave Government service.

Q. What procedures will you use to select the key members of your Administration?

A. We will have a committee of people who are not only qualified to judge the accomplishments of possible appointees, but who also could have some clout in recruiting them for the Government. My basic rule is that I want people who don't want a job in Government. I want people who are already so successful that they would regard a Government job as a step down, not a step up. I don't want empire builders; I want people who will be the first to tell me if their jobs are unnecessary. Out there in the private sector, there's an awful lot of brains and talent in people who haven't learned all the things you can't do.

My basic rule is that I want people who don't want a job in Government. I don't want empire builders.

Q. So there will be some surprising choices?

A. Yes, there will be a lot.

Q. Do you plan to bring Democrats into your Cabinet?

A. I think so. Yes.

Q. Are there Democrats of sufficient stature and in sufficient agreement with you to handle the Pentagon or the State Department?

A. I believe so. But again, I think you are thinking in terms of people already in Government. I'm thinking in terms of people who are out there and very successful in the private sector.

Q. Whoever your Secretary of State is, he will be bringing you some complicated news about dealings with the Soviets. How are you going to make the Soviets more amenable on SALT or other issues?

A. I believe that in the Soviet Union right now, there is an element of confusion about the vacillation of our recent foreign policy, the threats and then the backdowns, and so forth. I honestly believe that the Soviet Union would prefer consistency. That you can be firmer with them, make it clear that you would not be pushed around, and they would know what to expect. They would know what our policy is. They do not want to accidentally make a move that would bring them into a confrontation they don't want. I believe that they would be happier with someone—even though it was someone who is firmer, someone who opposed some of the things they did—who let them know what they were dealing with. And this would be my approach.

Q. How do you intend to open this dialogue?

A. We could open it by telling them that we have to renegotiate SALT II. We could take what is usable out of SALT II, and then tell them that we are not going to ratify the treaty the way it is and then make it plain that we are ready to sit down to legitimate negotiations. I will say this right away.

Q. Would you welcome an early meeting with Brezhnev?

A. I remember a happier time when there was a tradition that the President of the U.S. never left our shores, but I don't say that you could do that today. Still, the first job is to let them see the course we were going to follow domestically, getting hold of our economy, straightening out our energy problems. And the fact that we have the will and determination to add to our defensive stature.

Q. Henry Kissinger recently proposed that the U.S. should seek an interim arms control agreement while a longer-term SALT III is being worked out, and that during this process there should also be broad political negotiations to get the Soviets back on the track toward détente. Does his proposal reflect your thinking?

A. Yes, very much. I agree that there has to be linkage be-

tween arms control and other areas of difference, and there has not been. The Soviets have wanted to discourage that so that they could go their own way with a free hand, such as in Afghanistan, or in the other things they are doing. I think if we are going to sit down and negotiate on arms or anything else, the whole package has to be on the table. You cannot sit there and negotiate arms and pretend that the Soviet Union is not invading Afghanistan. Broad negotiations are the kind that I would support and believe in.

Q. During the Ford Administration, Kissinger tried that approach with only limited success. How do you see that changing now?

A. I think that in negotiations you are going to have to make it plain to the Soviets that there are some disadvantages for them if they do not go along. Maybe the disadvantage would be that you wouldn't negotiate. I think that they have a very great stake in those negotiations.

Q. Would you, for instance, make a pullout from Afghanistan one price of serious arms control negotiations?

A. I'd make no commitment at this time on specific things because it's bad diplomacy to go into a negotiation having said everything that's on your mind in advance. But let's put it this way: their overall policy of aggression must be a part of what is going on at the negotiating table.

Q. Kissinger has been more and more visible at your side since the convention, and has become something of an adviser. What role do you foresee for him?

A. He has made it very plain that he does not want to be a part of the Administration, but he has also made it plain that any time I want to call upon him for missions or something of that kind, he would help.

Q. Perhaps he would be available for more full-time employment. Have you tested him on that?

A. No, but he has spoken out on that, and I accept that.

Q. President Sadat has suggested that an urgent Middle East summit is required to get the peace negotiations moving. Are you considering such a summit shortly after your Inauguration?

A. I have not actually thought that out, but I could see where that particular trouble spot should very quickly have some knowledge of what this Administration's course will be.

Q. A very early initiative?

A. Yes. Possibly even before the Inauguration

Q. You have been very explicit in your support for Israel, including its West Bank settlements. Are you concerned that such a policy may drive many Palestinians and other Arabs even further toward seeking support from Moscow?

A. The Nixon Administration was largely responsible for getting the Soviet influence out of the Middle East, but look how much it is getting back in there now. That is the boiling pot, and lately we have even seen the possibilities of, literally, a religious war—the Muslims returning to the idea that the way to heaven is to lose your life fighting the Christians or the Jews. I think that Jordan is a key in settling this. And I think if we stand ready to help we could achieve a settlement.

Q. Would you like to meet soon with Jordan's King Hussein?

A. Yes, and I think that meeting would be an important one.

Q. In dealing with foreign policy, will you rein in your National Security Adviser and leave the State Department pre-eminent?

A. I think of the NSC as a kind of liaison, and to correlate what comes in from the State Department for the benefit of a President. I think that the White House adviser should not be a rival of the Secretary of State, as he has been so much in the past. The National Security Adviser has seemed to be almost in competition with the Secretary of State, and I want that changed. Policy remains between the Secretary of State and the President. The adviser is the President's liaison to the Secretary.

Q. All recent Presidents have promised large roles for their Vice Presidents, but their promises always seem to fade away. What do you plan for George Bush?

A. George very definitely has a great capacity to be of more help than one usually thinks of a Vice President as being, and I intend to utilize that. I think that there has long been a need for a Vice President to be something of what in the corporate world they would call an executive vice president, so that he is involved in the functions of Government.

Q. Your success will depend a lot on getting along with a Congress that will be Democratic and quite difficult. How will you do that?

A. I'm not sure how difficult Congress would be. The present Democratic Congress certainly had its problems with the present President. And some of those problems arose because they seem to be more favorable to the things I'm talking about than they were to what he wanted. I believe we've got a new kind of Congress, on both sides of the aisle. I think it might be a Congress that could be appealed to on the merits of what I am trying to do. I certainly intend to work with them.

Q. We know your views about the Department of Energy and the Department of Education. Would there be a fairly early attempt to get rid of those?

A. Well, I think you have to take at least enough time for some study, because both of those agencies, though they are new as agencies, did incorporate other existing programs in them. Now, you'd have to find out what of those programs are necessary, are proper functions of Government, and then, where should they properly fit.

Q. Governor, do you think it is time for a President to come into office proclaiming himself a one-term President?

A. No. I have thought of it at times, but I do not think it is necessary. The reason is that I am determined to behave as if it's a one-term office. I think that with too many Presidents, in fact with most of them, there is a terrible temptation to think in terms of the next election. This past Administration has been more guilty of that than most. But I will not do that. In California I promised myself that I would make every decision based on the assumption that I would never seek office again.

Q. And that will be the rule for this Administration?

A. Yes.

Q. That's a promise?

A. Yes.

I am determined to behave as if it's a one-term office. There is a terrible temptation to think in terms of the next election.

A Determined Second Fiddle

Bush will probably urge policies of caution and balance

George Bush seemed nervous. It was a rare occasion on which he shared a platform with the head of his ticket, Ronald Reagan. Bush's voice was reedier than usual, his introductory praise of Reagan awkwardly effusive, his applause during Reagan's speech a shade overzealous. Then a man sitting in a tree shouted something that made the crowd in Birmingham, Mich., laugh. A puzzled Reagan announced into an open microphone: "I didn't hear." Like a jack-in-the-box, Bush popped up to cup his hand around Reagan's ear and whisper what the tree sitter had said about Jimmy Carter: "He's a

dicted with characteristic preppie self-confidence: "I'll get into the inner circle because I'm intelligent and motivated by what's in the best interest of the country." Reagan has said that he will seek Bush's advice on foreign affairs, national security matters and relations with Capitol Hill, befitting Bush's background as a former Congressman, envoy to the U.N. and China and director of the CIA. Bush will probably urge a policy of caution and balance, two qualities that Reagan had trouble convincing some voters he possessed.

But Bush makes clear that he expects to operate strictly behind the scenes while

plied: "None." And this fall, as Reagan's running mate, he conducted a campaign that was the very model of self-effacement. He said so little of national interest that a reporter for the Los Angeles Times once phoned his editors to discuss a Bush story, was put on hold and fell asleep; when the reporter woke up six hours later, he found he was still on hold.

Bush frequently did make regional headlines and get on local TV news shows with ringing defenses of Reagan against Jimmy Carter's attacks—and indeed against the criticism that Bush himself had voiced during the Republican primaries. Asked about his charge that Reagan's plan for a 30% cut in income tax rates over the next three years constituted "voodoo economics," Bush blandly replied that Reagan had changed his economic policies (true, but not about the depth of tax cuts). As Election Day neared, some of Bush's aides griped privately that Reagan had run a bumbling campaign; one grumbled that if Bush had been the nominee, he would have been leading in the polls by 20 points. But Bush praised Reagan warmly to the end, telling one audience in Pittsburgh's black ghetto that "there is not a bigoted bone in Ronald Reagan's body. Not one."

Such loyalty is all the more remarkable because Reagan initially balked at putting Bush on the ticket; he doubted Bush's toughness. As the campaign began, the two knew each other chiefly from having shared podiums at party functions and debates during the primaries; Bush cannot remember ever having seen a movie starring Reagan. Bush insists that they now get along famously. "I really, really like the man," he bubbles. They conferred by phone about three times a week during the campaign, but Reagan paid Bush the compliment of letting him run his own race, secure in the knowledge that Bush would not upstage him. Bush also won Reagan's regard by scoring well among suburban voters, who found in Bush's dress and Eastern Establishment airs an image of reassuring moderation.

For all his determined playing of second fiddle, Bush still yearns for the top spot. Late in the campaign, he made one rare show of independence: at a time when there were many crucial swing states to visit on Reagan's behalf, Bush waited out a snowstorm to fly to the safe state of Iowa and campaign for Congressman Thomas Tauke, who had endorsed Bush on the eve of the Iowa caucuses that rocketed Bush to national renown in January. Much as Bush may have to stay under wraps, the vice presidency will give him many more chances to repay such past favors, rebuild the network of supporters he established during two years of arduous campaigning for the 1980 nominations, and otherwise prepare for a renewed White House bid of his own.

—By George J. Church, Reported by Douglas Brow and Evan Thomas with Bush



The Vice President-elect with Wife Barbara (left) celebrating in Houston Ready, preppie and planning to crash his chief's inner circle.

jerk." Reagan chuckled, and Bush sat down smiling, glad to have been of service.

That scene illustrates the paradox that Bush will face when he is sworn in as Vice President. As No. 2 to a President who will turn 70 only 17 days after his Inauguration, Bush has unusually strong prospects of some day succeeding to the Oval Office himself. Quite apart from any possibility that he might have to finish Reagan's term, the widespread expectation that Reagan will retire after four years makes Bush a potential front runner for the Republican presidential nomination in 1984. But Bush knows that he can capitalize on his position only by loyally serving a very traditionalist chief who will probably require him to play the Vice President's classic public role of Invisible Man—and that he can exert influence only by metaphorically, if not literally, whispering into Reagan's ear.

As Bush sometimes told campaign audiences, "If I gain Reagan's confidence, I'll have tons to do. If I don't, I'll be going to funerals in Paraguay." To TIME he pre-

dicted little in the public eye, except perhaps attending those foreign funerals. His model Vice President is Nelson Rockefeller. At meetings of the National Security Council that Bush attended in 1975-76 as head of the CIA, he recalls, "Rockefeller gave his advice and would speak up even if he disagreed with President Ford. He was strong, and Ford was impressed." Bush says he will do the same, but he adds that "if Reagan took a position that I disagreed with, I would not try to embarrass the President of the United States" by even leaking dissent. He showed that style during the campaign. While Bush was visiting China in August, Reagan said he favored "official" relations between the U.S. and Taiwan; Bush was infuriated but kept his anger to himself and tried to assure his hosts that Reagan's remarks had been misinterpreted.

Bush has been practicing a long time for such a role. In his Government posts, he loyally carried out presidential orders; asked once how much autonomy he had enjoyed as a diplomat, he candidly re-

U.S. Energy: A 3% Solution?

By Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin

CAMBRIDGE, Mass. — The battle over decontrol of oil prices and then the windfall-profits tax befogged the outlook for U.S. oil production. The Presidential-campaign energy debate has confused matters further. The real question is not "how much can domestic production be increased?" but rather "can the decline be slowed?"

In 1970, U.S. oil production peaked; then the decline set in. That decline, measured against growing demand, led to the vast growth in oil imports. This growth, in turn, has been one of the major pressures that has led to the current unstable market with its high prices.

The trend is likely to become more pronounced in the 80s. Domestic production in the lower 48 states has declined from 11.3 million barrels a day in 1970 to 8.7 million today. The addition of Alaskan oil, fortunately, has added 1.6 million more barrels a day, so total domestic production is now 10.3 million a day. To keep domestic production at today's level through 1990, an average of 3.7 million barrels would have to be added to domestic reserves annually.

Decline Predicted

However, there have been only four years in the last 20 when that many barrels have been added. Indeed, forecasts indicate that domestic production will fall by 1990 to 6 to 7 million barrels daily — a decline of 30 to 40 percent.

Given the production declines in existing oilfields, even this lower figure assumes considerable success in finding new oil. Giant or supergiant fields could be found but the probability is very low. Higher prices and improved technology will make some extra oil available that would not otherwise be available, and the United States needs every extra barrel it can get.

But the effect will be to slow the decline, not reverse it. Bigger fields tend to be found sooner. Higher prices are necessary to make it profitable to produce oil from the smaller, higher-cost fields.

In addition to all this, relatively poor results from drilling in the Baltimore Canyon in the Atlantic has contributed to pessimism. It can take a decade to bring a major new region into production. So, in effect, the United States can look ahead a decade, and there is nothing in sight in the 1980s to compare with Alaska in the 1970s. Thus, the likely decline.

Such a fall is alarming. If it is not made up in one way or another, the United States faces an unsavory choice: either try to increase oil imports, or experience periods of slow economic growth interspersed by recessions.

Recent forecasts have argued that the shortfall will be made up in two ways: by higher rates of energy efficiency, and by a considerable substitution of other domestic fuels.

Nub of Matter

We agree with the projections that show only a 20-percent decline in natural-gas production and a 50-percent increase in coal supply. It is in projections for synthetic fuels and nuclear power that we see wishful thinking at work. The forecasts project by 1990 a tripling of nuclear power — the addition of 2.8 million barrels daily of oil equivalent — and a growth in synthetic fuels from zero to 1.5 million barrels a day of oil equivalent.

Given the problems of the utility industry, the long lead times, and political controversy, the nuclear estimate seems wildly optimistic. So does that for synthetic fuels, which face long lead times, large investments, uncertain environmental effects, and technologies not commercially proved.

Here we come to the nub of the matter. Make the nuclear-fuel and synthetic-fuel estimates more realistic. Assume that there is a considerable increase in energy efficiency. But also assume a modest amount of economic growth. In such circumstances, the U.S. demand for oil imports could reach more than 12 million barrels a day by 1990, compared to an average of 8.4 million last year. But that much oil will not be available in the world. Seeking it, the United States would create enormous strains in relations with other industrial nations, enormous tensions in the world market, enormous economic problems at home.

The United States has an alternative. The prudent course is to assume that it is unlikely to see any substantial growth in total domestic energy supplies because of the shortfall resulting from the precipitous decline in domestic oil production.

U.S. Goal

Thus, the U.S. national goal should be to become 3 percent more energy-efficient each year. That would allow a respectable 3-percent annual rate of economic growth without counting on any

growth in energy supply. We can meet this goal. In recent years, the United States has achieved a 1.5-percent increase yearly in energy productivity, and if energy productivity is given the same level of federal aid as synthetic fuels, the 3-percent goal is reachable.

At the same time, the United States should be doing everything it reasonably can to stimulate domestic energy production — but remembering that the task is more urgent and more difficult than is generally thought.

Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin are co-editors of "Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School." They wrote this article for The New York Times.

Purit

BOSTON — Next week in Madrid the countries that signed the Helsinki Agreement in 1975 meet to review how it has been carried out. The conference is a chance for the United States and the West to indict the Soviet Union for its brutal violations of the Helsinki pledges on human rights — the barriers to Jewish emigration, the confinement of dissidents in mental hospitals, the imprisonment of scientists who call attention to Helsinki.

Ronald Reagan was asked by Newsweek whether he would send a U.S. delegation to Madrid if he were president. He replied:

"Frankly, I have an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can't go, why should the diplomats go?"

Callousness

In other words, Gov. Reagan thinks that sending athletes to Moscow for the Games advertises Communism as the same thing sending diplomats to Madrid denounce Soviet tyranny. The ignorance of that view vies with callousness.

Yet there are liberal-Americans, people concerned with human rights, who say they see a difference between Ronald Reagan and President Carter. They cite the example of an amazing pro-

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— Letter

« dans sa tentative de lutter contre l'inflation en faisant ce qu'il avait juré de ne pas faire : utiliser le chômage comme outil. »

(Interview du magazine « Time », le 30 juin 1980.)

L'ENERGIE

« Dans notre sous-sol et au large de nos côtes, d'importantes réserves de pétrole et de gaz naturel demeurent intactes parce que l'administration actuelle paraît convaincue que le peuple américain préfère un renforcement de la réglementation, un relèvement des impôts, et une augmentation des mesures de contrôle à un accroissement des ressources énergétiques.

« Le charbon offre des possibilités énormes. Cela vaut aussi pour l'énergie nucléaire, à condition de la soumettre à des mesures de sécurité très strictes. Elle pourrait, en effet, alimenter en électricité des milliers d'industries et des millions de logements, et fournir des millions d'emplois. Son développement ne doit pas être entravé par une minuscule minorité hostile à la croissance économique, dont les campagnes d'obstruction trouvent souvent des oreilles complaisantes dans les agences fédérales de protection de l'environnement. »

(Idem.)

Le monde 6/80

Il 4 novembre gli americani sceglieranno tra Carter e Reagan: in ogni caso è evidente una crisi di legittimazione dell'istituzione centrale del sistema politico americano

La fine delle presidenze imperiali



Reagan e Carter in campagna elettorale. Qualunque sia il risultato della consultazione, sembra ormai si debba ritenere superata la fase politica in cui fu possibile quasi teorizzare l'esistenza di un'incolombabile distinzione di campi tra politica interna e politica estera

Appare definitivamente superata un'intera fase politica. I traumi della vita pubblica degli anni '70, dalla guerra del Vietnam al Watergate, hanno lasciato segni non rimarginabili. La difesa del negoziato sugli armamenti esprime una presa d'atto dei mutamenti nel mondo. Un processo di modificazione strutturale che si esprime nell'insoddisfazione dell'elettorato

di Leonardo Paggi

New York, ottobre. — Con la trasmissione in diretta da Cleveland del confronto televisivo Carter-Reagan, non certo entusiasmante, la campagna elettorale ha toccato il suo acme agonistico. Contemporaneamente la questione degli ostaggi, che quasi un anno fa impresse un corso determinante a tutto l'andamento delle primarie, sembra ora voler sigillare su un risultato a sorpresa la conclusione di questa lunga ed estenuante competizione politica. Eppure non si ha certo l'impressione che quel senso di scetticismo, di disaffezione e di disinteresse che è stato finora largamente dominante, stia improvvisamente per dissolversi. Si potrebbe fare un'antologia, anche non priva di *humour*, delle battute irriverenti sui candidati presidenziali, e gli *staff* rispettivi, che sono comparse sulla stampa. Per non parlare dell'incertezza e dell'imbarazzo che sono immediatamente percettibili tra la gente, e che gli stessi sondaggi elettorali continuano a mettere in evidenza. E, ciò nonostante, sarebbe un errore attribuire tutto questo ad una presunta tradizionale disaffezione di questo paese dalla politica.

In realtà alla politica si pensa e di politica si parla molto in queste settimane, un po' dovunque; e occorre aggiungere che sarebbe difficile fare altrimenti, dal momento che tutta la gigantesca rete dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa del paese risulta, in mille modi, quasi monopolizzata dagli sviluppi delle presidenziali: dalle notizie sugli avvenimenti del giorno, alle inserzioni pubblicitarie dei candidati o dei partiti, alle lunghe tavole rotonde di esperti sui problemi più scottanti via via sollevati dal dibattito politico. Se dunque la grande macchina elettorale americana, ad onta delle sue sofisticate tecnologie, sembra sprovvista di ogni forza griffante, le ragioni vanno cercate altrove: fondamentalmente nella percezione largamente diffusa che lo svolgimento del dialogo politico, con le relative dichiarazioni di intenti, finisce per essere un'immagine riflessa sempre più pallida ed estenuata della durezza dei problemi e delle alternative che si pongono nella vita del paese.

Dopo una lunga fase interlocutoria

nella quale avevano assunto un peso determinante toni esclusivamente personalistici, la campagna elettorale ha finalmente affrontato, nelle ultime due, tre settimane, i grandi temi scottanti. Si riconferma ancora una volta come i temi relativi alla questione femminile (in primo luogo l'aborto) e all'insieme dei diritti civili siano diventati un punto fermo, e ormai quasi endemico, dello scontro politico su tutta l'area dei paesi di capitalismo avanzato. Ma due, in particolare, sono i temi che in questi ultimi giorni Carter e Reagan non hanno potuto fare a meno di assumere come dirimenti dei rispettivi indirizzi politici: da un lato il problema dell'inflazione e dell'insieme della situazione economica del paese; dall'altro quello della pace e della guerra. Ebbene, proprio su questi che appaiono essere i due grandi banchi di prova degli Stati Uniti degli anni '80 (come del resto già lo furono per il passato), la volontà di disegnare possibili alternative globali a ciò che fino ad ora è stato fatto (presente soprattutto nella campagna del candidato repubblicano), o di prospettare soluzioni alternative di carattere taumaturgico appare in larghissima parte destituita di ogni effettiva attendibilità. Una capacità di diversificazione dei candidati inversamente proporzionale all'acutezza dei dilemmi posti sul tappeto: questa sembra essere, qui come altrove, la legge che governa un processo di vera e propria implosione della politica.

I dati ufficiali resi noti nell'ultima settimana sembrano riprodurre un'immagine ormai abbastanza consueta dello stato dell'economia americana. Nel mese di settembre la produzione industriale registra un aumento netto dell'1 per cento, il maggiore che si sia avuto dal maggio del 1979. E' la prova definitiva che la breve recessione del secondo quadrimestre è giunta a termine prima del previsto. Ma nello stesso periodo di tempo l'indice dei prezzi sale ancora dell'1 per cento secondo un tasso annuale di inflazione che è del 12,7 per cento. In un quadro internazionale che nel corso del 1980 è stato di tipo nettamente recessivo, l'economia americana, pur non potendosi certo avvantaggiare di consistenti livelli di esportazione, ha evitato l'arresto dello sviluppo pur pagando il prezzo dell'inflazione a due cifre, determinata da una sostanziale con-

tinuità di politiche espansive. Su questo stato di cose è tornata ad esercitarsi la critica di Reagan in un discorso televisivo di mezzogiorno nel corso del quale la politica economica di Carter è stata definita «un fallimento di dimensioni così grandi e di effetti così devastanti, che non ha paragoni nella storia americana», ma è ormai largamente noto che, a parte un complesso stratagemma tecnico secondo cui si potrebbe realizzare una decurtazione delle tasse, la quale, per gli effetti positivi indotti sui tassi di attività economica non dovrebbe implicare alcuna riduzione del prelievo fiscale, il candidato repubblicano non sembra avere ricette peculiari. Anzi egli deve ancora una spiegazione circa il modo in cui pensa di conciliare una lotta all'inflazione più decisa di quella sostenuta dall'amministrazione in carica con la richiesta di ulteriori incrementi dei livelli, ormai assai alti, della spesa pubblica permanenti.

Pod darsi dunque che una dura campagna di aggressione alle tradizionali basi operative del Partito democratico degli Stati industriali del Northeast e del Midwest dia i suoi frutti dal punto di vista della raccolta dei voti. Ma è certo che il candidato repubblicano non è riuscito sino ad ora a dare indicazioni realmente alternative. E forse non a caso. L'America non è l'Inghilterra, e se è vero che il liberismo continua, paradossalmente, ad essere una componente assai importante dello spettro ideologico del paese, è altrettanto indubbio che il blocco degli interessi legati ad una politica di sviluppo è troppo grande per essere sfidato impunemente anche con semplici dichiarazioni deflazioniste. Del resto a sottolineare ulteriormente la sproporzione che esiste tra le proposte politiche definite per contrapposizione alla campagna elettorale e la complessità dei fattori che alimentano le difficoltà dell'economia statunitense vale ricordare i tratti generali dell'analisi della crisi condotta dall'economista del Mit Lester C. Thurow nel suo recentissimo libro *The zero-sum society*, e che oggi registra una convergenza vastissima di consensi.

Una società può essere definita a somma zero — per analogia con la teoria dei giochi — quando i guadagni da parte di alcuni individui o gruppi sociali implicano perdite corrispondenti da parte di altri. L'accettare di giocare

questo gioco, che costituisce come è noto una netta antitesi di tutta la filosofia radicata fino alla precedente esperienza americana, significa anche riconoscere il ruolo determinante del governo politico dello sviluppo, almeno nella misura in cui la produzione di risorse materiali non è più considerata un metodo idoneo a garantire una « soluzione » spontanea e automatica del conflitto. « Quando si sono vantaggi economici da realizzare — scrive Thurow — il nostro sistema politico è in grado di farlo. Quando ci sono invece delle perdite da dividere, esso è paralizzato. E con la paralisi politica viene la paralisi economica ».

Le soluzioni dunque ci sono per ciascuno dei grandi problemi — inflazione, energia, produttività, crescita — che in modi diversi costituiscono altrettanti esempi paradigmatici di un gioco a somma zero. Ma ciascuna di esse implica l'esistenza di prezzi che qualcuno deve pagare. L'analisi economica trapassa in quella politica. Sorge l'interrogativo finale se il processo di formazione della volontà operante attualmente negli Stati Uniti sia in grado di realizzare una selezione della domanda, tale da consentire l'accettazione di queste nuove regole del gioco. Ed è appunto sulla soglia di questi problemi che la competizione elettorale in corso, quale si configura ormai come spunto alternativo tra due personaggi, rischia una caduta verticale di senso.

Non meno complesso appare il quadro delle questioni aperte sull'altro grande versante del rapporto pace-guerra, cui la questione degli ostaggi sta ora aggiungendo nuovi elementi di incertezza. In che misura la riapertura di una trattativa (resa trasparente dagli accenti di Muskie all'« invasione » irachena e all'opposizione degli Usa ad ogni « smembramento » dell'Iran) per un rilascio immediato degli ostaggi è compatibile con gli interessi americani di più lungo periodo nella regione del Golfo, e soprattutto con quella posizione di neutralità che oggi sembra ripetutamente, urgentemente, richiesta dalla gravità della crisi a ciascuna delle due superpotenze? La concessione di ricambi militari all'Iran non rischia di fare precipitare una compatta opposizione anti-americana del blocco degli Stati arabi? Sono domande che si stanno avanzando forse non senza motivo in questi giorni, ma qualunque

NUOVA YORK — Il tasso della produttività dell'economia americana è aumentato nel terzo trimestre di quest'anno del 2,6 per cento. L'ha annunciato il dipartimento del lavoro, sottolineando come tale dato confermi la tesi dell'amministrazione Carter secondo cui la recessione è terminata con il secondo trimestre, periodo nel quale la produttività subì un calo del 3,7 per cento.

Ma di questo parere non è David Rockefeller, forse l'uomo di punta del sistema bancario americano, che si appresta a lasciare la carica di presidente della Chase Manhattan Bank. Secondo Rockefeller, che è uno strenuo difensore di Reagan, gli economisti del presidente Carter hanno annunciato troppo in fretta la fine della recessione.

In un'intervista che appare nel numero di questa settimana del «Mondo», Rockefeller non lesina critiche nei confronti del governo: «Molti dei problemi americani — dice — derivano da uno scarso senso di previggenza. Il governo americano troppo spesso si è dato alla pazzia gioia. Capisco la necessità di un disavanzo di spesa occasionale per stimolare un'economia fuori fase, ma negli ultimi due decenni il bilancio è stato gestito in rosso accumulando un deficit di 380 miliardi di dollari. Questa è stata la maggior fonte di inflazione. Il risultato, naturalmente, è stato quello di deprezzare il dollaro e di far lievitare i prezzi».

Secondo Rockefeller «gli Stati Uniti devono impegnarsi con urgenza a risolvere i problemi attuali e futuri ricorrendo a qualche forma di programmazione a medio e lungo termine». Per quanto riguarda il problema della disoccupazione, il

Deputy

By Kevin Kliese
Washington Post Service

MOSCOW — Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, the second-most powerful man in the Kremlin during the 16-year era of Leonid Brezhnev, was dropped from his government post Thursday at his own request because of poor health.

The premier, who is 76 and had a severe heart attack last year from which he has not recovered, was succeeded by Nikolai Tikhonov, 75, a Brezhnev protégé who has been first deputy premier for the last four years and a full Politburo member since 1979.

Mr. Kosygin's retirement was announced in a message by Mr. Brezhnev to a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in the Great Kremlin Palace Thursday afternoon. It marks the most significant leadership change since Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin came to power in October, 1964, after Khrushchev was ousted as supreme Soviet leader. Mr. Kosygin's resignation is the first time in the 63-year history of the Soviet state that a party chief or premier has retired honorably.

Mr. Brezhnev, party chief since then and president since 1977, said that Mr. Kosygin also asked to be relieved of his seat on the Politburo. The request is expected to be granted soon after a regular leadership meeting.

Apparent Precedent

The choice of Mr. Tikhonov

The Grain Embargo

This year could well turn out to be an exceedingly bad one for the world food supply. (Just to keep things from getting too easy, agricultural years coincide with neither the calendar year nor the fiscal year — they run from July to June, so that "this year" ends in June 1981.) The latest evidence comes from an unusually self-critical speech delivered by President Brezhnev to the party's Central Committee early this week. Without being specific, Mr. Brezhnev hinted that the Soviet grain harvest would fall far below its goal of 235 million tons. How far below is not yet known, but the consensus among experts is that the harvest will be bad but not disastrous.

As it happens, the Soviet Union will not be alone in its bad luck. The U.S. harvest will be way down from last year's. Canada and Australia have also been hit by the drought that damaged U.S. crops. And Argentina is reported to have had such a bad harvest that it has canceled all its export contracts for the year.

This small group of four countries exhausts the list of major grain-exporting nations. Americans accustomed to an abundant and reliable domestic food supply find it hard to remember the extent to which they enjoy a unique situation. Just before World War II every continent except Western Europe exported grain, but today only North America is a net exporter. The United States alone produces 60 percent of the world's sup-

ply of exports in the grain market. Arabia dominates the rest.

This contrast underscores the enormous power of the contrary. From Kennedy to Reagan, groups in this embargo have been feeling the pinch. The Polish food shortage is necessary to people why many are so high a priority to improving the natural sector.

The effects of the cutoff of U.S. grain are up without doubt. Reserves to draw on for years, such as the option may be closed. It has been obvious all along. When the Soviet Union entered the international grain market in 1972, it did not choose to be dependent on its principal adversary; it simply discovered that no other combination of suppliers could fill its needs. In this connection, Mr. Carter — and John Anderson, who has alone among other candidates supported the embargo — was right.

THE WASHINGTON POST.

FINANZA

WALL STREET

Il Gene ha fatto boom

Per trovare un precedente a quello che è successo martedì 14 ottobre a Wall Street bisogna risalire agli anni ruggenti della borsa americana prima del crack del '29, quando i sindacati speculativi facevano impennare le quotazioni di un titolo e lucravano milioni di dollari in poche ore. Era le dieci, ora di apertura della contrattazione, e le 10.25 del mattino, l'azione Genentech (iscritta per la prima volta al listino) è passata dai 35 dollari del prezzo di emissione a 80 dollari: un balzo del 128%. La sola Merrill Lynch,

lioni di dollari ciascuno. E Robert Scheller, che da studente aveva lavorato per la Genentech ricevendo in cambio delle sue prestazioni 15 mila azioni della società, è diventato improvvisamente milionario in dollari.

La spiegazione dell'apparente ondata di follia che ha colpito Wall Street è che la Genentech è la prima società di bioingegneria quotata in borsa. Considerati apprendisti stregoni da una parte della comunità scientifica e pionieri ai limiti estremi della genetica dagli scienziati più avventurosi, i bioingegneri tentano di modificare in laboratorio i codici riproduttivi delle cellule (Dna) per ottenere microrganismi rari in natura e quindi estremamente costosi. Le applicazioni potenziali della bioingegneria, quindi, sono vastissime: dalla fabbricazione dell'insulina alla

costruzione di ormoni, dalla strutturazione di fertilizzanti per l'agricoltura alla produzione di enzimi mangiapetrolio per ripulire i mari dalle chiazze di idrocarburi che li deturmano.



Union soviétique

LA SESSION DU SOVIET SUPRÊME

Le président du Gosplan confirme le ralentissement de la croissance économique

ÉCART VRSR
tyliere.
d'après
ult. annuel

De notre correspondant

Le Soviet suprême poursuit à Moscou l'examen du plan et du budget. On remarque l'absence à cette session de M. Kossyguine. Le chef du gouvernement, malade, n'a eu aucune activité publique depuis le 3 août.

de 168 à 171 roubles avec un effort particulier pour les citoyens les plus défavorisés (médecins, enseignants et travailleurs des services...). La rémunération mensuelle des khokhoziens augmentera de 4,1 % pour atteindre 123 roubles.

Construction de centrales nucléaires

Dans le secteur de l'énergie, qui sera une des priorités du prochain Plan, la production d'électricité devrait passer à 1335 milliards de kilowatts-heure (soit une augmentation de 3,5 %). L'accent sera mis sur la construction des centrales nucléaires, notamment dans la fédération de Russie où les sources traditionnelles d'énergie sont en voie d'épuisement. La croissance de la production pétrolière sera très faible puisqu'elle n'est fixée qu'à 1,7 % (600 à 610 millions de tonnes). La production de gaz s'accroîtra au rythme actuel d'environ 5 % alors que le charbon dont l'extraction a baissé au cours des dernières années, devrait faire un bond de 15 %.

M. Baïbakov a annoncé que les échanges avec les pays socialistes augmenteront plus vite l'année prochaine que ceux avec le reste du monde. La part de ces États dans le commerce extérieur soviétique devrait augmenter de 3 points. Si cet objectif se réalise, il sera contraire à l'évolution de ces dernières années : malgré les déclarations des dirigeants soviétiques sur le renforcement de la coopération avec les pays frères, les échanges commerciaux avec le monde capitaliste ont augmenté à un rythme beaucoup plus rapide.

La présentation du budget par M. Garbouzov n'a réservé aucune surprise. Les recettes et les dépenses sont équilibrées à 298 milliards de roubles. Quant aux dépenses militaires, elles continuent à baisser régulièrement (17,05 milliards de roubles en 1981 contre 17,1 milliards de roubles en 1980) ce qui ne manque pas d'étonner pour un pays qui met sans cesse en avant le renforcement de sa capacité défensive.

DANIEL VERNET.

(1) 1 rouble = 6,50 F au cours officiel.

● Un appel de M. Sakharov pour un poste ukrainien. — L'académicien, exilé depuis janvier 1980 à Gorki, a, par le truchement de sa femme, demandé aux « écrivains et poètes du monde entier » de prendre la défense du poète ukrainien Vassili Stouss, condamné la semaine dernière à quinze ans de détention pour « agitation et propagande antisoviétique ». — (A.F.P.)

Moscou. — Le discours prononcé le mercredi 22 octobre par M. Baïbakov, président du Gosplan, devant les mille cinq cents députés du Soviet Suprême, a confirmé le ralentissement du rythme de la croissance économique au cours du dixième Plan qui s'achève, sans avoir été pleinement réalisé, et la modestie des objectifs pour le prochain quinquennat (1981-1985).

Encore doit-on se demander si les chiffres avancés officiellement correspondent à une quelconque réalité. Ils ne sont en tout cas pas exempts de contradictions internes. Ainsi les investissements globaux pour 1981 s'élèveront à 149 milliards de roubles (1), selon l'administration du Plan, alors que les investissements de l'État seul sont fixés à 162 milliards de roubles par le projet de budget.

M. Baïbakov a indiqué que cette année le revenu national augmentera de 3,3 % pour atteindre 436 milliards de roubles ; le revenu moyen par habitant de 3 % (contre 2,9 % prévus par le plan). La production industrielle croîtra de 4 Z, alors que l'objectif du plan était de 4,5 %. La productivité du travail progressera également moins vite que ne l'auraient souhaité les responsables. Enfin, M. Baïbakov a été très discret sur les résultats agricoles de cette année en se contentant d'expliquer que la production agricole globale avait en moyenne augmenté de 9 % par an au cours de ce quinquennat par rapport aux cinq ans précédents, et il a prévu une croissance encore plus faible en 1981 (7,5 %), insuffisante sans doute pour satisfaire les besoins de la population en produits alimentaires.

Si les grandes lignes du onzième Plan quinquennal sont déjà sur le papier, il n'en a rien été révélé pendant la session du Soviet suprême qui a officiellement adopté le projet de Plan pour 1981... Selon ce texte, le revenu national devrait augmenter de 3,4 %, le revenu moyen par habitant de 2,9 %, la production industrielle de 4,1 % avec un léger avantage au secteur B (bien de consommation) par rapport au secteur A (industrie de base). Le projet de budget prévoit, lui, que « le gros des investissements ira à l'industrie lourde, base de l'économie socialiste ». La priorité pour les biens de consommation annoncée par M. Brejnev est donc modestement prise en compte.

M. Baïbakov a annoncé que le salaire mensuel moyen des ouvriers et des employés passerait

URSS. Scioperi operai e manifestazioni di studenti in Estonia. È la seconda volta in poche settimane

MOSCA. (a. d.) Scioperi operai e agitazioni studentesche si sarebbero ripetuti due volte nelle settimane scorse a Tartu, la seconda città dell'Estonia dopo il capoluogo Tallinn, teatro a sua volta di manifestazioni studentesche concluse con scontri di piazza e arresti alla fine di settembre. Motivazioni economiche e politiche sarebbero confluite nel determinare la protesta: per primi sarebbero scesi in sciopero — secondo fonti del dissenso estone a Stoccolma — gli operai della «Katseremonditehas», una fabbrica di macchine agricole di Tartu, contro l'aumento del ritmo deciso dalla direzione e il ritardo nel pagamento dei premi di produzione. Lo sciopero sarebbe durato due giorni, l'1 e il 2 ottobre, e si sarebbe concluso con l'accettazione da parte dell'azienda delle richieste operale. L'azienda avrebbe voluto rifiutare, dicono le fonti, ma il cedimento è avvenuto su pressione di due alti funzionari di Mosca, preoccupati di far finire subito le agitazioni. Una settimana dopo, il 10 ottobre, si sarebbero poi svolti dei cortei studenteschi nelle strade di Tartu per protestare contro l'eccessiva ingerenza russa nella repubblica e contro la repressione che in precedenza aveva colpito gli studenti di Tallinn.

nel mondo

Mentre in Polonia continua il successo del solidarnosc e di Walesa

Scioperi in Ungheria: dopo Danzica, Budapest?

Conclusa a Varsavia la riunione dei ministri degli esteri del Patto orientale. Rilanciata una conferenza sul disarmo in Europa

VARSAVIA

BUDAPEST, 20 — Dopo la Polonia l'Ungheria? Il vento di Danzica sembra soffiare ora anche sulle rive del Danubio. Secondo fonti attendibili, scioperi spontanei di alcune ore si sarebbero avuti in alcune fabbriche nelle vicinanze della capitale ungherese. Del resto una conferma indiretta all'agitazione è venuta da parte del leader dei sindacati ufficiali, Sandor Gaspar, che, in una intervista al quotidiano *Nepszabadsag* parlando degli scioperi ha affermato: «Quello che non possiamo ottenere senza gli scioperi non potremmo ottenerlo neppure con gli scioperi. Lo sciopero non rientra negli strumenti dell'edificazione socialista». Il riferimento alle recenti agitazioni è evidente.

nel su del paese accolto con molto interesse dalla popolazione. Nella capitale polacca si è oggi conclusa la riunione del comitato dei ministri degli esteri del Patto di Varsavia. I ministri sono stati ricevuti dal segretario del POUP Kania.

Come riferisce la PAP, durante i due giorni della riunione il comitato ha discusso i problemi connessi con la conferenza di Madrid e quelli legati alla convocazione di una conferenza sulla distensione militare e il disarmo in Europa.

Va ricordato a tale proposito che il ministro bulgaro Petyr Mladenov, durante il ricevimento ieri al consiglio dei ministri offerto dal primo ministro Josef Piankowski, ha confermato «d'intenzione comune» dei paesi socialisti d'organizzare questa conferenza a Varsavia, nella capitale «della Polonia socialista». L'organizzazione di una conferenza sul disarmo in Europa da tenersi a Varsavia è stata per la prima volta proposta, all'inizio dell'anno da Edward Gierk, l'ex primo segretario del POUP.

mondo? La media anagrafica del Politburo che nel 1918 era sui 35 anni, oggi è ormai sui 70. L'invecchiamento è stato progressivo quanto inesorabile. Nel 1953, alla morte di Stalin, i quattro principali aspiranti alla successione, Malenkov, Kruscev, Molotov, Beria, producevano insieme una media di 57 anni. Nel 1964, al momento del colpo di palazzo contro Kruscev, essa saliva ai 62. Ora, eliminato Kossighin, nato nel 1904, i due più importanti personaggi che restano

Carter

LA STAMPA

INTERVISTA CON IL RIVALI

Reagan d.

Secondo il candidato repubblicano alla «merica» - «Le nostre difese sono deteriorate» - «I Paesi Nato devono fare di più» - Migliorare i rapporti con la Cina, «

Questa intervista del candidato repubblicano Ronald Reagan è stata concessa a Ranan R. Lurie, analista politico e columnist di *Die Welt*. È un'esclusiva del quotidiano tedesco e, in Italia, di *La Stampa*.

D. — Governatore Reagan, ho analizzato il suo atteggiamento verso i problemi della difesa: è corretto riassumerlo con le parole «investimenti per la difesa» piuttosto che «spese per la difesa»?

R. — Sì, è esatto. E l'investimento al quale penso è un investimento in favore della pace: sono convinto che il pericolo

non l'avremmo tollerato. Poco dopo venne a dirci che tutta la faccenda era «accettabile». Che cosa avrebbe potuto fare, invece? Quello era un momento di distensione tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica. I russi ne avevano approfittato da un

motivo di arruolare. È un vero guaio che ogni giorno la metà dei nostri aerei militari non possa decollare per mancanza di manutenzione.

Generali tedesco-occidentali mi hanno detto che l'esercito americano è passato

di anni di socialismo, al dinosauro della burocrazia sovietica di uccidere se stesso. Breznev ha però voluto dare un segno della sua volontà e ha elevato alla massima carica di «membro effettivo» del Politburo un giovanotto, per gli standards del PCUS, il quarantenne Mikhail Gorbaciov, ministro ed esperto in agricoltura. Un «ragazzo» nell'ufficio politico, dove l'età media è 70 anni.

Vittorio Zucconi
21 ott. 80
CC PCUS
Michajl Gorbaciov

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nato il risultato del referendum anti-nucleare del 1980, in cui la mozione contro le centrali nucleari è stata sonoramente battuta: forse era logico, poiché esso è stato tenuto il 23 settembre, giorno in cui l'Iraq ha invaso l'Iran. Ma è difficile dire quale delle due notizie sia più importante.

Importante è però sottolineare che la bilancia dei pagamenti italiani si chiuderà alla fine del 1980, con un passivo di circa 10 miliardi di dollari soprattutto a causa dell'importazione di materie prime energetiche. Ed è importante sottolineare la situazione impossibile in cui viene messo l'Enel.

Fedeli - nota?

Food Shortages Stressed

Brezhnev Hints Harvest Will Be Below Estimate

By R.W. Apple Jr.
New York Times Service

MOSCOW — President Leonid Brezhnev hinted Tuesday that the nation's vital grain harvest will be worse than anticipated this fall.

In a major economic report to the regular fall meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee, which formulates party policy, Mr. Brezhnev laid special stress on the problems of agriculture. He said the country was still having grave trouble supplying the cities and industrial centers with such foodstuffs as milk and meat.

The Soviet leader said he wanted to talk not about steel or transportation or energy, but about farming and consumer products, which he called questions on whose solution the living conditions of the Soviet people most directly depend. In the wake of the strikes in Poland, which were motivated in part by shortages, Mr. Brezhnev seemed to be saying to his own people that their government was conscious of their needs.

To ease the political tensions growing out of meat shortages, the Soviet Union had hoped this year for a near-record grain harvest of 235 million tons, much of which would have been used as fodder. The latest U.S. Department of Agriculture estimate anticipates a yield of only 205 million tons, but it now appears that the figure will be even lower.

Mr. Brezhnev told Tuesday's meeting, on the eve of a three-day session of the Supreme Soviet, the country's nominal legislature, that the grain harvest over the last five years would average more than 200 million tons a year, but he did not say how much more. If the average barely tops 200 million tons, the 1980 figure would be calamitously low — about 165 million tons.

But the burden of expert opinion suggested that the total would probably be somewhere between 190 and 200 million tons. Soviet agricultural sources have predicted in recent days that it will be at the lower end of that range — a disappointing result, but not a disastrous one like that of last year, when only 179 million tons of wheat was harvested.

In a move that underlined continuing Soviet farm problems, the

Central Committee elected Mikhail Gorbachov, a 49-year-old agricultural specialist, as a full member of the ruling Politburo.

Mr. Gorbachov has spent most of his career in the party bureaucracy in Stavropol, where he was born. Stavropol is a city of 250,000 in the grain-growing steppes just north of the Caucasus Mountains.

Two years ago, he came to Moscow as secretary for agricultural affairs of the Central Committee. If he stays out of political trouble, and particularly if he improves Soviet agricultural output, he would be an obvious candidate some day

for one of the seats in the Soviet hierarchy.

The committee also elected Leonid Kiselev, who came to the party leadership as a candidate of the Politburo.

U.S.

Of

By Richard
New York Times

WASHINGTON — Department officials permitted a six-month testing of the launched Cruise missile, authorizing its scheduling its deployment to West Germany in December, 1983.

The delay appears to complicate an already tense dispute over the new U.S. allies in Europe, which have been reluctant to place the missile placed on their soil with the Soviet Union, which has been eager to block the program.

Informed military officials blamed the delay on the \$2.7-billion program's technical difficulties, particularly in the computers and communications systems that control the sophisticated flying missile itself. They also noted that the program had to be developed from existing technology, rather than from a completely new design.

The officials said the program has been delayed because of the price of the program, which thus may cause problems with the 1982 budget cuts. The program is expected to cost \$355 million.



Swiss Passes Snowbound

ZURICH (UPI) — All of Switzerland's ten main Alpine passes are snowbound, the

(OK)

BUSINESS / FINANCE

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U.S. GNP Is Up At a Rate of 1%

From Agency Dispatches

WASHINGTON — The U.S. economy grew at a 1 percent annual rate in the third quarter due chiefly to a sharp rebound in personal spending, the Commerce Department said Friday.

A preliminary report showed the inflation-adjusted value of all goods and services — the real gross national product — rose by \$3.5 billion during the July-September period to an annual rate of \$1.41 trillion. The annual rate is determined by projecting the change in one quarter over a full 12 months.

Before adjusting for inflation, GNP rose 10.2 percent during the quarter, to \$2.58 trillion.

The third-quarter performance contrasted with the record 9.6-percent decline in real GNP in the second quarter and was another indication that the recession may be over.

But the increase stemmed mainly from a sizable increase in government-subsidized, multi-family housing units as the administration put record amounts of assistance into the beleaguered housing industry at the close of fiscal 1980 on Sept. 30. Increases in single-family homes housing starts were negligible.

The department said personal spending, which had fallen \$2.9 billion in the second quarter, rose \$55.2 billion in the third.

Business investment rose \$3.2 billion in the third quarter after a \$4.4 billion plunge in the second three months of the year.

The department's measure of inflation, called the GNP deflator, showed the price spiral slowed in the third quarter. The deflator indicated prices rose by 9.1 percent in the third quarter compared with 10.7 percent in the second.

Final Sales Rise 7.5%
The department said the turnaround was caused by a 3.7-percent, or \$91 billion, increase in final sales after a 10.2 percent decline

Chase Leads Rise In Prime Rate to 14%
Citibank

WORLD BUSINESS

Prize if he isn't guaranteed one already."

Last week Klein, 60, got his Nobel Prize—for his pioneering work in the development of the new analytical tool called the econometric model. Incorporating modern statistical analysis and computer technology, the system has revolutionized economic forecasting. Today models are used to predict everything from steel production to the impact of economic policy on employment, prices and national output.

At the heart of econometrics is the notion that economic events are interrelated—and that by careful study of historical relationships, equations can be constructed to determine, for example, the impact of changes

in farm prices on demand for durable goods. When Klein's first model, produced when he was only 24, correctly contradicted the widely held view that the United States would slip back into depression at the end of World War II, it did so with only twenty formulas. Today Klein's Wharton model contains more than 1,000 equations, and new refinements and statistics can be digested almost instantaneously.

Imperfect Science: But econometrics is still an imperfect science. In 1974, for example, all of the major models failed to predict the severity of that year's recession; more recently, none foresaw the soaring inflation in 1980's first quarter. In part, the difficulties stem from reliance on historical data in an age when events seem to

be accelerating and consumers and businessmen behave in radically new ways. In addition, all of the best-known models reflect the view that output is determined chiefly by demand—a theory that many economists now believe is inadequate to explain the problems of the past decade.

During the '76 campaign, for example, Klein urged greater fiscal stimulus and easier money to foster growth—and many economists now argue that such advice, followed by Carter, led the nation to its stagflationary impasse. But no one questions the value of the tool Klein refined. It is economic theory, not econometrics, that needs the services of a Nobel laureate.

HARRY ANDERSON with CONNIE LESLIE
in New York

FRIDMAN

gasoline stations on weekends and suspended export of sugar—used to manufacture the alcohol fuel that powers a growing share of the nation's cars. Finally, with the Iraqi connection severed, Brazil negotiated increased oil imports from Venezuela, Indonesia, Gabon, Saudi Arabia, China, Angola and the Soviet Union.

Export Market: All of that helped. But Brazil's stake in the gulf war goes far beyond oil supplies. In recent years the country has established a special \$2 billion trading relationship with Iraq, making it Brazil's largest export market in the Mideast. Now Brazil is stuck with a huge backup of shipments destined for the warring state. A \$70 million sale of Brazilian-built Volkswagens may be lost, and hostilities have

A Model Economist Wins a Nobel Prize

In December 1976, a newly elected Jimmy Carter was close to designating his chief mentor in economics, Lawrence R. Klein, as chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers. But Klein never went to Washington, partly because he wanted to continue his latest project at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School—an effort to create a computerized model of the global economy. "He's the central figure in the project," stressed a Wharton colleague at the time. "And that's the project that will guarantee him a Nobel

Thurow's command of English when most economists understand by escaping nautical mumbo-jumbo, he writes in a clear, concise style which non-Americans can appreciate. His book does not come return to the political ideas of the great nineteenth-century economists. The marriage of politics and economics is also the reason why his book is valuable.

Thurow's zero-sum framework indeed explain the failures of American economic policy. It shows real income losses or the real income gains of other countries turned the formulation of policy into a long adversary process in which his decisions are

needs to take. Nevertheless, each one of his ideas is challenging and worth arguing about. He does not attempt to provide a blueprint. But he does indicate a starting point for developing a new range of policies.

This should be a guidebook for those lonely, liberal voices, such as Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts, who realise yesterday's liberalism does not answer today's problems but who do not yet know what to replace it with. Liberals who are not yet aware of a need for new thinking, such as Senator Edward Kennedy, would profit even more by reading it. So would Mr Ronald Reagan, the more simplistic of whose free-market nostrums would not survive this book's hard-headed complexities. But it would be most painful of all for President Carter to read.

ARTICLES De notre correspondante

New-York. — Le secrétaire à la défense, M. Brown, a consacré une partie du discours qu'il a prononcé le 10 octobre au grave problème des effectifs de l'armée. Il a révélé qu'il manquait, par exemple, vingt mille sous-officiers dans les rangs de la marine. Les pro-

blèmes de défense dans la campagne contrairement à de l'une des causes du rétablissement

La conscription a mauvaise presse, et il se passe peu de manifestations de jeunes sans que pancartes et bannières ne la vouent aux gémonies. La modeste proposition de M. Carter de procéder au recense-

militaire, la question du recrutement paraît difficilement soluble. Depuis que le service militaire obligatoire a été abandonné en 1973, les spécialistes ont calculé que, du fait même de la chute de la démographie, le nombre des jeunes hommes

BOOKS

USA econ.

America's straitjacket

THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY

By Lester Thurow

Basic Books New York. 230 pages

\$12.95.

"Whose income do you and your party plan to cut in the process of solving the economic problems facing us?" That is the blunt question, above all others, that Lester Thurow, Professor of Economics

gain is obvious—but congress
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Solutions to inflation all
the zero-sum game. Prof
argues convincingly that m
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(including the present one)
and the young who tend
jobs, but these are groups
weakest influence on wages

BOOKS

ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN

The False Promise of the Modern American Presidency

By Godfrey Hodgson. Simon & Schuster. 296 pp. \$12.95.

Reviewed by Michael R. Beschloss

THE modern president is at once omnipotent and impotent, Godfrey Hodgson argues in this thoughtful and disturbing volume. Poised to exercise leadership, he finds an American constituency no longer schooled in followership. Elected to the most powerful office on earth, he strives to maintain an influence that will swiftly wane.

How to explain the paradox of the modern presidency? Hodgson points to the corroded links between the White House and the crucial sources of democratic authority. The president's chief weapon, Harry Truman believed, is the power to persuade. The targets of presidential persuasion today — the bureaucracy, Congress, party, media and, through them, the electorate — are indifferent or obsolescent or intransigent.

Hodgson, a longtime and perceptive British observer of U.S. politics, presents a convincing portrait of a presidency buffeted by the whirlwinds of latter-day Washington. As executive officials seek direction from private interest groups and congressional committees, the White House staff hectors Cabinet secretaries in the name of the president. "The best he can do," Hodgson observes, "is to rely on the hasty, hectic efforts of his 'small band of zealots' to ensure that the great, slow machine of the bureaucracy, whose proper function is to administer the delivery of services to the citizens, delivers political booty to the president with which he can reward his followers and retain the loyalty of his 'disciple-officials.'"

Congress has adopted the lineaments of the 18th-century Polish Diet, "where hundreds of independent members, bound by no ties of party and each as proud as a sovereign, jealously guarded the power to block anything the king might attempt without ever organizing any means of putting forward alternative policies of their own."

The political parties retain "little more than a vestigial function in presidential politics." Too frail to command significant support for presidential programs, they are mainly ignored for three years out of four. Nor can press, radio and television any longer substitute as a source of influence. The modern chief executive finds that he must fence with a skeptical media establishment and a public that is tuning out.

All of this is, for the most part, familiar territory, yet Hodgson presents it in a cogent fashion that serves him especially well in describing the stalemate between president and Congress. He has read widely and grounds his arguments on both contemporary journalism and scholarship. This balance is occasionally injured by an inclination to grand assertion. We are told, for instance, that "people supported George McGovern, after all, not because of what they could get out of it, and certainly not because they were overwhelmed by his charisma, but because they shared his convictions on the war."

The author tends also to overstate the direct influence of the media. "Television," he writes, "more than any other single force, has nominated and elected modern presidents (all except Gerald Ford), established their authority, and kept them in power." Even the most jaded among us might resist the supposition that if Richard Nixon "had contrived to moderate the intensity of his administration's conflict with the media, then perhaps he would have gotten away with it and lasted out his second term."

Hodgson offers a prescription that is more tentative than his diagnosis. He asks Americans to lower their expectations of presidential performance, and presidents to share their burdens more broadly. He believes that a national primary could increase participation and strengthen the parties. "If party leaders were to wheel and deal to preselect candidates ahead of the primary, the voters would always have the sanction of voting for the other party's candidate in the general election, or of 'going fishing.'"

He proposes that the roles of government institutions be more precisely distinguished to reduce paralyzing duplication and competition. Yet he also suggests that the separation of powers doctrine be laid aside in favor of certain innovations, such as the legislative veto, that help to bridge the gulf between president and Congress without upsetting the balance of power. "It may be time to recognize that, while the value of a system of checks and balances has been proved over and over again, and not least in the Watergate crisis, such safeguards do not logically or necessarily demand an impenetrable separation between the executive and the legislature."

Hodgson believes that congressmen should serve four-year terms concurrent with the president's, committing all to a common ticket and platform, and that the president should be encouraged to appoint a kind of "supercabinet council" from among his party's congressional leaders. The members of this institutionalized collegiality would frame presidential programs together, and therefore be more motivated to fight for them together.

Although this book is being published during a presidential campaign autumn, Hodgson has little confidence that the outcome will matter. The constraints upon recent U.S. presidents, he maintains, have been more structural than personal. Would that Americans were as intrigued by the state of the presidency as by the selection of the president. For, as this book cogently demonstrates, the powers of presidential persuasion today are in dangerous eclipse, and they can only be restored by thoughtful, daring and unsentimental reform.

Michael R. Beschloss is the author of "Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance." He wrote this review for *The Washington Post*.

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Jimmy Carter

dera, stando sempre alla Glad, che questa disposizione a saltare i fossi lo ha anche liberato dall'obbligo di mantenere gli impegni politici e la lealtà verso i collaboratori e imbarazzo verso chi abbandonava.

Concludendo, mentre diversi osservatori reputano la mania perfezionistica di Jimmy Carter, la sua caparbieta, l'incapacità a rimanere fedele ad un impegno, come contraddizioni incomprensibili, Betty Glad sostiene che invece tutto ciò è perfettamente logico in un tipo "espansionistico-narcisista": Carter avrebbe un'enorme considerazione del suo io-idealizzato mentre sarebbe estremamente incerto del suo io-reale.

MAURO CALAMANDREI

Tutte le cose che non ha imparato

New York. Di "Jimmy Carter alla ricerca della grande Casa Bianca" abbiamo parlato con la stessa autrice, Betty Glad e con due noti politologi: James Fallows, che dal 1976 al 1978 ha scritto i più importanti discorsi politici del presidente, e James Mac Gregor Burns, biografo di Roosevelt, Wilson e Kennedy, e autore tra l'altro di "Leadership", il più ambizioso studio sulla problematica del potere in una società democratica moderna.

DOMANDA. Una delle prove della carenza creativa di Carter, portate da Betty Glad nel suo libro sarebbe l'incapacità del presidente di assimilare le citazioni dotte che egli fa spesso nei suoi discorsi. Se Carter è così poco creativo come ha fatto a organizzare le campagne elettorali vincenti del 1970, e 1975-76?

GLAD. Non avrei mai ricordato le citazioni di Carter se lui stesso non ne avesse così spesso parlato a vanvera in conversazioni private.

BURNS. Carter enuncia i grandi principi che derivano dalla sua fede religiosa: suscita così grandi aspettative destinate però a rimanere insoddisfatte. Tutto ciò genera cinismo e sfiducia nel processo politico. In una vasta gamma di argomenti specifici, Carter ha spesso una straordinaria cono-

Jimmy Carter

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Jimmy Carter

scienza tecnica ma gli manca il secondo livello, quello in cui i principii generali vengono tradotti in visione programmatica generale, e specifici obiettivi sono organicamente coordinati nell'ambito delle forze politiche.

FALLOWS. Carter è capace di esaminare e risolvere una situazione a breve scadenza: nei due anni che ho lavorato con lui sono venute alla conclusione, invece, che non è capace di un discorso astratto, di un impegno intellettuale o morale sul lungo periodo. Carter può credere in cinquanta cose, non in una sola.

DOMANDA. Da tempo i più intimi del presidente sostengono che le sue virtù vere di uomo di Stato verrebbero fuori nel corso di un secondo mandato. E' una cosa probabile? O finirebbe con l'andare peggio?

FALLOWS. Negli ultimi due anni c'è stato un miglioramento alla Casa Bianca. Carter, però, se era incapace di una visione politica quattro anni fa, lo è anche adesso. Resta il Carter che, avendo avuto nel giugno 1978 da Cyrus Vance e da Brzezinski due testi contrastanti sul Salt e sulle relazioni con l'Urss, non seppe quale scegliere preferendo aggiungere l'uno all'altro, sicché il comunicato finale divenne assolutamente incomprensibile.

GLAD. Il futuro dipende da troppi fattori indipendenti da Carter o da chiunque altro per poter fare previsioni. Direi, tuttavia, che non c'è da aspettarsi niente di meglio da un secondo mandato.

BURNS. Carter non ha mai capito la natura della presidenza. Non ha il senso della direzione, l'abilità e la passione per mobilitare l'opinione pubblica, né sufficiente saggezza. La sua modestia come presidente non è solo dovuta, però, alle carenze del suo carattere o della sua educazione. Molta colpa è del sistema con cui in America si sceglie il presidente. Del resto, se viene eletto Reagan avremo un caso simile a quello di Carter: non si deve imparare a fare il presidente mentre lo si fa. Con tutti i suoi difetti, il sistema di un primo ministro, previsto in altre democrazie occidentali, costringe gli uomini che vogliono arrivare al vertice almeno a una lunga routine di apprendistato. Noi non arriveremo a questo, ma per lo meno dovremo evitare che il capo dell'esecutivo venga scelto in base alla sua immagine televisiva.

in cura di MAURO CALAMANDREI

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New York. Le polemiche di questa vigilia elettorale sulla controversa personalità di Carter sono state rinfocolate dalla pubblicazione del libro di Betty Glad, "Jimmy Carter alla ricerca della grande Casa Bianca" (W. W. Norton & Co., New York). Per 475 pagine, la Glad, con l'aiuto di un gruppo di assistenti, ha meticolosamente ricostruito la vita di Carter, dalla nascita alla campagna elettorale di quest'anno, ha rivisitato l'ambiente di provincia in cui è vissuto, ha risalito la storia della sua famiglia, sfrondando tutto il materiale raccolto, delle leggende, delle distorsioni e delle invenzioni diffuse da chi aveva il compito di creare "il personaggio" a fini pubblici, dai familiari del presidente o, addirittura, da lui stesso. E aggiungendo a tutto ciò una meticolosa analisi delle sue tecniche elettorali, delle sue trovate politiche, dei suoi espedienti per sfruttare gli amici e neutralizzare gli avversari, l'autrice riesce a cavarne un quadro tutt'altro che attraente: è infatti difficile immaginare un elettore che, dopo aver passato in rassegna quella carriera di acrobazie morali spericolate, voglia contribuire a mantenere Carter alla Casa Bianca per altri quattro anni.

Il libro diventa, tuttavia, veramente originale e divertente, anche se opinabile negli ultimi due capitoli, dove la Glad, sulla scorta della propria grande esperienza di biografa e aiutandosi con la competenza di insigni psicologi e politologi come Kubie, Horney, Kernberg, Maslow, Kohut, Barber e Mac Gregor Burns, si butta ad interpretare la personalità della sua cavia.

Come primo risultato, emerge soprattutto l'autentico provincialismo di Jimmy Carter. Nato e cresciuto a Plains, Georgia, grosso paesotto rurale, fino a quarantasei anni non se ne è pratica-

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su un libro recente («Jimmy
Carter: in search of the great
White House», di Betty Glad)
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Area nel 1980

Per scoperte sulle reazioni immunologiche

Premi Nobel per la medicina due americani e un francese

Le loro ricerche consentono il trapianto di tessuti a malati di cancro

STOCOLMA — L'Istituto Karolinska di Stoccolma ha assegnato ieri i Premi Nobel 1980 per la medicina. L'ambito riconoscimento è andato a **Baruj Benacerraf**, **Jean Dausset** e **George Snell** per le loro scoperte «sulle strutture delle superfici cellulari geneticamente determinate che regolano le reazioni immunologiche».

Benacerraf è nato a Caracas, in Venezuela, nel 1920, dal '43 è cittadino americano. Laureato in università francesi degli Stati Uniti, dopo aver ottenuto parecchi riconoscimenti nel campo della immunologia, è attualmente professore di patologia alla Harvard Medical School.

Jean Dausset è nato a Tolosa, in Francia, nel

1916; laureato a Parigi, ha insegnato in università francesi. Attualmente è docente di immuno-ematologia all'Università di Parigi.

George Snell, nato nel 1903 negli Stati Uniti, distintosi nel campo della ricerca, membro dell'Accademia americana delle scienze, lavora nel laboratorio Jackson di Bar Harbor, nel Maine, Stati Uniti.

E' dal 1960, con i primi risultati di Baruj Benacerraf a New York (dal '70 lo sperimentatore lavora all'Harvard Medical School di Boston), che si è aperta la strada al concetto che i meccanismi dell'immunità — cioè il nostro modo di rispondere, difensivamente, agli agenti estranei (batteri, virali, cellulari ecc.) — si svolgono sotto il controllo genetico.

Si è visto che un complesso di «geni» sovrintende la sintesi delle immunoglobuline e la funzione delle cellule «immunocompetenti» (linfociti T e B) e che questo tipo di supervisione è attiva nel limitare o modificare l'entità e il tipo della risposta immunitaria. Il complesso più importante in questo tipo di reazioni — analogamente al gene H2 del topo — è l'Hmc (Major histocompatibility complex). E' l'«istocompatibilità» che permette di individuare i «donatori» per trapianti e che può «guidare» l'indicazione nelle trasfusioni di piastrine o di globuli bianchi.

Il processo è avvenuto attraverso lo studio di molteplici funzioni immunitarie (in animali geneticamente selezionati e poi opportunamente incrociati) e attraverso l'identificazione di «antigeni di membrana» sintetizzati sotto il controllo dei geni I o dei geni dell'Hmc (antigeni H). Si tratta

di «controllori» della quantità e qualità della risposta immunitaria, situati sulla superficie cellulare (intimamente connessi alla membrana citoplasmatica), caratterizzati da una catena maggiore (di peso molecolare 46.000 daltons) associata a una catena minore (12.000) costituita dalla beta2microglobulina.

Il loro compito — un po' come avviene nei rigetti di trapianto — è di riconoscere come estranee le sostanze non proprie dell'organismo (ivi comprese le cellule tumorali). In base a questa «sovrintendenza» (costituzionale) possono essere distinti i soggetti a reazione immunitaria normale (la maggior parte dei soggetti); quelli a reazione iperattiva (come nelle malattie «autoaggressive»); quelli a reazione deficitaria, per lo più parziale (soggetti costituzionalmente predisposti ai tumori).

Al di là del suo grande significato scientifico, la scoperta di Baruj Benacerraf, Jean Dausset e George Snell riveste importanza pratica nei riguardi del problema degli «eterotrapianti»: il trapianto cioè di tessuti emopoietici (midollo osseo, linfonodi) da soggetti con patrimonio immunitario normale a soggetti con patrimonio immunitario deficitario o depresso (tumori).

Ezio Minetto

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L'esercito a El Asnam contro i saccheggi

EL ASNAM, 14 — Soldati armati pattugliano da oggi El Asnam, con l'ordine di sparare a vista contro i saccheggiatori. Dopo che, ieri, gruppi di «sciacalli» avevano iniziato a dare l'assalto a negozi e abitazioni colpiti dal terremoto e abbandonati, il governo ha deciso di dichiarare «zona di pericolo» un'area di 60 miglia intorno all'epicentro del sisma, e ne ha affidato il controllo all'esercito. In pratica, la zona di El Asnam è sottoposta alla legge marziale.

Prosegue intanto l'opera dei soccorritori, che è ancora resa più difficile e rischiosa dalle continue scosse telluriche che interessano la regione. Ieri, altre 14 persone sono state estratte ancora vive dalle macerie ma la speranza di trovare altri superstiti diventano sempre più remote. Alcune scosse hanno raggiunto ieri punte del quinto grado della scala Richter. Il governo ha annunciato una campagna di vaccinazione di massa della popolazione nella zona colpita dal terremoto, per evitare epidemia di tifo o di altre malattie. Anche la distribuzione di prodotti alimentari e di altri aiuti d'emergenza alla popolazione si sta scontrando con alcune difficoltà, specialmente in alcune zone, dove gli abitanti di alcuni villaggi hanno sequestrato gli autocarri dell'esercito che trasportavano rifornimenti alle zone disastrose.

Nella zona di El Asnam stanno arrivando intanto anche i soccorsi internazionali. Oggi, è partita da Brindisi la nave appoggio «Caorle» della Marina militare, con a bordo un impianto completo per la depurazione dell'acqua, una cucina da campo e una squadra di tecnici. Finora, il governo italiano ha inviato in Algeria anche tende, coperte, letti, impianti d'illuminazione per tendopoli, generatori e gruppi elettrogeni, e diverse squadre di soccorso. Aiuti arrivano da molti governi. L'ampiezza della solidarietà internazionale è accolta con soddisfazione dalle autorità algerine, che sottolineano la simpatia di cui il paese gode, all'est come all'ovest.

Nobel '80: genetica e creazione del mondo

STOCCOLMA, 14 — Gli americani James W. Cronin e Val L. Fitch sono stati designati oggi vincitori del premio Nobel 1980 per la Fisica. Altri due americani, Paul Berg e Walter Gilbert, e un inglese Frederick Sanger, hanno vinto per la Chimica. Cronin e Fitch hanno scoperto certe «violazioni» di simmetrie naturali, che aiutano a spiegare come fu generato l'universo. I lavori dei tre scienziati che hanno ottenuto il premio Nobel per la Chimica hanno permesso di avere una visione particolareggiata della base chimica del meccanismo con cui si formano gli organismi viventi.

Val Logsdon Fitch ha 57 anni ed è padre di due figli. James Watson Cronin è più giovane: ha 49 anni e ha tre figli. I due, insieme, hanno sviluppato lavori attraverso i quali — dice l'Accademia svedese — si tenta «di descrivere come la materia della quale siamo composti venne un giorno creata in un «big bang» (una grande esplosione n.d.r.) e in qual modo essa riuscì a sopravvivere ai dolori della nascita». Le scoperte premiate oggi costituiscono la prosecuzione della ricerca sulla teoria del «big bang», riguardo alla creazione del tempo e dello spazio, per cui il Nobel per la Fisica del 1978 era stato assegnato ad altri due statunitensi, Arno Penzias e Robert Wilson.

Paul Berg, uno dei tre vincitori per la Chimica, è nato a New York nel 1926 e ha un figlio. Walter Gilbert ha solo 48 anni, sposato come gli altri e ha due figli. Frederick Sanger, l'inglese, ha 62 anni e ha avuto due figli, uno dei quali è morto. I loro lavori, dice il comunicato dell'Accademia delle scienze di Stoccolma, sono già all'origine di importanti applicazioni tecniche e in una prospettiva a più lungo termine avranno certamente un'importanza decisiva per la comprensione della natura delle malattie cancerose, dato che il cancro implica che cessi di funzionare il controllo della crescita e della divisione di una cellula da parte del materiale ereditario. La motivazione del premio sottolinea inoltre che il contributo alla ricerca in questo campo dato dai tre scienziati ha accresciuto in grande misura le conoscenze sul modo in cui il Dna, quale portatore dei caratteri ereditari, comanda il meccanismo chimico della cellula.

Gli SS-20 garantiscono al Patto di Varsavia una superiorità offensiva

Non bastano i "Pershing 2" a rafforzare la difesa Nato

Pessimismo dell'Istituto di studi strategici londinese sulla possibilità dell'Alleanza atlantica di colmare entro breve tempo il divario militare con l'Est europeo i cui sistemi saranno ulteriormente potenziati con i missili euro-strategici del tipo SS-21, 22 e 23. Anche la credibilità del deterrente nucleare degli Usa appare compromessa dai successi tecnologici sovietici che hanno aumentato la precisione degli ordigni intercontinentali

LONDRA, 17 — La Nato è debole, il Patto di Varsavia è sempre più forte, e tutti gli sforzi messi in atto dagli alleati occidentali in questi ultimi mesi non sono sufficienti per colmare il divario militare tra i due blocchi europei. Per quanto riguarda le forze nucleari strategiche Usa-Urss, lo sviluppo tecnologico sovietico che ha elevato la precisione e l'affidabilità dei sistemi missilistici intercontinentali di Mosca ha posto una seria minaccia alla credibilità del deterrente americano, anche se la decisione statunitense di procedere nella messa a punto del missile «MX» e di sostituire i sommergibili armati di «Poseidon C-3» con i nuovi «Trident C-4» dovrebbe stabilire entro breve tempo l'equilibrio russo-americano.

Sono queste, in sintesi, le conclusioni del «Military balance 1980-81» rese note

oggi dall'Istituto per gli studi strategici di Londra nella sua annuale rassegna degli equilibri militari internazionali.

Per quanto riguarda l'Europa, l'Istituto afferma che la recente decisione della Nato di ammodernare il suo sistema euro-strategico con i nuovi missili «Pershing 2» e «Cruise» che nella seconda metà del 1983 dovrebbero essere schierati in cinque Paesi della Nato — tra cui l'Italia — non sarà sufficiente a riequilibrare una situazione già nettamente favorevole all'Urss. «In termini di testate nucleari montate su missili con una portata superiore ai 1.000 chilometri — afferma l'Istituto londinese — il Patto di Varsavia ha fin da ora un vantaggio di 3,5 contro 1 rispetto all'Alleanza atlantica». Attualmente, infatti, l'Urss ha schierato sul teatro operativo europeo 160 missili SS-20 a tre testate nu-

cleari indipendenti e il loro ritmo di produzione dovrebbe aumentare considerevolmente per far fronte alle recenti decisioni francesi e britanniche di potenziare i sistemi strategici nazionali.

Le unità sovietiche, che dispongono oltre che dei missili SS-20 anche dei più vecchi SS-4 e 5, saranno inoltre potenziate con i nuovissimi ordigni SS-21, 22 e 23 di gittata più corta e perciò destinati principalmente al teatro operativo europeo.

Nel settore della difesa convenzionale, le forze della Nato in Europa non hanno subito notevoli variazioni rispetto allo scorso anno, ma molti Paesi alleati — come il Belgio e l'Olanda — hanno già ridotto i loro bilanci militari e non è escluso che anche gli Stati Uniti riducano l'entità del loro contingente nel centro-Europa.

209.9 - 44 = 163.9



Da sempre una delle figure chiave della politica cinese, Deng Xiaoping è nato il 22 agosto 1904 nella provincia di Sichuan. Agli inizi degli anni Venti, diciottenne, fu invitato a Parigi insieme a un gruppo di studenti scelti tra i migliori della Cina e qui conobbe Chu en Lai col quale divise da quel momento tutta la sua vita di rivoluzionario. Nel 1928 Deng si recò a Mosca per completare i suoi studi all'università per stranieri Sun Yat Tsen ma vi rimase soltanto un anno. Rientrato in patria, fece subito parte del gruppo organizzato da Mao Tze Tung. Nel 1935, l'anno della Grande Marcia, fu eletto segretario generale del partito comunista cinese ed è da quel momento che inizia la sua ascesa politica. Nel 1949, sconfitto Chiang Kai-Shek e fondata la Repubblica Popolare Cinese, Mao Tze Tung lo eleggè anche vice premier o membro del Politburo cinese. Il suo successo si interrompe bruscamente all'inizio della Rivoluzione Culturale, nel 1966.

Esiliato nella provincia di Jan Xi, Deng Xiaoping scompare quindi dalla scena politica di cui è stato protagonista per oltre trent'anni. Riappare improvvisamente nel 1973, e da questo momento riprende la sua ascesa: molti pensano che prenderà il posto del premier Chu en Lai, gravemente ammalato di cancro. Invece, dopo la morte di Chu, la sua stella tramonta di nuovo: il gruppo della Rivoluzione Culturale, capeggiato dalla moglie di Mao Tze Tung, Chiang Ching, non gli ha perdonato gli attacchi che, appena tornato al potere, Deng Xiaoping ha lanciato contro di loro.

Morto Mao Tze Tung, nel settembre dello stesso anno, è arrestata la Banda dei Quattro, sarà il nuovo premier o presidente del partito Huo Kuo Feng a richiamarlo, e il potere di Deng rifiorirà vittorioso. Infatti sarà Deng Xiaoping a riabilitare Liu Shao Chi, ad annunciare il processo contro la Banda dei Quattro, a lanciare il programma della Quattro Modernizzazioni, a guidare l'apertura all'occidente.

Nella foto, Deng Xiaoping con Oriana Fallaci.

diad, sfidando la sorte, e ciò non è saggio. Noi cinesi non ci comportiamo così. Quando affrontiamo problemi come quello del Vietnam lo facciamo nell'interesse di tutti: secondo le regole della strategia globale.

— Signor Deng, quali sono a suo parere i punti caldi che oggi possono avviare la guerra?

— Potrei citare anzitutto il Medio Oriente, e poi l'Indocina. Ma le zone pericolose ormai sono ovunque e non è facile stabilire dove si accenderà la miccia. E' facile, invece, dire chi accenderà la miccia. Vede, per lungo tempo i cinesi hanno ripetuto che solo due paesi sono in grado di lanciare una guerra mondiale: gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica. Però, dopo la Seconda guerra mondiale, voglio dire dopo la guerra in Corea e la guerra in Vietnam, la potenza americana è andata sempre più declinando e gli Stati Uniti hanno continuato a ritirarsi. Oggi sono sulla difensiva e, argomentando, gli Stati Uniti hanno paura dell'Unione Sovietica. Quindi ciò non bastasse, impongono d'un sistema politico che non gli consente di prendere decisioni immediate. L'Unione Sovietica, al contrario, è all'offensiva e per prendere una decisione non ha che riunire pochi membri del Politburo. E' successo così anche per l'Afghanistan: pochi membri del Politburo si sono riuniti e hanno deciso di invaderlo. Comunque, guardi: il punto focale della strategia sovietica è l'Europa, rimane l'Europa. E questa realtà non cambierà.

— Quindi la guerra potrebbe scoppiare in Europa? Ho capito bene?

— No, non necessariamente in Europa; per l'Europa, dico che la Terza Guerra mondiale scoppierà per l'Europa. Perché in Europa c'è l'economia forte, in Europa c'è l'industria pesante, in Europa c'è la forza militare, e di tutto ciò va bisogno per occupare il mondo. Quando si occupano il resto del pianeta, i sovietici possono stabilire l'egemonia globale a cui mirano, se non hanno l'Europa. L'egemonia globale si stabilisce soltanto quando si ha in mano l'Europa. Ma, naturalmente, quando affermo che il punto focale della strategia sovietica è l'Europa, intendo includere il Medio Oriente, le coste settentrionali dell'Africa, il Mediterraneo, insomma.

— Non ha citato il Golfo Persico, tra le zone pericolose.

— Ma anche quello, anche l'invasione dell'Afghanistan, cioè la marcia dei sovietici verso l'Oceano Indiano, fa parte della loro strategia per controllare l'Europa con una manovra a tenaglia. Chiaro che, con l'invasione dell'Afghanistan, l'Unione Sovietica intende raggiungere l'Oceano Indiano e poi ottenere il controllo del Medio Oriente? E quando questo piano si completerà, l'Europa si troverà dinanzi al suo momento critico. Perché cosa può fare l'Europa, una volta che i sovietici hanno conquistato i pozzi petroliferi del Medio Oriente? Quando l'allora primo ministro Callaghan venne in Cina, discussi a lungo questi fatti con lui. Gli dissi che il momento critico dell'Europa sarebbe giunto quando i sovietici avrebbero conquistato i pozzi petroliferi del Medio Oriente e gli rivolsi una domanda precisa: "Che cosa farete quando la marcia sovietica verso l'Oceano Indiano avrà raggiunto il Golfo Persico e il Medio Oriente? Perché a quel punto non avrete che due scelte, signor primo ministro: o innocui occhiacci dell'Unione Sovietica e del caso migliore, l'astensione, il che sarebbe la soluzione più onorevole, oppure combattere". E Callaghan rispose: "Esisterà una unica scelta". Non mi disse quale scelta, però lo compresi e replicai: "Quindi è meglio che facciate quella scelta subito, signor ministro. E' meglio che non aspettate". Mi ascolti bene: scegliere subito significa fermare il fronte in Afghanistan e in Cambogia...? Se per qualche anno si riesce a bloccare l'Unione Sovietica in Afghanistan e in Cambogia, la Terza guerra mondiale è posticipata.

bara furono quelli del cines. E portarono la firma di Chu en Lai.

— Guardi, i fiori che mandammo ai funerali di Franco... Quel che avevamo in mente erano i rapporti col governo spagnolo. Il giudizio che abbiamo su certi personaggi non deve influenzare le nostre azioni e, a proposito di Franco, le giuro che il nostro giudizio storico su di lui non è cambiato. Non è cambiato neanche quello sull'imperatore del Giappone, eppure abbiamo buoni rapporti col Giappone. Il fatto è che non possiamo peccetare i problemi del passato sulla realtà del presente.

— Pinochet non è il passato, è il presente. I dittatori argentini non sono il passato, sono il presente. Però avete rapporti anche con loro e con Pinochet.

— Il caso dell'Argentina è diverso: l'Argentina è sotto un governo militare. E noi trattiamo con l'Argentina come paese, conduciamo una politica che serve gli interessi della Cina con quel paese. Quanto a Pinochet, lo so che molti amici progressisti non comprendono il nostro comportamento nei suoi riguardi ma, parlando candidamente, le dirò che la nostra presenza in Cile s'è tradotta in buone cose. E le spiego che intendo. Allende era un amico della Cina, infatti la sua memoria ci è molto cara. Era un amico anche se si lasciava influenzare fortemente dall'Unione Sovietica, e a questo proposito Chu en Lai gli aveva dato un consiglio sincero: non seguire i vizi in tutto ciò che gli dicevano, ma adottare una politica di estrema sinistra; altrimenti avrebbe finito col restare isolato. Ebbene, dopo che Allende fu ucciso e le forme democratiche di quel paese si trovarono nelle tremende difficoltà che sappiamo, decidemmo a lungo se fosse il caso di mandare una rappresentanza diplomatica in Cile oppure rompere ogni rapporto. Ma scegliemmo di restare. Sa, quando si giudica certe faccende bisogna avere una mentalità aperta ed esaminare secondo criteri che si allungano nel tempo. Bisogna anche considerare gli interessi globali, insomma bisogna essere molto cauti, molto prudenti. E, sebbene le scelte cui lei si riferisce siano state fatte dal presidente Mao e dal premier Chu en Lai, non da me, lo ritengo che siano state giuste. Mi ascolti bene: lei è un giornalista, uno scrittore...

...così può dire quello che vuole sulle faccende internazionali. Può scegliere liberamente quando si dirige un paese...

...Ecco una risposta consistente, signor Deng. Ma è a questo punto che affronto il mio argomento su cui sono venuto ed è la guerra mondiale. E' meglio, ciò che noi cinesi definiamo l'inevitabilità della guerra mondiale.

La guerra è inevitabile perché esistono le super potenze e perché esiste l'imperialismo. E non siamo i soli a pensarla così: in ogni parte del mondo, oggi, molti sono convinti che la guerra scoppierà negli anni Ottanta. I prossimi dieci anni sono molto, molto pericolosi, sono terribili. Non dovremmo mai dimenticarci perché solo in questo modo possiamo impedire che la guerra scoppia subito. Solo in questo modo possiamo posticiparla. Ma non con le chiacchiere sulla pace e sulla distensione. E' dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale che gli occidentali parlano di pace, di distensione. L'Unione Sovietica anche. Ma dov'è la pace, dov'è la distensione? In un anno, se non due, non si sono visti i punti caldi. I punti caldi sono stati la Terza guerra mondiale, e quelli parlano di distensione di pace.

Il fatto che noi non lo capiscono, non vogliono capire, non ci credono, non vogliono capire. Soltanto in Europa, in Occidente, si illudono che la guerra possa essere evitata. E così chiudono gli occhi, ogni volta che qualcuno li tocca. E' uno degli elementi che conducono alla guerra; questa cecità, questa insensibilità, questa arretratezza. Questa Seconda guerra mondiale non fu ciò di diverse celebri con una parola: appeasement. La usavano Chamberlain e Daladier per spiegare il loro atteggiamento passivo nei riguardi di Hitler che si stava mangiando l'Europa orientale. Oggi alcuni paesi europei, come altri paesi del resto, si comportano esattamente come alla fine degli anni Trenta. Chamberlain e Daladier? A cosa servi il loro appeasement? La Seconda guerra mondiale scoppiò proprio perché il pericolo era stato sottovalutato, perché certi leader europei si illudevano di...

«L'URSS non si fermerà all'Afghanistan»

— E poi? Se la Terza guerra mondiale è inevitabile, rinviarla serve a ben poco.

— Poi... si vedrà. Fra qualche anno le cose potrebbero anche migliorare. L'importante è posticipare la guerra, guadagnare qualche anno.

— E l'Iran? C'è chi sostiene che l'Afghanistan è una specie di prova generale per invadere prima o poi l'Iran.

— Sono sicuro che l'Unione Sovietica non si fermerà in Afghanistan, se non ce la fermiamo noi. E il suo prossimo obiettivo non può essere che l'Iran o il Pakistan. E, sebbene non sia possibile prevedere quale dei due paesi sceglierà per primo, penso che si debba concentrare l'attenzione sull'Iran.

— Ma non trova che il dramma degli ostaggi americani, il caso in cui sia occupato l'Iran, la follia di Khomeini e dei suoi seguaci, insomma quel che avviene da dieci mesi in quel paese, vada a vantaggio dei sovietici?

— Senta, lo non capisco molto bene quel che accade laggiù. Posso rispondere soltanto che l'Iran non è un punto caldo, è un punto bollente. Non dimentichiamo che l'Unione Sovietica ha un'influenza molto forte in Iran. Ehi! Molto forte. E questo le spiega perché abbiamo tutte le intenzioni di mantenere i migliori rapporti possibili con l'Iran. Qualsiasi cosa accada in Iran, vedo che avere un'ambasciatore cinese a Teheran serve parecchio.

— Agli americani non è servito.

nel suoi depositi si ammucchiano sempre di più gli armamenti convenzionali. Questi armamenti non sono cibo, non sono scarpe, non sono vestiti, roba che si consuma o va a male. Prima o poi verranno usati.

— Ciò mi permette un'osservazione, signor Deng. Voi cinesi dite sempre di non temere l'Unione Sovietica: d'essere pronti ad affrontarla. Ma come potete pensar di competere con la tremenda efficienza della macchina militare sovietica?

— (Ride). «Chi La Cina è povera e il suo equipaggiamento militare è arretrato: ne convengo. Ma abbiamo le nostre tradizioni, sa? E' da molto tempo che, disponendo di equipaggiamenti inadeguati e miserrimi, coltiviamo l'arte di scongiurare i nemici bene armati. Il nostro territorio è vastissimo, e in questo territorio vastissimo la gente ha imparato ad avere la resistenza necessaria a condurre una lunga guerra, a piegare l'altrui forza con la propria debolezza. Chiamque voglia invader la Cina deve tener presente questa verità, ed io credo che i sovietici lo sappiano. La gente continua a prendere in considerazione l'obiettivo dell'Unione Sovietica, parlo della Cina, e alcuni amici ci forniscono anche informazioni per dimostrare che i sovietici stanno ammassando truppe lungo la frontiera con la Cina e nelle regioni vicine alla Cina. Ma noi gli rispondiamo che non è mai stato un segreto per noi, e che invader la Cina è un passo molto grosso per loro. Perché? Occupassero Pechino, e tutta l'area è non del Mare Giallo, per noi non sarebbe un grande successo. No, non bisogna militarizzare la superiorità militare sovietica quando ci si riferisce alla Cina. I guerriglieri afgani sono molto attivi in Afghanistan, sa? E in Cina abbiamo tanto posto, ripeto, tanta gente.

— Ho capito a quale tradizione allude, signor Deng. A quella che consiste nel muovere il difeso e dire dolcemente: «Venite, cari, venite. Accomodatevi. Poi vedrete quel che vi succederà: chi vi ritorna più?»

— (Ride forte). «Guardi, io di tante cose non me ne intendo. Neanche di economia mi intendo molto. Ma di guerra me ne intendo un po'. Lo so come ci si batte».

— Il fatto è che probabilmente nessuno avrebbe il tempo di batterli, signor Deng. Perché la guerra con la Cina significa guerra mondiale, la guerra mondiale significa guerra nucleare, e la guerra nucleare significa la fine di tutto.

— Sono d'accordo sulla prima parte dell'assioma: se l'URSS ci invade, non è una guerra locale. Non sono d'accordo sulla seconda parte, invece: non è detto che la Terza guerra mondiale sia una guerra nucleare. Secondo me, proprio perché entrambe le parti dispongono di armi nucleari, esiste una forte possibilità che la Terza guerra mondiale sia una guerra convenzionale.

— Grazie, signor Deng. Ho finito, signor Deng.

— Grazie a lei, e per favore faccia capire bene tutto ciò che le ho detto. Spieghi bene che bisogna fare una valutazione obiettiva dei presidenti Mao, e prima considerare i suoi meriti, dopo i suoi errori. Spieghi bene che continueremo a seguire il pensiero di Mao Tze Tung ma che saremo anche molto chiari nel dire dove ha sbagliato. E infine spieghi bene che alcuni di quegli errori furono anche nostri, anche miei.

— Lo farà, signor Deng, e mi consenta un'ultima domanda: quali noti dovrebbe a se stesso?

— Uhm! Senta: gli errori li ho commessi, sì, e a volte anche seri. Però non li ho mai commessi per cattivi scopi: li ho sempre commessi con buone intenzioni. Quindi non c'è niente nella mia vita per cui mi senta la coscienza sporca. Uhm! Senta: lo direi che potrei darli il cinquanta per cento. Sì, il cinquanta per cento va bene.

Oriana Fallaci

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La stessa... c'era il... non è... Non a caso... un paese... Social-im... dato da quel... imperialista, è... la possa essere... lo comunista... tanto a questo... al mondo, i soli... i paesi comu... dall'altre... è un solo paese... l'irriducibile... a tra loro... na e pincerò... perse, Vietnam... Lo disse an...
iti? Guardi, da... le strategie, di... scicare le orme... accordo scappò... it. Non basta, a... occupato il... ro il vuole per...? Noi cinesi... te a capire... noi. Durante... a l'abbiamo... abbandonati... ferito nelle... quale aiuto... al vietnamiti?... te, ammonita... na chiedergli... di dollari... vero come la...
mente ammaz... una piccola...
siato un con... loro. Ma, a... che sia stato... troppo. Ve... no contrari e... Ma l'episodio... a sculacciare... amo il diritto...
ostro tempo,... gemo per il... tro la guerra... chiede: sba...
mo, non sba... liamo affatto... le. Fu giusto... che un popolo... straniera. Ma... è rovesciata...
e lo meravig... è possibile... Por?...
rità in faccia... ambogia? Chi... regime di Lon...? Non fu forse... scritto comuni... Pot? A quel... in aveva alcu... to dalla sua... a sostenersi... chino col suo... in Cambogia... arto comuni... vine, e quasi... arché? Perché... gna venivano... Cina non ha... aiutare il cam... fessano tutto... oia, nulla...
di. E' vero che... no continue... lo ignari. Non... c, ricordando... forse avemo... Lo abbiamo... che la nostra... di non com... i partiti, degli... le paese e non... di volersi im... tà da affronta... da porre è la... ziamidi? Siba... forza, nessuna... di Son Sam... he nascono a... lace contro i... guidati da B... il segue...
Deng. Come... guano chi li... suti col san... sbogli, signor... è uno sbaglio... è completo: un... fare sono state...
sicura. Lei non... può seguire Poi... ot abbia ucciso... lone su quattro... una parzia... non esopria... tiva politica... na non sspge... delle masse... ogni giorno di... Poi Pot, volerlo... sili e basta. E... è proprio fuori... lo non consente...
oro che risovo... Deng: per farci... si. Poi Pot do... creature che ha... monanza di... parole un'altra... il centro ranti... rapporti con... tu non è mica... generalissimo... nero sulla sua...

ORG

6 Mars, 14 août 1950

BULLETIN DE L'ÉTRANGER

La Pologne en crise

Le recours à la grève est-il en passe de devenir un moyen de revendication toléré dans un pays socialiste? On peut se poser la question à voir comment les choses évoluent en Pologne.

Les autorités de Varsovie, faisant contre mauvaise fortune bon cœur, ne tentent pas d'ailleurs de nier cette nouvelle réalité. C'est ainsi que M. Jerzy Lukaszewicz, membre du bureau politique et secrétaire du comité central du parti ouvrier unifié, a convoqué, mardi 12 août, les correspondants étrangers en poste en Pologne pour faire le point de l'agitation sociale déclenchée il y a six semaines par les augmentations des prix de la viande.

Selon le responsable de la propagande du parti polonais, la situation évolue favorablement: Les «grèves massives, a-t-il dit, ont pris fin, et on ne constate plus que des «débrayages partiels à caractère économique». Accusant le Comité d'antodéfense sociale (KOB) et les radios occidentales d'avoir cherché à «politiser» le mouvement, il s'est déclaré satisfait de ce que «nul n'ait remis en cause le socialisme d'Etat ou ne désire un retour à l'industrie privée et aux grandes propriétés terriennes». Il a enfin jugé nécessaire d'élaborer une nouvelle législation sur l'autogestion ouvrière qui pourrait prendre en compte les comités de grève élus spontanément par les ouvriers mécontents de la passivité des syndicats officiels.

Le ton, on le voit, n'est pas pour l'instant à la répression. Débordées par l'agitation sociale, les autorités ont choisi de faire le gros dos, en attendant que la vague de mécontentement s'affaiblisse. Elles savent bien qu'une fin de non-recevoir opposée aux revendications ouvrières n'aurait fait que «politiser» bien davantage le mouvement. Mais elles savent aussi que, de concession en concession, leur pouvoir réel s'effrite. D'où leur volonté de reprendre peu à peu et en souplesse les choses en main.

Ce ne sera pas chose facile. Toute vraie réforme économique nécessite beaucoup plus que les incantations habituelles: il y faut du temps, mais aussi une volonté politique qui est loin d'être évidente. La situation financière du pays, enfin, est plus que critique. Paradoxalement, c'est surtout de l'Ouest que lui vient l'aide: alors que Varsovie démentait l'octroi d'un prêt soviétique d'un milliard de dollars, on a appris mardi qu'une semaine avant la rencontre à Hambourg du chancelier Schmidt et de M. Gierek, un accord de crédit portant sur 1,2 milliard de marks (680 millions de dollars) a été conclu entre la Banque polonaise du commerce extérieur et un consortium de vingt-cinq banques ouest-allemandes dirigé par la Dresdner Bank.

Ce prêt qui est inférieur de 300 millions de marks aux demandes polonaises, permettra à Varsovie de souffler quelque peu. Les experts occidentaux évaluent cependant à 1,9 milliard de dollars les crédits que la Pologne devrait encore obtenir cette année pour faire face au remboursement de ses dettes venues à échéance. Le total de l'endettement de la Pologne était évalué à plus de 19 milliards de dollars à la fin de 1949.

A cette énorme dette, contractée durant les cinq premières années du règne de M. Gierek pour industrialiser rapidement le pays, s'ajoutent la hausse du prix du pétrole soviétique et les énormes dégâts que viennent de causer aux récoltes de blé et de betteraves à sucre les pluies torrentielles de cet été. C'est dire qu'en dépit des aspirations populaires l'heure est à l'austérité.

Reste à savoir comment les autorités pourront faire accepter de nouveaux sacrifices à une classe ouvrière qui retrouve de plus en plus son franc-parler. Tout cela se passe, ne l'oublions pas, sous l'œil vigilant et sans doute passablement réprobateur des dirigeants du Kremlin, qui n'ont jamais dans le passé, assisté à de tels désordres dans leur camp sans réagir vigoureusement.

per la quarta volta

In un anno fa avevamo raccolto la parola di una barzelletta, riproposta oggi più che mai attuale. I polacchi chiedevano: «Che differenza passa fra Gomulka e Gierek?» per poi rispondere: «Nessuna, soltanto che Gierek non lo sa ancora.» Forse il capo polacco sta comprendendo la parola proprio in questi giorni, trovandosi di fronte a una protesta operaia molto simile a quella che fece naufragare il suo predecessore.

Le notizie dalla Polonia spiegano perché scioperano gli operai: i salari sproporzionati all'aumento dei prezzi; ma non viene chiarito altrettanto contro chi sono rivolti gli scioperi. Fra il «perché» e il «contro chi» della protesta si trova, però, anche la risposta su quanto ai suoi iniziali motivi economici si aggiungano quelli politici. L'autorevole membro del Politburo del partito Jerzy Lukaszewicz ha affrontato, con un coraggio inconsueto in quelle burocrazie, i corrispondenti esteri cercando di convincerli che si trattava di rivendicazioni esclusivamente economiche. Per essere più convincente nel confutare le possibili implicazioni politiche, l'alto funzionario ha sostenuto che buona parte delle richieste dei protestatari erano giustificate. L'agenzia ufficiale polacca «Interpress» si è premurata, pure per la prima volta, di far recapitare alle redazioni occidentali un commento in cui si riconosce la vastità del «movimento degli scioperi», addirittura al di là di quanto sia stato accertato dagli stessi inviati speciali, però si insiste che il movimento verte attorno a problemi «strettamente economici», per i quali ora il governo starebbe cercando una soluzione «discutendoli con gli operai».

Bisogna prendere atto che la quarta rivolta operaia della Polonia viene affrontata dal partito dominante in maniera nuova, più tollerante e dialettica. A Gdansk furono inviati i carri armati. A Ursus e Radom i reparti speciali della «Mincija». Ora siamo alle trattative ed alle conferenze stampa. Già di per sé questo è un fatto di

operai in certi momenti non si rendono conto di questo fatto è perché mancano della giusta coscienza di classe, la quale, allo Stato, non può mancare mai, essendo il partito dominante l'emanazione materiale e organizzata di quella coscienza. Gli scioperanti, a quanto sembra, stanno contestandogli questa qualità.

Inoltre l'attuale sciopero, più che una protesta contro determinate misure economiche, segna la sconfitta di una lunga campagna politica del partito. La storia dei prezzi e il «romanzo della carne» durano quasi quanto il regime. Nel 1956 Gomulka era risalito al posto di primo segretario, direttamente dalle prigioni staliniane, sull'onda della protesta operaia di Poznan contro le bassissime condizioni materiali. Il capo riabilitato aveva promesso di cambiare tutto e di salvaguardare un discreto livello di vita. Il prezzo della carne risultava determinante e Gomulka promise di non toccarlo. Qualche anno dopo si scopri che l'economia, con i

to importante... dieci anni. Nel 1970 viene deciso così l'aumento dei prezzi alimentari con il conseguente esautoramento di Gomulka sull'ondata delle rivolte operaie del Baltico. Gli succede Gierek, il quale, come primo atto, promette di non toccare i prezzi della carne. Sei anni dopo, seguendo la stessa logica

Frane Barbieri
Nello stesso senso
(Continua a pagina 2 in quinta colonna)

Riceviamo

VARSAVIA — Lo sciopero del cantiere navale di Danzica continua a agitarsi, che da tre giorni paralizza la regione della stessa Baltica, era parsa ieri pomeriggio, ma finalmente risolto: l'agenzia ufficiale Interpress aveva dato infatti notizia di un accordo fra lavoratori e governo. Ma in realtà la stessa Interpress ha comunicato che nella prima serata era seguita una rottura; in

Wyszynski esalta la vittoria polacca sui bolscevichi (1920)

CZESTOCHOWA — Il cardinale Stefan Wyszyński, Primate di Polonia, prendendo venerdì la parola durante una cerimonia religiosa a Czestochowa, ha alluso agli scioperi in corso in Polonia che «bisogna fare in modo che ciascuno possa ottenere il proprio pane quotidiano». Il Primate, che si rivolgeva a una folla di 150 mila persone, ha anche parlato del «miracolo della Vistola», la vittoria dell'esercito polacco del maresciallo Pilsudski sulle forze bolsceviche alle porte di Varsavia, il cui 60° anniversario è stato commemorato giovedì con una manifestazione nella capitale polacca. Egli ha esortato i fedeli a «sentimenti di riconoscenza verso la Vergine Maria, grazie alla quale abbiamo conservato le frontiere del nostro Paese, e che ci ha permesso 60 anni fa di poter avere le nostre proprie leggi».

Wyszynski ha anche affermato: «60 anni fa, in un momento in cui la libertà e la volontà di vivere della nazione polacca erano in pericolo, Dio permise di salvare il nostro Paese».

Il presidente iraniano salta a terra prima dello schianto

TEHRAN — Il presidente iraniano, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, è sceso a terra prima dello schianto tra un aereo iraniano e un aereo turco. L'incidente è avvenuto nel Golfo Persico, a sud di Bahrein. L'aereo iraniano, un Boeing 747, stava per decollare per un volo a Gdansk. L'aereo turco, un Boeing 737, stava per atterrare a Gdansk. I due aerei si sono scontrati in volo, ma il presidente iraniano è riuscito a saltare a terra prima dello schianto. L'incidente ha causato la morte di 29 persone e feriti 130. Il presidente iraniano è stato ferito e ricoverato in ospedale. L'incidente è stato considerato un disastro aereo.

Il presidente iraniano, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, è sceso a terra prima dello schianto tra un aereo iraniano e un aereo turco. L'incidente è avvenuto nel Golfo Persico, a sud di Bahrein. L'aereo iraniano, un Boeing 747, stava per decollare per un volo a Gdansk. L'aereo turco, un Boeing 737, stava per atterrare a Gdansk. I due aerei si sono scontrati in volo, ma il presidente iraniano è riuscito a saltare a terra prima dello schianto. L'incidente ha causato la morte di 29 persone e feriti 130. Il presidente iraniano è stato ferito e ricoverato in ospedale. L'incidente è stato considerato un disastro aereo.

By Brian Mooney

WARSAW, Aug. 17 (Reuters)—Strikers who have brought the Baltic port city of Gdansk to a standstill tonight issued a list of 16 demands that openly challenge the way Poland's Communist system is run.

The demands, drawn up by leaders of strikers in 21 enterprises in and around Gdansk, pushed a 48-day-old wave of labor unrest to the brink of a major political confrontation.

In an almost unprecedented show of strength, the strikers formed a joint committee to press their demands, which were released in a communique in Warsaw by the dissident self-defense committee KOR.

They called for freedom of speech and press, the release of those they called "political prisoners," the right to form independent trade unions, the opening of mass media to all churches (strike pay), higher wages and better food supplies.

Commission Appointed

Simultaneously, authorities an-

informed mood, stirred when Premier Edward Gierek spoke on television Friday.

Their new demands underlined the fact that the strikes in Poland are now only marginally connected with the imposition of higher meat prices that triggered the labor unrest.

The 16-point communique issued by the self-styled Inter-Factory

Strike Committee suggested a groundswell for reform and reflected what appeared to be deep-rooted frustration about the way Poland is run. But it did not challenge the existence of a Communist system.

The strike committee listed three men whom they described as political prisoners: Edmund Zadrozynski, Marek Kozlowski and Jan Kozlowski.

The communique said its demands also included a call for full information on Poland's economic crisis, closure of shops for privileged citizens and the abolition of high-priced commercial stores. The strike committee also demanded a wage raise of 2,000 zlotys (\$68) for all workers.

The committee set up its head-
(Continued on Page 2, Col. 7)



LE MONDE DIMANCHE

*Plan
Index*

plus d'actualité

Le mécontentement

*Précis all
intellectuel
intellectuel,
de celle
de celle
de celle
de celle
de celle*

Géopolitique et socialisme

L'intervention télévisée du premier ministre polonais, vendredi soir, est significative du désarroi qui règne à Varsovie : M. Babiuch, en effet, n'a rien trouvé d'autre, s'adressant aux grévistes de Gdansk et d'ailleurs, que de faire une allusion indirecte mais parfaitement claire à une intervention des Soviétiques, « nos amis fidèles qui se préoccupent aussi de nos difficultés, qui croient que nous serons capables d'y faire face seuls et nous le souhaitent de tout cœur »...

L'histoire et la géopolitique ont parfois des lois implacables : ainsi les autorités polonaises n'ont-elles aujourd'hui d'autre argument à offrir aux travailleurs, dont elles sont en principe les représentants, que le risque d'une intervention du grand protecteur du monde socialiste. L'argument, il est vrai, a du poids à quelques jours du douzième anniversaire de l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie. Rien ne permet cependant d'affirmer à ce stade que ce sinistre scénario va se reproduire. Mais la menace plane, même si l'U.R.S.S., déjà empêtrée militairement en Afghanistan, sait parfaitement que les Polonais ne resteraient pas passifs devant une tentative de « normalisation ».

*Notes
le monde
del 17
poto*

La grève malgré

Les comités sont coupés, on ne peut apprendre Lénine, dont ont été suffoqués des milliers d'ouvriers...

La manifestation adressée vendredi soir, à la fois le jour et la nuit, pour faire de la grève (maintenir le dernier) et pour appeler à...

M. Gierek en Crimée, ces en U.R.S.S. attention qu'elle n'a pas M. Gierek le 19 et 20...

Ni à Tirana, socialistes à Tirana, trent « capitalisme » Varsovie...

Varsovie de grève, Varsovie en comités, cette semaine inquiète. Tout ça...

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pre più grave, e lo sciopero de-
gli agricoltori non ha miglio-
rato la situazione.

Ieri ai cantieri «Lenin», che
sono diventati il centro della
protesta operaia, si sono rac-
colti circa 15 mila lavoratori.
Una parte era rimasta tutta
la domenica, altri sono torna-
ti ieri all'alba (a piedi per lo
sciopero dei mezzi pubblici).
Davanti al cancello principa-
le, dove domenica è stata cele-
brata la messa, sono rimaste
due immagini: una di Papa
Wojtyla, l'altra della «Madon-
na nera» di Czestochowa. Per
tutta la mattina elicotteri
hanno sorvolato la zona, lan-
ciando manifestini in cui si
invitavano i lavoratori dei
cantieri a riprendere il lavo-
ro; analoghi inviti erano dif-

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"Attento più attento"
"Ciclo della Velle" Agn:
1975, Cac. 68, 10. 8.

QUASI UNA RIVOLUZIONE NELLA REALTA' SOCIALE DELL'EST

ARCH.

*Museo
Polonia*

Il regime polacco costretto a subire l'arma dello sciopero

Con centinaia di «astensioni dal lavoro» in tutto il paese, i lavoratori sono riusciti ad ottenere consistenti miglioramenti salariali per compensare l'aumento del prezzo della carne - Scavalcati i sindacati, le trattative si sono svolte tra i dirigenti delle imprese e i delegati operai - I carri armati sono rimasti nelle caserme e le autorità hanno evitato minacce e condanne

per la polonia
DALLA VOCE INVITATO PER LE
VARSAVIA — E' una miccia a lenta combustione che sta percorrendo da più di un mese la Polonia da un capo all'altro e di cui non si intravede ancora la fine. Ursus Lublino, Varsavia, Lodz, Breslavia, Danzica: il grosso degli scioperi è terminato. Brevi astensioni dal lavoro vengono puntualmente annunciate in località diverse da fonti del dissenso (in particolare dal KOR, Comitato di autodifesa sociale).

analoghi interessino altre fabbriche, ma in generale la situazione è calma. La grande tensione di luglio culminata con il biennio passato giorni della città di Lublino, paralizzata dallo sciopero dei ferrovieri e dei trasportatori, si è andata sciogliendo. Su questa tranquillità momentanea pesano però i rischi e le incognite legati ad una situazione economica drammatica. Rivendicazioni salariali che hanno riguardato sinora un centinaio di imprese potrebbero estendersi ad altri settori produttivi.

no ha promesso di venire loro in aiuto, di aumentare le pensioni più basse, ma basterà? Già si profila, al ritorno dalle vacanze, la prospettiva di un autunno caldo dalle conseguenze imprevedibili. Ad aumentare preoccupazioni e perplessità c'è poi il fatto che il governo non sembra disporre, almeno attualmente, di un programma efficace con cui fare uscire il Paese dal tunnel della recessione.

E' il caso, ad esempio, dell'industria meccanica WSK di Swidnik, una cittadina ad un centinaio di chilometri da Varsavia, dove gli operai hanno incrociato nei giorni scorsi le braccia avendo trovato nella busta-paga le trattenute degli scioperi che avevano effettuato a metà luglio ed hanno ripreso il lavoro solo dopo aver ottenuto l'assicurazione, da parte della direzione dell'azienda, che non sarà tolto loro neppure un centesimo.

Il malcontento regna in particolare fra i lavoratori meno pagati, che vedono assottigliarsi sempre di più il già esiguo potere d'acquisto. Il gover-

All'origine di tutto, ancora una volta, l'aumento del prezzo della carne (dal 30 al 90 per cento, a seconda della qualità) deciso dalle autorità il primo luglio, un provvedimento verso il quale i polacchi hanno da sempre manifestato insofferenza e allergia. Mantenere stabile il prezzo della carne costa allo Stato duecento miliardi di zloty all'anno, pari a sei mila miliardi di lire. Gomulka, nel 1970, mandò i carri armati con-

A PAGINA 4
Aereo in una laguna in Mauritania: salvi 166 (su 168) molti a nuoto

Sandro Scabello

CONTINUA IN SECONDA PAGINA NELLA OTTAVA COLONNA

Il regime polacco

CONTINUA DALLA PRIMA PAGINA

tro gli operai scesi in piazza a protestare a Danzica e Stettino. Nel 1976 la violenta reazione popolare di Ursus e Radom bloccò gli aumenti decretati da Gierek.

Questa volta non ci sono stati né spargimento di sangue né disordini, saccheggi o atti di vandalismo. La polizia è rimasta in disparte, i carri armati e i soldati nelle caserme. Per la prima volta in un Paese dell'est europeo, il governo ha accettato senza batter ciglio immediatamente tutte le richieste dei lavoratori. Ma le concessioni — destinate ad aprire un dibattito che non ha precedenti nel monolitismo delle società socialiste — che gli operai sono riusciti a strappare, non si fermano qui: le trattative per i miglioramenti salariali si sono svolte direttamente fra i «comitati di sciopero» e la direzione delle aziende, con esclusione quindi degli organi centrali e regionali. Inoltre è stata ottenuta l'immunità per i leader delle agitazioni, che in altre circostanze sarebbero finiti in carcere.

I sindacati sono stati scavalcati «perché non rappresentano e non difendono i nostri interessi» e dovranno rivedere d'ora in poi ruolo e funzioni se vorranno riacquistare fiducia e credibilità. Il potere è stato costretto a cedere su tutta la linea per evitare l'esplosione dei conflitti e reazioni incontrollabili.

Con gli scioperi di questi mesi i polacchi hanno gettato le basi per un nuovo dialogo con il sistema, dalle quali difficilmente in futuro potranno essere obbligati ad arretrare e che avranno sicuramente ripercussioni anche al di là dei confini. Gli scioperanti (qui al posto di sciopero i mass-media preferiscono usare termini come «arresto o interruzione del lavoro») hanno ottenuto aumenti in taluni casi sino al quindici per cento dello stipendio. In parecchie aziende i miglioramenti sono stati conseguiti addirittura senza che fosse neces-

sario fermare la produzione.

Dal rincaro del prezzo della carne — le cifre si basano per forza di cose su stime approssimative — lo Stato conta di ricavare un introito di due miliardi di zloty, mentre dovrà sborsarne più di otto per gli aumenti salariali. Sul mercato quindi si riverseranno sei miliardi di zloty che andranno ad accelerare l'inflazione (ora del dieci per cento) oltre ad aumentare lo scontento e le frustrazioni dei consumatori che dispongono sì di più soldi, ma non sanno come spenderli, data la crescente scarsità di prodotti anche nei *pewez*, i negozi in cui si possono fare acquisti solo in valuta straniera.

Nel frattempo i debiti con l'estero sono arrivati quasi alla soglia fatidica dei venti miliardi di dollari. Il reddito nazionale è diminuito del due per cento, la produzione industriale ha subito un sensibile rallentamento e le piogge torrenziali dei mesi scorsi hanno inondato più di un milione di ettari, compromettendo irrimediabilmente un terzo del raccolto.

Sotto la calma si nasconde la paura. Il potere è conciliante perché teme, usando il pugno di ferro, di innescare una bomba pericolosissima. I dissidenti agiscono con moderazione, sapendo di non potersi spingere oltre un certo limite, la Chiesa non parla, perché stavolta non sono stati violati diritti, non c'è stata repressione, nessuno è finito dietro le sbarre. Tace anche Mosca.

Gierek sta trascorrendo le vacanze nell'Unione Sovietica. Avrà sicuramente affrontato con Breznev il tema spinoso degli scioperi. Qui dicono che il Cremlino gli ha lasciato carta bianca, che gode della più totale fiducia di Breznev e che i sovietici hanno in questo momento ben altre preoccupazioni e badano soprattutto che fra i satelliti venga rispettata il più rigorosamente possibile la fedeltà in campo strategico militare. Per il resto lasciano fare. Ma sino a che punto?

Sandro Scabello

teur. Tous : « La radio ! » Un membre du comité de grève : « Ce que

la Pologne, des bateaux qui ne seront pas construits dans les

Les vingt et une revendications du comité inter-entreprises de Gdansk

Voici la liste des vingt et une revendications communes définies par le comité central inter-entreprises de grève de Gdansk :

1) Reconnaissance de syndicats libres indépendants du parti et des employeurs sur la base de la convention n° 87 de l'O.I.T. (Organisation internationale du travail), ratifiée par la Pologne ;

2) Garantie du respect du droit de grève, de la sécurité des grévistes et des personnes qui les aident ;

3) Respect des libertés d'expression, de publication et d'impression garanties par la Constitution. Arrêt de la répression contre les publications indépendantes et accès aux médias des représentants de toutes les Eglises ;

4) A. Rétablissement des droits des personnes licenciées après les grèves de 1970 et 1976 et des étudiants exclus de l'enseignement supérieur à cause de leurs opinions politiques ; B. Libération de tous les prisonniers politiques, notamment : E. Zadrozynski, J.-M. Kozlowski ; et cessation des représailles pour raison d'opinion ;

5) Diffusion par les mass-médias de l'information sur la création du comité de grève inter-entreprises et publication de ses revendications ;

6) Lancement d'actions réelles ayant pour but de sortir le pays de la situation de crise, comme par exemple : diffusion publique de toutes les informations sur la situation socio-économique de la Pologne. Et possibilité donnée à tous les milieux et couches sociales de participer aux discussions sur un programme de réformes ;

7) Payer tous les grévistes comme pendant les périodes de congés ;

8) Augmentation du salaire de base de chaque travailleur de 2 000 zlotys par mois en compen-

sation de l'augmentation du prix de la viande ;

9) Echelle mobile des salaires ;

10) Réalisation d'un approvisionnement plein du marché intérieur en articles alimentaires et limitation des exportations aux surplus ;

11) Introduction de cartes de rationnement pour la viande jusqu'à la stabilisation du marché ;

12) Suppression des prix commerciaux et des ventes en devises étrangères sur le marché intérieur ;

~~13) Détermination des managers en ce sens uniquement sur leur qualification et non sur l'appartenance au parti. Suppression des privilèges de la police, de la sécurité et de l'appareil du parti par l'égalisation des allocations et la suppression du système des ventes spéciales ;~~

14) Droit à la retraite après trente-cinq ans de travail ; à cinquante ans pour les femmes et à cinquante-cinq pour les hommes ;

15) Suppression des différences entre les deux systèmes de pensions et de retraites par l'alignement sur le plus favorable ;

16) Amélioration des conditions de travail des services médicaux afin d'assurer aux travailleurs les services dont ils ont besoin ;

17) Création de crèches et écoles maternelles en nombre suffisant pour les enfants des mères qui travaillent ;

18) Extension de la durée du congé maternel payé à trois ans ;

19) Limitation du temps d'attente pour l'attribution d'appartements ;

20) Augmentation de 40 à 100 zlotys des frais de déplacement et augmentation de la prime de déplacement ;

21) Compensation dans les usines travaillant à plein temps de l'absence du samedi libre par l'allongement de la période de congé ou par l'introduction de jours fériés particuliers.

Le samedi, 20 zloty 80

Le virage nucléaire de Washington

Par une « Directive présidentielle » peu remarquée, Jimmy Carter vient d'aligner sa doctrine stratégique sur celle des Soviétiques. Il a de bonnes raisons pour le faire. Et les Européens de bonnes raisons de s'inquiéter

■ Dans le tapage follement coloré de la course à la présidence des Etats-Unis, le président en exercice Jimmy Carter vient de signer à la fin de juillet la « Directive présidentielle 59 », connue de la presse le 5 août dernier et qui est passée quasiment inaperçue du public. Elle semble cependant sinon remettre totalement en question, du moins réorienter fondamentalement la stratégie du plus grand des « nucléaires » et par là même, puisqu'il s'agit de l'Amérique, la conception de la défense de l'Occident tout entier.

Cette « Directive » pourrait en effet conduire à l'abandon de la stratégie de prévention de la guerre par des traités dans lesquels on s'accorde à soi-même et reconnaît à l'adver-

saire une telle puissance nucléaire, une telle variété de systèmes d'arme, que ce serait se condamner avec certitude que d'attaquer l'autre. Cette stratégie est connue sous le nom de « destruction mutuelle assurée ». Rompant avec elle, la « Directive 59 » affiche la détermination du plus haut responsable et la capacité de l'exécutant militaire américains à s'attaquer avec efficacité, en une guerre courte ou longue, à tout ou partie de ce qui fait la puissance des Soviétiques : leurs postes de commandement civils et militaires, leurs systèmes d'arme au sol. Pourquoi « au sol » ? Parce que seuls ces systèmes possèdent, pour l'instant, une précision de tir susceptible de menacer les systèmes d'arme au sol des Américains.

En gros, il s'agirait d'abandonner la « menace anti-cités », donc la dissuasion, donc la non-guerre, pour la menace d'une guerre spécifique susceptible de détruire l'arme capitale de l'ennemi. Ce serait le passage de « l'anti-cités » à « l'anti-forces ». L'évolution est considérable. On comprend que le secrétaire d'Etat (ministre des Affaires étrangères), Edmund Muskie, vienne de marquer son vif mécontentement d'avoir découvert en lisant le journal le tournant pris, sans qu'il en soit informé, dans un domaine capital de la politique américaine par le trio Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski (conseiller pour la Sécurité à la Maison-Blanche) et Harold Brown (secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense).

Une profonde divergence a toujours existé entre stratèges américains et soviétiques concernant le feu nucléaire. Pour les premiers, la stratégie nucléaire se fonde sur une menace d'emploi. L'apocalypse assurée — surtout quand on a décidé, comme Nixon et Brejnev à Moscou en mai 1972, de renoncer à élever des barrières « anti-missiles » — doit décourager tout homme d'Etat responsable de se livrer à des agressions pouvant conduire à l'escalade nucléaire. Cela a été confirmé par l'accord signé à Washington en 1973, dont un article prescrit la concertation des deux Grands pour empêcher que tout conflit entre quelques pays que ce soit ne grimpe au niveau nucléaire.

Pour les stratèges soviétiques — et même si leurs gouvernants prennent, à juste titre, toutes les précautions diplomatiques pour éviter l'escalade —, l'arme atomique, qu'elle soit à usage stratégique ou tactique, est un gros obus. On n'ose répéter après tant d'autres que dans la terminologie stratégique soviétique l'équivalent du mot « dissuasion » n'existe pas. A l'heure de vérité, dans le droit-fil de la pensée militaire qui court de Guibert à Foch en passant par Napoléon et Clausewitz, on attaque avec ses plus gros canons les forces les plus puissantes de l'adversaire. La bible des stratèges soviétiques est le livre du maréchal Sokolovski « Stratégie nucléaire » (1968). Phrases clés : « En l'occurrence, les forces principales de l'opération seront les armes



Emplacement des I.C.B.M. soviétiques

nucléaires stratégiques » ; le but doit être d'« éliminer les forces nucléaires des forces adverses », brisant ainsi « la maîtrise gouvernementale et militaire » (de l'ennemi). Conclusion sans fioritures : « Ça, c'est faire la guerre nucléaire. »

Il semble que la « Directive 59 » adresse aux Soviétiques le message suivant : « Cette guerre-là, vous ne pourrez pas — ou vous ne pourrez que très partiellement — la faire, parce que nous nous attaquerions nous aussi à votre système d'arme le plus précieux et que nos armes sont plus précises que les vôtres, nos satellites beaucoup plus sophistiqués, nos "aides à la navigation et à la pénétration" supérieures d'une génération aux vôtres. »

Ce faisant, d'ailleurs, Jimmy Carter ne fait qu'entériner les conclusions du Pentagone. Déjà, en 1973, James Schlesinger, alors secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense, avait préconisé, sans avoir le temps (ministériel) de l'imposer, une doctrine de « frappe sélective ». La conception et les études qu'elle provoquait n'en continuèrent pas moins leur chemin. La « destruction mutuelle assurée » semblait pourtant avoir la vie dure, puisque, en janvier 1979, « l'oscillant Jimmy Carter » — selon le mot de Brejnev, à qui la suite, en l'occurrence, semble avoir donné raison — claironnait, non pas dans une tournée électorale mais dans son discours de janvier 1979 sur l'état de l'Union, que la valeur dissuasive du système d'arme américain pouvait se mesurer au fait qu'un seul sous-marin du type « Poseidon » (2 % de la puissance nucléaire disponible) avait la capacité de rayer de la carte, en une bordée, toutes les villes soviétiques de cent mille habitants et plus. Ce qui est d'ailleurs exact.


Une riposte à Reagan

On doit donc se demander pourquoi, sur une question d'une importance si vitale, Jimmy Carter a effectué un brutal virage et s'est rendu aux raisons de Brzezinski et de Brown. C'est d'abord parce que leurs arguments étaient bons. Au cours des cinq dernières années, les Soviétiques ont à peu près remplacé dans les mille quatre cents silos creusés dans le sol de l'U.R.S.S. leurs vieux missiles balistiques intercontinentaux (I.C.B.M.) par une nouvelle génération d'armes : les « SS » 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, plus puissants, plus rapides à mettre en œuvre (les « SS 13 » et « SS 16 » sont à poudre), à têtes multiples, et surtout plus précis. Avec la mise en service de ces engins, la doctrine Sokolovski prend tout son sens : les « Minute-man » I à III, en silos, qui constituent le système d'arme intercontinental américain, pourraient — je dis pourraient — être fortement endommagés par une frappe préventive — ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'ils ne lâcheraient pas leur bordée dès l'alerte, pendant la durée (trois quarts d'heure) du parcours vers eux des I.C.B.M. soviétiques ; ce serait le *launch under fire*.

La raison principale du changement de stratégie annoncée par la « Directive 59 » est donc technique. Mais cette décision a aussi pour président américain son utilité politique immédiate et directement électorale. Avec ce geste, l'administration démocrate en place aime le pion aux Républicains. Ronald Reagan promet en effet, s'il vient au pouvoir, d'en finir avec l'arms control, l'équilibre des armements, la pondération du quantitatif par le qualitatif, bref, avec ce que l'opinion publique a très bien baptisé l'« équilibre de la terreur » ; et il s'engage à donner aux Etats-Unis la supériorité pure et simple en matière de puissance militaire. Carter répond : « Cette supériorité, je ne vous la promets pas : je vous la donne déjà. Et je

Piste de lancement du « MX »

Disposés sur d'énormes transporteurs, les « MX » peuvent être déplacés entre différents silos de lancement répartis autour de deux cents « pistes » ovales de vingt-cinq kilomètres de long



peux vous la donner parce que je l'ai préparée. Pour matérialiser ma "Directive", il me suffit de l'accord politique de vos représentants au Congrès pour mettre aussitôt en chantier le missile intercontinental "MX", mobile au sol, donc relativement invulnérable, qui surclasse, à la fois par sa précision et par le fait qu'il emporte dix têtes nucléaires, tous ses homologues soviétiques. Votez démocrate et vous aurez aussi les missiles de croisière lancés du sol, de la mer ou des airs, dont trois mille quatre cents exemplaires sont déjà commandés et dont je prépare une nouvelle génération à plus longue portée (au-delà de deux mille six cents kilomètres). Et puisque les traités S.A.L.T. II ne seront pas ratifiés par notre Sénat aussi longtemps que les Soviétiques n'auront pas fait un certain nombre de concessions, je peux ordonner le déploiement des armes mises au réfrigérateur par le Protocole du traité, en particulier les super-sous-marins "Trident II". »

Bipolarité renforcée

Le puissant complexe industrialo-militaire américain ne peut qu'être satisfait. Le déploiement des « MX » dans les Etats du Nevada et de l'Utah va coûter — prix de départ — cinquante-six milliards de dollars ; plus huit milliards de dollars pour la mise en place de la défense rapprochée des sites « MX ». De son côté, Boeing ploie sous le vrai marché du siècle, qu'il vient d'enlever de haute lutte à General Dynamics Convair : la construction de trois mille quatre cents premiers missiles de croisière.

Sur le plan extérieur, Carter se donne les moyens de vendre très cher la ratification des S.A.L.T. II aux Soviétiques. Ou bien ceux-ci acceptent les lourdes concessions demandées par le Sénat américain, ou bien il leur faut entrer dans la course technologique dont Carter donne le coup d'envoi. Or ils ont, au départ, plusieurs longueurs de retard, et cette course serait plus ruineuse encore pour eux que pour les Américains. En raison des différences entre les appareils industriels de l'un et l'autre pays, on estime en effet que l'effort financier nécessaire se traduira aux Etats-Unis par une aug-

mentation annuelle de 3 à 4 % du budget de la Défense, en dollars constants, et en U.R.S.S. par une augmentation de 10 %.

Pour les pays européens et pour le Japon, les conséquences de la nouvelle attitude américaine ne sont pas claires. Mais les dirigeants s'inquiètent. Certes, les Américains affirment que leur nouvelle stratégie — c'est-à-dire leur décision de se donner les moyens de conduire une guerre nucléaire (*warfighting nuclear capability*) et non plus seulement de prendre en cas d'attaque l'initiative de l'escalade anticipée — a une valeur hautement dissuasive. Mais elle est aussi, dans la mesure où elle se rapproche de la stratégie de Moscou, un coup d'œil d'intelligence aux Soviétiques. Quand on est un atlantiste modéré, on se méfie de l'accent mis sur le *partnership* des deux Grands dans un domaine si important. La bipolarité sort incontestablement renforcée de la « Directive 59 ». Est-ce un bien ? On peut en douter, surtout au moment où un porte-parole soviétique, N. Portougalov, écrit, dans la « *Literaturnaja Gazeta* » du 6 août, que l'U.R.S.S. ne veut pas de « la transformation d'une Europe occidentale en une force militaire indépendante comme succédané de la participation des Etats-Unis aux affaires du continent ». Ce qui est une façon de dire aux Américains : « Nous sommes deux bretteurs face à face ; ne nous laissons pas entraîner à nous battre par un perturbateur quelconque, qu'il soit de notre mouvance ou non. Nous nous occupons des gens de notre camp ; occupez-vous de ceux du vôtre, et tout ira bien. »

Ce n'est pas exactement l'avis des alliés de l'Amérique. Aussi bien, le père de la nouvelle stratégie nucléaire américaine, Harold Brown, secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense, a-t-il adressé le 11 août un message rassurant à ses collègues des pays de l'O.T.A.N. Il affirme que, loin d'abandonner l'ancienne stratégie pour une nouvelle, l'Amérique se donne les moyens de jouer les deux. Il doit s'en expliquer en détail le 20 août, dans un discours qu'il prononcera à l'Ecole navale d'Annapolis — et qui sera étudié avec autant d'attention par les Européens que par les Soviétiques. GEORGES BUIS

■ « Vous n'imaginez pas l'impression que ça fait à l'étranger ! L'Amérique ne doit pas continuer à monter en épingle un problème ou un autre pour se débarrasser, sans façons, de ses présidents. Elle ne peut plus se permettre de les détruire systématiquement, d'en user cinq en vingt ans ! »... Ce cri d'alarme, c'est un vieil ami de la famille Kennedy qui le pousse. Quelques jours avant l'ouverture de la Convention démocrate, Abraham Ribicoff, sénateur du Connecticut, blanchi sous le harnais des grandes causes libérales, a brusquement déserté le camp de Ted pour faire allégeance à l'homme de la Maison-Blanche. Un geste qui devançait le retour en grâce de Jimmy Carter, dans une partie de l'opinion, après les trois semaines les plus noires de son administration.

Carter peut-il encore gagner ? C'était la question qui bourdonnait dans les travées de la Convention, lundi dernier. En s'asseyant sur leurs chaises rouges, dans la nef de Madison Square Garden, les grands prêtres du Parti démocrate et leurs ouailles ont souvent la gorge serrée, derrière leur sourire de circonstance. Interrogés par l'hebdomadaire « U.S. News », les gouverneurs du pays viennent juste de prédire un raz de marée pour Ronald Reagan, à l'élection du 4 novembre prochain. Catastrophique, l'institut de sondage Louis Harris a fait savoir que, dans aucun domaine, il ne trouvait une majorité de l'opinion pour approuver la politique présidentielle. Décidément, l'Amérique a pris en grippe le Géorgien de Washington qui, comble du crime, a laissé s'envoler le prix du hamburger... jusqu'à trois dollars parfois ! Et elle est de plus en plus montée contre les démocrates. Lors des élections sénatoriales, en automne prochain, quelques barons du parti pourraient bien être balayés : George McGovern et Frank Church, par exemple, sont aux abois.

L'urne et Phôtel

D'où la tension qui règne sur Madison Square Garden, lorsque commence la grand-messe démocrate. L'air affairé, mystérieux aussi, les kennedystes se battent pour que la Convention accepte que les délégués n'aient pas à voter, au premier tour, pour le candidat sur la liste duquel ils ont été élus lors des primaires. Ce serait la seule chance de l'emporter pour le sénateur du Massachusetts, arrivé minoritaire à New York. En son for intérieur, Kennedy a probablement compris que le parti ne désire pas sa candidature. Il n'en montre rien. Mais si les règles du jeu sont changées, les apparatchiks sont convaincus qu'il finira par se retirer pour laisser place au vieil Henry (« Scoop ») Jackson, l'orateur le plus soporifique de tous les Etats-Unis, ou au secrétaire d'Etat Edmund Muskie, fier-à-bras qui, déjà, frétille d'aise sous l'amicale pression de ses



Pourquoi pas Carter ?

definitive deterring

It has to deter



If you wish to prevent somebody doing A to you, by threatening to do B to him if he does, you first make sure that the threat of B is plausible. President Carter has chosen to change American policy on the targeting of nuclear weapons in a singularly Carterian way—by signing Presidential Directive 59 without telling his secretary of state about it, and by then blandly assuring his ruffled allies abroad that there is nothing to worry about. But the hamfisted way of doing it does not mean that what Mr Carter has done is not necessary and, with a couple of caveats, desirable. Presidential Directive 59 will make it possible for America's nuclear forces to strike at Soviet missile silos instead of at Soviet cities. It will ensure that the nuclear deterrent can continue to deter.

A change is necessary because the old policy has been made obsolete by the growth of Russia's missile power. From 1960 until 1974, the American nuclear target plan was so rigid that a president obliged to press the button against Russia would have found himself with only two possibilities: his missiles and bombers would have been heading either (a) for the entire list of Soviet cities and other targets on the document known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (Siop) or (b), if he wished, for that Siop list minus Moscow and a few other cities. (Until the early 1960s China too would have been swept into the holocaust.) In 1974 Mr James Schlesinger, the defence secretary of the time, tried to put a bit more flexibility into the target plan, by making it possible to attack smaller groups of targets, and deliberately leave other targets untouched. But Mr Schlesinger found that the United States had neither the weapons nor the control system needed to make his plan work. And even the Schlesinger degree of flexibility is no longer enough, now that Russia is approaching the time when its expanding missile force—including its 308 huge 10-warhead SS-18s—may be able to destroy virtually all America's land-based missiles at a blow, and still leave a lot of Russia's missiles unused.

Preventing the third strike prevents the first

The problem is that, if a Russian first strike did wipe out the land-based missiles, America's surviving bombers and submarine-launched missiles are not accurate enough to hit back at the unused portion of Russia's missile force. They would have to go for the cities

instead. The defenders of the old policy (who until recently included Mr Carter) argue that "city-busting" is a good enough deterrent. The critics, now including Mr Carter, reply that it is not, because the Russians would know—and would know the Americans knew—that those unused Russian missiles would then be able to obliterate the United States.

In the terrifying logic of the nuclear exchange, this certainty of a Russian third strike would paralyse the American second strike which is supposed to deter the Russian first strike. The fear that this is how the Russians see things is reinforced by the fact that they do not use the concept of deterrence (the Russian word would be *ustrashenie*, but it is almost unknown in the military sense). The Russians explain that they want to avoid nuclear war; but they make it clear that, if it happens, they intend to fight it through and win it (see page 38).

The only way out of the corner is to re-create an effective American second-strike force, which would make it impossible for the Russians to deliver that third strike, and would therefore deter them from any nuclear attack at all. An effective American second-strike force needs missiles which are invulnerable to a Russian first strike and also accurate enough to hit Russian missile silos and other pinpoint targets. Two such weapons, the MX mobile land-based missile and a Trident submarine-launched one, are planned for the second half of the 1980s (it is not yet possible to rely on the undersea Trident alone, because communicating with submarines is still a dicey business). A second-strike force also needs a system of control that would work among the mushroom clouds. Equipped with the right sort of missiles and control system, the United States would be in a position to destroy a list of Russian missile sites, troop centres, power stations, oil refineries and so on without starting the mutual mass murder of the old policy.

Presidential Directive 59 is the document which will pull the new weapons and a new control system together into a new policy. It will be helped by Directive 58 (on "continuity of government") and Directive 53 (on keeping communications open). All this does not "make nuclear war more likely by making it less unthinkable", as some nervous first reactions have put it. At bottom, it makes nuclear war less likely

by removing from the Russians the temptation to believe that they could paralyse the United States with a first blow (or nibble it to surrender by a series of little nuclear attacks which the Americans could not reply to in kind). It does not "change the rules of nuclear war", because the rule the Americans thought they had—anyone touch anyone and we all blow up cities—does not seem to be regarded as a rule by the Russians. It replaces an implausible deterrent with a plausible one, something this newspaper among others has long been urging.

Two itching fingers? No

The caveats, then? First, the business of keeping the government of America alive and in touch with its missile commanders—the subject of Directives 53 and 58—is not achieved by a stroke of the pen. The flexibility of the new targeting plan will require quite a large nuclear command staff. Arrangements have to be made to get the president and this staff, plus other necessary parts of government, out of Washington and into safe places within about half an hour, provide them with bomb-proof and radiation-proof communications to their surviving nuclear bases and submarines—and keep them sane while the shouts of destruction and despair would be coming to them through the ether. To make these arrangements is the best way to ensure that they will not have to be used; but it will not be easy. In particular, the nuclear planners should not be encouraged to believe that a "controlled" nuclear war could stay under control for very long.

Second, it has to be recognised that the sort of American missile force which could provide a real second-strike deterrent might one day be big enough to pose a first-strike threat to Russia's land-based missiles (which America cannot now do). This is not, be it noted, the "two itching fingers on the trigger" combination that everybody is rightly terrified about. That would happen if both sides simultaneously believed that they could destroy the other if they hit first, but could not retaliate if they let the other hit first: in a crisis, anything would then depend on who pulled the trigger first. The "two itching fingers" are not in prospect because the main point of PD-59 is to give America the assured power to retaliate flexibly as an alternative to holocaust or surrender. The Americans, knowing they had this power, would not be tempted to strike first and the Russians, knowing the Americans had it, would not dare to. But PD-59 does face the Russians with the need to build an assured second-strike force of their own—perhaps by keeping fewer of their missiles in silos on land, and more out at sea in submarines.

The whole subject of preventing nuclear war combines the obscurity of higher mathematics with the ugliness of horror fiction. This leads many people to say that the best way of avoiding the unthinkable is not to think about it. They are wrong. It is the unthinkable we must think about, and then act intelligently upon the thinking. Presidential Directive 59 is the clearest piece of nuclear thinking yet to come out of Mr Carter's Washington.

Safe conduct? No, thanks

You cannot protect journalists by international codes without restricting press freedom

Most journalists accept that they cannot be infallibly shielded from the wrath of those angered by what they report or represent. All over the world they are in danger. This week a young American woman who writes for *The Economist* and the *Financial Times* was released from detention in Bolivia by the intercession of the two newspapers (see page 30). This month some 400 South Korean journalists have lost their jobs (see page 28). The representatives of the BBC and Reuters have recently been driven from Beirut by Syrian threats on their lives. The last two American reporters working in Iran left when that country's government—if that is the word for it—announced that it could no longer guarantee their safety. With them went three British television reporters who had spent time behind bars. A columnist of the *Corriere della Sera* was gunned down at a bus-stop in Milan in May.

Could journalists be protected by some sort of international emblem, like the Red Cross? In Belgrade this autumn the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation may find itself considering whether to grant international status and protection to

journalists. This idea, it is suggested, will be proposed by Unesco's director-general, Mr Amadou M'Bow, prompted by Mr Sean MacBride, a quirky ex-foreign minister of Ireland who has great influence with Mr M'Bow and who, for unfathomable reasons, has added this issue to his list of windmills for tilting at.

"Protected" journalists means licensed ones

The idea would do no good and a great deal of harm. It has been circulating, in one form or another, since journalists began disappearing in the Indochina wars. But it has always run up against the obvious problem. Who issues the safe-conduct cards? By what criteria is it decided who constitutes a protection-worthy journalist? And would the cards be withdrawn for failure to go on satisfying those criteria? The only result of the debate so far has been an addendum to the Geneva conventions, saying that journalists engaged on dangerous missions in areas of international armed conflict should be treated as civilians, so long as they act as such.

Safe-conduct cards will achieve even less than that.



mental missile capable of surviving a surprise Soviet attack. Though the nation's 550 Minuteman IIIs, most already fitted with the new Mk-12A warhead, can achieve the pinpoint accuracy necessary to carry out the counterforce strategy, there is wide agreement among defense experts that these ICBMs will soon be vulnerable to a pre-emptive Soviet strike. The U.S. Navy's missile-launching submarines, hiding quietly at great ocean depths, are safer from attack, but they are much more appropriate for striking cities than for destroying missiles encased in concrete deep in the ground; for one thing, they are not sufficiently accurate.

What offers both accuracy and, because it is mobile, the ability to survive a surprise Soviet blow is the MX missile. It is, however, a controversial system, not only because of its hefty \$33.8 billion price tag (sure to grow with cost overruns) but because there are some doubts about how long it would be before Moscow would find a way to cripple the MX missiles in a pre-emptive strike. Most experts are confident, however, that because the missile will not be a stationary target and will be protected by various other measures still under consideration, it will remain virtually invulnerable for at least a couple of decades. This has been the life span of the Minuteman system.

In fact, because of the Minuteman's fast-approaching vulnerability to attack, the MX probably would be required by the U.S. in any case. But the weapon's counterforce role is likely to become one of the most important arguments for going ahead with it. This was one of the points stressed last week by the Carter forces at the Democratic Convention when they pushed successfully for an endorsement of the MX in the party's platform.

Harold Brown has emphasized that Presidential Directive 59 represents only an evolutionary change in U.S. strategic policy. As far back as 1962 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara flirted with the concept of counterforce but abandoned it mainly because it was too costly, given the state of technology in that era. Eleven years later, Pentagon Chief James Schlesinger strongly advocated the concept. As a result, Schlesinger now says, "80% of the [new] doctrine has been in place since the summer of '73."

The specific policy that Brown is to announce had its immediate roots in the opening months of the Carter Administration, when the President ordered a thorough review of U.S. strategic options. This eventually led to a top-secret report completed in early 1979. Details of the new directive were thrashed out in a long series of meetings of senior officials from the Pentagon and National Security Council staff. Throughout the proceedings, the NATO allies also were kept informed of the policy discussions. At NATO's Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Norway in June, Brown discussed the matter in detail with his allied counterparts and received their ap-



Minuteman III during a test in Florida



Missile in its silo in California

Doomsday to prevent a holocaust.

proval for the shift in strategic emphasis.

Not so well informed, apparently, was Edmund Muskie. Although State Department aides were advised of the doctrinal discussions at various times in the past year, the planning sessions had concluded before Muskie became Secretary of State in May, and he apparently had not been fully informed of the new policy's details when its general outlines were leaked to reporters early this month. By angrily making no secret of the fact that he felt he had been left in the dark, Muskie created a minor but embarrassing flap that fueled speculation about rivalries between his staff and that of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is responsible for coordinating the formulation of such policies. Was Brzezinski, it was asked, already trying to undercut the new Secretary of State? By week's end, however, Muskie seemed generally mollified.

The fact that the new counterforce policy is a modification of existing doctrine has raised questions about why Carter has dramatized the change by making it a Presidential Directive. Brzezinski was the chief advocate of the move, while Brown is thought to have favored keeping the policy an internal Pentagon matter. A number of critics believe that Carter wants to publicize the matter because he needs to appear tougher on defense issues to blunt criticism from G.O.P. Nominee Ronald Reagan. Says Herbert Scoville Jr., former CIA deputy director for research and now a strong advocate of arms reduction: "They're playing politics with the thing." Observes former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: "I do not believe that the middle of an election campaign is the appropriate moment to announce a new strategy for conducting nuclear operations."

More important than the possible political reasons for Carter's action is the impact the policy may have at home and abroad. Doves are generally critical. Complains Scoville: "Anything that makes it easier to fight nuclear war is a step in the wrong direction." Even Harold Brown has had reservations about the counterforce strategy; he has been worried that once a nuclear exchange begins, no matter how limited, it will inevitably escalate into Armageddon. But Brown also believes that the U.S. must have the option of responding to a nuclear strike with something less than a full-scale atomic fusillade.

Brown's original hesitations about the policy seem valid, for there is a fundamental ambivalence involved in counterforce. Explains Lawrence Korb, director of defense studies at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington: "The irony of this doctrine is that it could make war either more or less probable. The threshold may be easier to go over, but if you do, you may be able to put the genie back in the bottle. It is stoppable, but because it is, it also is more startable." —By Burton Pinos. Reported by Don Sider/Washington

Ecn. II forte

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Senate Panel Passes \$22-Billion Tax Cut

By Caroline Arkinson

20 forte

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (WP) — The Senate Finance Committee yesterday rushed through major tax cuts for both individuals and business, to be effective next Jan. 1.

In less than 15 minutes, the committee voted, 16 to 0, for a \$22-billion cut in individual income taxes next year, equivalent to an across-the-board reduction of about 6 percent.

The committee had already voted, 20 to 0, for a cut in business taxes of more than \$11 billion next year, equivalent to roughly one-sixth of their tax due. Businesses would be able to write off their purchases of new plant and equipment about 40 percent faster than under present law.

Burden of Inflation

The personal tax cut is aimed at offsetting the Social Security tax in-

crease of \$100 in the so-called zero bracket amount, below which income is tax-free, to \$2,400 for single persons, and \$3,600 for married couples filing jointly.

A two-step deduction to reduce the so-called marriage penalty. The deduction would be 5 percent in 1981 on the first \$30,000 of earned income of the lower-paid spouse, rising to 10 percent in 1982.

An increase in the earned income tax credit, which benefits lower-income working parents, from 10 percent to 11 percent on income up to \$5,000 and with the credit phasing out at higher income levels than at present.

A general rate reduction. Rates will be cut in almost all tax brackets, with the top rate down from 70 percent to 67 percent, and the bottom rate cut probably from 14 percent to 12 percent.

failure in the rock," explained Dr. Witherspoon. "There is too much technology to search out these sites."

Radioactivity From U.S. Volcano Found to Top Three Mile Island's

PALO ALTO, Calif., Aug. 14 (UPI) — The volcanic eruption of Mount St. Helens released radioactive gas "many times more significant" than that released from the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, a report published yesterday said. Battelle Pacific Laboratories of Richland, Wash., said its scientists found "rather high concentrations" of several radioactive elements as far as 225 miles away from the volcano in Spokane, Wash., since the May 18 eruption.

20 forte

ARCT.

AUX ÉTATS-UNIS, LES PARTISANS DE M. REAGAN ENVISAGENT LE RÉTABLISSEMENT DE L'ÉTALON-OR

Plusieurs des conseillers économiques du candidat républicain à la Maison Blanche, M. Ronald Reagan, envisagent la restauration, d'une forme ou d'une autre, d'étalon-or (gold standard). Le programme (plateforme) du parti fait allusion à ce point : « L'abolition, dit-on dans ce document, du lien entre l'or et les biens réels dans les années 60 et 70... a entraîné des forces hyperinflationnistes à l'intérieur des États-Unis et le désordre monétaire à l'étranger, sans pour autant apporter aucun des avantages économiques désirés. » Et d'ajouter que « l'une des tâches les plus urgentes sera de rétablir un étalon monétaire digne de foi — autrement dit, de mettre fin à l'inflation. »

Post, rapporte que l'un des auteurs de ce passage, le député (membre de la Chambre des représentants), M. David Stockman, a récemment déclaré que si l'or n'est pas nommément mentionné dans le document, c'est bien à cette « matière première » que pensaient les stratèges du parti républicain, en rédigeant ce texte. M. Alan Greenspan, un autre conseiller de M. Reagan (et précédemment du président Ford), a dit, pour sa part, qu'il serait partisan d'un étalon or, une fois le dollar stabilisé par des politiques budgétaires et économiques appropriés. En revanche, M. George Shultz, ancien secrétaire au Trésor sous la présidence de M. Nixon, et aujourd'hui également conseiller du candidat républicain estime qu'« un retour à l'étalon or n'est pas approprié ».

Notre confrère, le Washington

S. E. S. G. DM Flor F.S. L. C. DM S. E. Flor F.S. L. C. Fr.

or deterring a holocaust.

The new strategy calls for the United States to respond to a Soviet attack with limited strikes against Soviet military targets—such as missile silos—and political command centers. Until now, the United States has relied on a Strangelovian concept in which it would respond to a "first strike" with an all-out attack that annihilated major Soviet cities and industrial areas, as well as military centers. That doctrine—known as MAD, for "mutual assured destruction"—held that the threat of such devastation was so terrifying that the Soviets would not attempt a first strike. The trouble was that the Soviets never accepted that logic, and now they have the tech-

WASHINGTON, Aug. 14 (WP)

President Carter will commit himself to developing a new strategic bomber, a "stealth" bomber, Thursday night when he accepts nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York. Government sources said yesterday. Such a commitment would mean a march on Republican standard-bearer Ronald Reagan and his adherents, who have lambasted Mr. Carter for canceling the B-1 bomber program in 1977.

Breakthroughs in technology, sources said, will enable Mr. Carter to argue that his cancellation was a good move because the contemplated new bomber could foil Soviet defenses that are becoming lethal enough to down a B-1.

One key breakthrough is a top-secret way to make a long-range bomber virtually invisible to radar, which is used to detect invading aircraft and aim guns and missiles at them.

Some Air Force enthusiasts have nicknamed the new bomber "Stealth" because of its ghost-like qualities. Specialists explain that Stealth pre-

tion, but to hold on he reads.

You're not born or later a knowledge of the combat that President

Although I'm not sure about the enemy, Burke, Air said public of hardware for a absorbing of cross-section prove survive face-to-air shoot-down

William chief, can develop look down level bon

hard to get out. When an economy is not growing, no gain without others losing, no investment made for tomorrow's growth without cutting consumption (not merely moderating its rise).

In "The zero-sum society", a book now serving as America's worry-beads, Professor Lester Thurow reports a Harvard alumni reunion where

"I suggested that we were all in favour of more investment, but that the heart of the problem was deciding whose income should fall to make room for... raising our investment in plant and equipment from 10 to 15% of the gnp. One hand was quickly raised, and the suggestion was made to eliminate welfare payments... I pointed out that welfare constitutes only 1.2% of the gnp... Whose income were they willing to cut after they had eliminated government programmes for the poor? Not a hand went up".

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me brave initiatives problems of Ulster

can see where common ground lies. It is unlikely that Mr Atkins will be able to meet his deadline and announce some legislative proposal for a new Ulster assembly by next November. When really up against the wall of no agreement, he may fall back on some woolly wording about "a progressive transfer of power over a period of time" of the powers to Ulster. That soft fallback would be a pity. Instead, the British

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reached out to the Libyan diplomat and opened up an exchange with Col. Qadhafi.

THE WASHINGTON POST.

notes → Carter / He. Feb 7 1976

ARH

U.S. Gas Rationing Plan

① The U.S. gasoline rationing plan is now legally in place. Is that reassuring? Does it mean the United States is ready to deal with even the direst shortage of oil?

It will take another year and \$100 million to get the regulations written and the coupons printed, but the main outlines of the system are established. Rationing would go into effect only in the event of a severe drop in oil supplies — a shortage at least twice as severe as the one that caused the gasoline lines last year. A ration book would go to each car, so the three-car family would get three times as much gas as the one-car family. It would be legal to buy and sell the coupons.

A few questions haven't quite been settled yet. How much will businesses have to cut back, compared with private motorists?

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079
③
④ What about the people who buy old cars to get the ration books? The Department of Energy is considering a limit on the number of ration books per household — but it isn't easy to define a household, as the White House Conference on Families discovered. And then what about diesel fuel, which is the same thing as home heating oil?

The ration coupons would have a substantial cash value. In a shortage sufficient to trigger the rationing law, a gallon of gasoline would be worth about \$3, the Department of Energy calculates. If the price at the pump was \$1.25, the coupon would be worth \$1.75.

Since people wouldn't want to walk around carrying hundreds of dollars' worth of coupons, the banks would provide coupon checking accounts. That's another checkbook to be balanced at the end of the month. But just a minute. Don't these coupons begin to look like money — and act like money?

Of course they do. This whole intricate, expensive, parallel system of currency is being created for the usual inadequate reason. Congress thinks its constituents consider rationing fairer than a tax. Most of Congress understands that rationing is, in its impact, exactly the same as a tax with a rebate. But gasoline taxes are unpopular, and Congress likes to be loved.

At least the rationing system wouldn't be in effect long — less than a year, if last year's experience is a guide. Rationing would tell foreign oil producers that their prices for crude oil were too low. They would raise their prices until supply balanced demand, just as they did last summer. A tax with a rebate would recirculate the higher costs of gasoline back into the U.S. economy. But when the foreign producers increase their prices, there's no rebate. Once again the president and Congress, in pursuit of a spurious idea of social equity, have constructed a mechanism that, in a crisis, would benefit primarily the foreign oil producers.

THE WASHINGTON POST.

of deferring a holocaust.

The new strategy calls for the United States to respond to a Soviet attack with limited strikes against Soviet military targets—such as missile silos—and political command centers. Until now, the United States has relied on a Strangelovian concept in which it would respond to a "first strike" with an all-out attack that annihilated major Soviet cities and industrial areas, as well as military centers. That doctrine—known as MAD, for "mutual assured destruction"—held that the threat of such devastation was so terrifying that the Soviets would not attempt a first strike. The trouble was that the Soviets never accepted that logic, and now they have the tech-

ment serbe, en amendant la loi sur les uni- mes les pro-

Belgrade. — Depuis la dévaluation de 30 % du dinar (*le Monde* du 8 juin), le gouvernement fédéral yougoslave s'est attaqué avec vigueur aux principaux problèmes économiques accumulés au cours des dernières années. La tâche révèle cependant de longue haleine et difficile, car l'économie est totalement décentralisée et il

De notre correspondant
PAUL YANKOVITCH

le système yougoslave est un mélange d'économie de marché et d'économie dirigée n'est pas de nature à simplifier les choses. Néanmoins, après de laborieuses

Solzenicyn e l'Occidente

Mentre si stava svolgendo questa polemica, nello scorso gennaio, il suo protagonista Solzenicyn scriveva nel Vermont, dove risiede, l'articolo *Il comunismo è esposto alla vista di tutti ma non è capito* (*Kommunizm: u vsech na vidu - i ne ponjat, Russkaja mysl'* - *La Pensée Russe* n. 3296, 21 febbraio). Citiamo i punti salienti di questa presa di posizione politica. Prima accusa: nel 1918 l'Occidente non appoggiò i russi, uniti contro il comunismo, e concesse invece il suo aiuto economico al regime sovietico. Nel 1941, l'Armata rossa si ritirò dal Mar baltico fino al Mar nero: « In alcuni mesi circa tre milioni di combattenti si arresero. Que-

Solt.

Brown-Brzezinski Tandem Pushed New U.S.

By Richard Burt

WASHINGTON, Aug. 13 (NYT) — Just a few days before he was to move into the White House in January, 1977, Jimmy Carter, in a meeting with his new national security aides, asked Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to study the feasibility of reducing the nation's strategic arsenal from 1,800 long-range missiles down to about 200 systems.

Three-and-a-half years later, the Pentagon is embarked on several new weapons programs designed to bolster U.S. strategic power, and the year ago President Carter approved a revised nuclear targeting strategy that gives priority to being able to strike at military and political targets in the Soviet Union.

The new nuclear policy, contained in a document known as Presidential Directive 59, has sparked some controversy because

Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and his senior aides were evidently excluded from the final stages of its formulation. But the few officials familiar with the manner in which the decision was reached say that it provides insight into how the administration's military posture has changed over the years and how Mr. Brown and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Mr. Carter's national security adviser, have become intellectual companions and movers on security matters.

Schlesinger Doctrine

In substance, the new targeting policy represents an evolutionary change from a nuclear war plan, known as National Security Decision Memorandum 242, formulated in the final months of the Ford administration. That memorandum, which said that U.S. missiles needed to be capable of threatening a wide

range of civilian and military targets in the Soviet Union, was stimulated by former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

But during the 1976 presidential campaign, Mr. Carter, in several interviews, expressed strong skepticism over the idea of being able to undertake "selective" nuclear strikes against Soviet military targets, as suggested by Mr. Schlesinger. As late as December, 1978, Mr. Carter told a news conference that his administration's approach to deterrence was based on the principle "that any attack on us would result in devastating destruction by the nation which launched an attack."

According to officials, both Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Brown, by the end of 1977, had started to express reservations about basing deterrence on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation. A major factor, they said, behind the two senior

aides' re-evaluation of nuclear posture was the finding of an exhaustive interagency study on the global military balance.

The study, prepared by Samuel Huntington, formerly a close aide to Mr. Brzezinski who is now teaching at Harvard University, concluded that Moscow did not accept the theory of mutual deterrence based on massive retaliation. On the basis of the study, Mr. Brzezinski is said to have sent a note to Mr. Brown asking the Pentagon to re-examine nuclear war plans in light of Mr. Huntington's findings.

Study Was Ordered

Pentagon aides said that early in 1978, Mr. Brown asked Leon Sloss, a State Department aide experienced in strategic issues, to conduct a thorough study of nuclear targeting. Working with a small team, Mr. Sloss is said to have developed many of the concepts associated with Presidential Directive 59, including the need to create a reserve force of missiles for use in prolonged war, the importance of being able to hit military targets and the desirability of threatening the Soviet political apparatus.

The "conclusions" of the Sloss team, sent to Mr. Brown at the end of 1978, are said to have impressed the defense secretary and Mr. Brzezinski for somewhat different reasons. Mr. Brown, close aides report, was mainly interested in convincing Moscow that it could not gain an advantage by striking at U.S. military targets. As a result, the aides said he was intrigued with the notion that the best way to do this was to threaten the survival of Soviet leaders and military forces.

Mr. Brzezinski, according to his aides, was less concerned about the possibility of a Soviet attack and more worried about how Moscow might use its growing nuclear power to "blackmail" Washington in future political crises. Thus, he is said to have emerged as a strong advocate of programs, such as civil defense, that his aides asserted would enhance U.S. "crisis bargaining" in disputes with the Soviet Union.

Officials said that Mr. Brown's and Mr. Brzezinski's support for increasing the nation's capacity to make pinpoint strikes naturally led both aides to press Mr. Carter, in the early part of 1979, to approve the Air Force's proposal for a new mobile intercontinental missile, the MX. The missile, which is scheduled for deployment in the late 1980s, is not only designed to escape any Soviet "first strike" but it would possess the necessary accuracy to threaten Russian missile silos and other well-protected military targets.

Summer Sessions

Following Mr. Carter's decision, in May, 1979, to approve the development of the MX, Mr. Brzezinski is reported to have

cal Peaks Still Unscaled in Kashmir

British fighting — only an occasional potshot. The dispute is as emotional as it is political. Kashmir has been divided for so long, and the prospects for unification are so remote, that many see no likelihood of a solution.

"There is no chance of resolving the issue for the time being," said Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the 70-year-old, independent Moslem who has dominated the region's politics for almost five decades.

When Maharajah Hari Singh "acceded" to the signing over of Kashmir in 1947 to largely Hindu India,

it was Sheikh Abdullah who rallied the predominantly Moslem population behind the decision.

After serving seven years as the first prime minister of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah was jailed during much of the 1950s and 1960s, allegedly for trying to push Kashmir too far toward autonomy. After Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rehabilitated him in the mid-'70s, he again took over in Kashmir and, in the years since, has re-established a bond with his people that has made him almost invulnerable politically.

Many observers point to Sheikh Abdullah's role as a stabilizing factor as a major reason why Kashmir has remained so quiet in recent years. They cite his quiet defusing of anti-Indian feeling here after last month's clash between Indian troops and Kashmiri civilians as an example of his influence.

Traffic Accident

The clash, set off by a traffic accident involving an army truck and a bus, quickly erupted into a full-scale riot, with truckloads of off-duty soldiers battling civilians. Civilians retaliated the next night by attacking the homes of senior army personnel.

With the situation worsening, Sheikh Abdullah called a public meeting in Srinagar's main square. He denounced the violence and promised to punish those guilty of starting it, then talked the angry crowd into going home.

But Sheikh Abdullah is in the twilight of his political career and with the winds of an Islamic resurgence stirring Kashmir's population at a time when the forces of regionalism are on the rise in India, those who know Kashmir talk apprehensively of its future.

The small Islamic fundamentalist

would result in a vote to join Pakistan, has gained strength in the state — especially among the educated, unemployed youth.

India and Pakistan agreed 31 years ago that Kashmir's fate would be decided by a plebiscite, but India has backed away from the idea. It now favors a negotiated settlement.

Despite Pakistan's disastrous political history since independence, there are still strong feelings among many Kashmiri Moslems that Pakistan is where they belong.

"Pakistan's problems aren't enough to discourage us," a Moslem community leader said. "The religious tie is more important. If we accede to Pakistan, then we'll feel safe."

Pakistan's late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was probably more loved in Indian Kashmir than in his own country because of his efforts to resolve the issue. When Mr. Bhutto was hanged by Pakistan's military authorities last year, the largest, most violent demonstrations were not in Pakistan but in the Kashmir Valley.

27 Die as Moslems, Hindus Fight in India

NEW DELHI (UPI) — A pig that strayed into an Islamic prayer gathering touched off bloody Moslem-Hindu clashes that left 27 dead and 200 injured in northern India today, the Press Trust of India reported.

Police said the violence erupted at a prayer ground where thousands of Moslems had gathered to offer prayers after Ramadan, the Moslem month of fasting and praying. A pig, which Moslems consider as a representative of Satan, strayed into the prayer ground, causing the

ops in Cambodia

Radio Hanoi, quoting press reports, alleged that Chinese naval units were on constant patrol around Vietnamese islands near the Chinese border and said that a number of Chinese warships intruded into Vietnamese waters last month. It said that the provocations were part of a scheme by China to pressure Vietnam.

Is Cited as U.S. Fight in Bolivia

Paz and accused of "defamatory libel," allegedly for an article implicating the nation's rulers in the drug trade. Today the military authorities released the journalist, Mary Helen Spooner, 28, of St. Louis, after accepting "expressions of re-

Un général soviétique a été tué à Kaboul dans un attentat

Un général soviétique a été assassiné lundi 28 juillet à Kaboul, affirme l'A.F.P. qui se réfère à une source proche du ministère afghan de l'intérieur.

Cet attentat intervient à un moment où le corps expéditionnaire soviétique doit faire face à la rébellion de plusieurs unités de l'armée afghane, dont deux dans la banlieue de Kaboul.

D'autre part, selon un Afghan résidant à Moscou, plus de cinq cents Afghans qui se trouvaient en Union soviétique lors de l'entrée de l'armée rouge dans leur pays, et qui voulaient se réfugier en Occident, seraient détenus par le K.G.B.

L'armée rouge tente d'écraser la mutinerie d'unités afghanes

C'est alors qu'il quittait sa résidence en voiture que le général soviétique a été tué d'une balle par un Afghan. Il exerçait d'importantes fonctions au sein du ministère de l'intérieur où il était responsable de la coordination de l'espionnage à la frontière pakistanaise et du recrutement de membres des tribus hostiles pour les infiltrer au sein de la résistance. Le 7 avril, deux généraux soviétiques avaient déjà trouvé la mort lorsque leur hélicoptère avait été abattu par les maquisards islamiques. En décembre 1979, le général Papoutine, vice-ministre de l'intérieur, avait péri, à Kaboul, dans des circonstances mystérieuses.

D'autre part, selon des voyageurs arrivés de Kaboul, le quartier général des 4^e et 5^e divisions afghanes à Pul-i-Charki, dans la banlieue de Kaboul, est encerclé par des troupes soviétiques; ces unités auraient été impliquées dans une tentative de putsch contre le régime de M. Babrak Karmal.

Un commandant de la 14^e division basée à Ghazni et qui a déserté, a confirmé à l'envoyé spécial de l'A.F.P. à Kaboul, où il est revenu clandestinement pour coordonner la résistance, que cette unité s'était mutinée le 24 juillet et que l'aviation soviétique avait bombardé Ghazni et des villages environnants. Les incidents sont intervenus après le limogeage du com-

mandant, appartenant au Khalq, et son remplacement par un membre du Parcham, qui a été rapidement assassiné. Après le renvoi de l'armée de soldats khalqis, un soulèvement s'est produit et la plupart des soldats de la division sont passés à la dissidence ou se sont retranchés à Ghazni; ils auraient emporté avec eux leurs armes, y compris des missiles sol-air Sam.

A Moscou, cinq cents Afghans résidant en U.R.S.S. sont détenus après avoir demandé à émigrer en Occident, a déclaré à l'agence américaine U.P.I. un Afghan qui s'est lui-même vu refuser par le service soviétique des passeports et visas, l'OVIR, un visa de sortie, et qui a été interrogé deux fois par le K.G.B. Quatre de ses amis ont été rapatriés à Kaboul et fusillés; parmi ceux-ci, il y avait MM. Amir Saikhadar Shah, étudiant à Khiev, Mohammed Khalrullakh et Mohammed Khalil, résidant à Moscou.

Un autre Afghan, étudiant en mécanique automobile, M. Ahmed Kasim Zariffa, serait détenu depuis le 1^{er} avril; il a été dit à sa famille qu'il était devenu fou. Ce même témoin, qui a désiré garder l'anonymat, a affirmé que la plupart des sportifs afghans aux Jeux olympiques souhaitaient se réfugier en Occident et étaient surveillés vingt-quatre heures sur vingt-quatre pour empêcher tout contact avec des Occidentaux.

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

Good-small vs good-big

"God", according to Voltaire, "is always on the side of the big battalions." Technology has changed warfare enormously since Voltaire's day, yet counting up the numbers is still the best way—short of actually fighting—to judge a potential enemy's strength.

People in the west, observing that Russia and its Warsaw pact allies have more of almost every sort of military power than Nato does, have long been tempted to believe that this communist advantage in sheer numbers can be cancelled out by "other factors"—morale, quality of equipment, political will, what have you. Western governments, asking their parliaments for defence budgets which provide less than the Russians have of almost everything, argue that superior western quality can somehow overcome Russia's big battalions.

There are three things wrong with this quality-beats-quantity fallacy: (a) nobody really knows what "quality" is (and westerners tend to think of it as synonymous with advanced technology, which sometimes results in complex gadgets that break down frequently if not maintained by highly trained technicians); (b) the Russians are making rapid improvements in the performance of almost all of their weapons, and are rapidly overtaking Nato in technological excellence; and (c) Voltaire was probably right.

The next three pages will discuss some of the most revealing numerical comparisons between Nato and the Warsaw pact

in mid-1980, examine some of the qualitative differences, and make a guess at what the balances might look like in a few years' time.

1. Defence spending. Money is not a weapon, but it is the basis of all military power: a measure of what is being produced at the moment, an indication of

several different groups of western analysts have calculated what lies behind the figleaf, the most comprehensive job probably being that done by the CIA. These analyses vary, but present the same broad picture. Military spending is now taking somewhere between 11% and 18% of the Soviet Union's gnp (the lowest and highest of the serious estimates), compared with 5.2% of America's, 4.9% of Britain's, 3.3% of West Germany's and 4% of France's.

There are two main ways to compare Russian spending with the west's: (a) the dollar estimate, which tries to measure how much it would cost the west to build




Russia's heavyweight Backfire floats like a butterfly

what will be available in the future and a strong clue to the political will behind it all. The sustained growth of Russian defence spending over the past 15 years is one of the most alarming features of its policy towards the west.


Russia's published spending figures are worthless, a mere statistical figleaf. But

a force equal to Russia's, and (b) the rouble estimate, which tries to measure the burden of the Russian military establishment on the Russian economy by estimating its cost in Russian currency.

The CIA's dollar comparison between Russia and the United States is shown in the charts below. The crossover point



The nuclear tally



between the two countries came in 1971, and the margin has been widening ever since as Russian outlays have continued to grow at 3-5% a year in constant prices, while those of the United States have declined. By the end of the 1970s the dollar cost of Russian military spending was about 50% higher than that of the United States, the rouble cost about 25% higher. Some other estimates make the Russian-American gap smaller, some make it bigger. All agree that Russia spends substantially more than America.

What is it spending it on? Not men in uniform (though it has more, it pays them much less). The money goes on buying new weapons, construction work and other sorts of military capital investment, immediate and solid additions to military strength. (Research and development, however, is a separate category, on top of these figures.) Chart two of the group on page 35 shows that since 1970 Russia has out-invested the United States by over £100 billion. If this seems an astonishing figure, consider some of the main things the Russians have bought in the past 10

- years:
- four new models of intercontinental ballistic missiles;
 - a new kind of tank;
 - a whole family of new tactical aircraft;
 - the largest fleet of armed helicopters in the world;
 - dozens of new warships for the Soviet navy.

Despite the growing disparity between Russia and America, Nato as a whole still seems to be ahead of the Warsaw pact as

1979 Russian production of major weapons

- 250 intercontinental ballistic missiles
- 40,000 anti-aircraft missiles
- 1,800 combat aircraft (including helicopters)
- 3,000 tanks
- 4,000 armoured personnel carriers
- 5 major surface warships
- 9 submarines

a whole in total defence spending: American outlays are only just over half of Nato's, whereas Russia accounts for about 85% of the Warsaw pact's. However, it seems unlikely that Nato's spending on weapons and equipment equals that of the Warsaw pact. The table above shows one year's Russian output of major weapons, which exceeds Nato's combined production in every category.

2. Nuclear weapons. Russia has modernised its nuclear armoury rapidly over the past six years. It is about to reach equality (at least) with the United States in intercontinental power, and has increased its nuclear challenge to western Europe by a breathtaking margin.

For several years Russia has out-reached the United States in most measures of nuclear strength—megatons of explosive power (1 megaton=1m tons of TNT), numbers of missiles and the total weight that can be lifted to the target. Only in numbers of warheads has the United States remained ahead. But even this last American advantage is rapidly disappearing as the Russians deploy large numbers of independently targetable re-


entry vehicles on their big new missiles. The charts above show the recent rapid change in numbers of warheads—including those carried by bombers as well as missiles—together with the likely trend until 1985.

And the raw warhead totals do not tell the whole tale, anyway. A much higher percentage of America's warheads are carried by manned bombers and submarine-launched missiles. The bombers have a much smaller chance of getting through than missiles do, and the submarine missiles are not only much less accurate than the land-based ones—not accurate enough to destroy the other side's missile silos—but also less readily usable (only about half the American missile submarine fleet is at sea and ready for action at any given time). Thus a tally of "reliable and accurate" warheads—those on land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles—while still failing to tell the whole story (as any single measure must) nevertheless gives a sobering second view of the warhead balance.

The best tanks have red stars



The Euro-nuclear tilt



incidents on a broad geographical front amounting, almost, to a Persian-Arab guerrilla war.

There is also a small-scale regular war sputtering along the Iraqi-Iranian border, news about which comes, exclusively, from the Iranians. According to their reports, undoubtedly based on facts, though exaggerated, the Iraqi army is taking the initiative in regularly hammering Iranian frontier posts with its artillery, plus launching the occasional probing infantry raid. These attacks are slowly increasing in intensity and frequency and are likely, in the long run, to be more important than the guerrilla hostilities elsewhere in the Arab world.

It is the guerrilla skirmishings, however, that catch the headlines. The main zone is Lebanon, where for the past three months the military force of Lebanon's Shia community (deceptively called Al Amal, or Hope) has been shooting it out with Lebanese members of the pro-Iraqi faction of the Baath party and with Palestinian members of the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front. Starting with large-scale fire-fights in which dozens of people were killed, the hostilities have now dwindled to individual killings; but these tit-for-tat attacks are growing more frequent.

An Iraqi diplomat was killed in Beirut three weeks ago. In revenge, on July 21st

the Shia head of something called "Al Hussein's suicide squad", an offshoot of Al Amal, was murdered, and a few days later a prominent Shia journalist, Mr Riad Taha, was assassinated. In retaliation, on July 28th, the second-in-command of the pro-Iraqi Lebanese Baath party was shot dead, and his killers named themselves as "the Iraqi Mujaheddin", claiming that they were revenging the killing in Iraq some months ago of that country's Shia leader, Bakr al-Sadr.

The violence has spread outside Lebanon. On July 27th, a bomb exploded in Benghazi airport in Libya. The Libyan authorities blame this on Al Amal, evidently trying to take revenge for the disappearance in Libya, two years ago, of Lebanon's Shia leader, Musa Sadr. Two days later, on July 24th, a bomb killed an Iraqi diplomat and wounded two others in Abu Dhabi, where there is a large Iranian Shia community.

Two weeks earlier, in Kuwait, where there is also a large Iranian Shia community, a bomb destroyed the offices of a newspaper, killing two journalists and wounding two others. The Kuwaiti minister of the interior blamed the attack on "a local fifth column loyal to countries hostile to the Arabs": the only local residents this description fits are the Kuwaiti Iranians.

So it goes on, in what is in effect the latest round in an ancient racial war between Arabs and Persians. As if to ensure that wretched fought-over Lebanon will remain a centre of Iraqi-Iranian hostilities, the Syrian government (which is anti-Iraqi and pro-Iranian, because the Alawite minority that dominates Syria is a Shia offshoot) has recently decided to recognise Al Amal as one of the three main political elements on the non-Christian side in Lebanon, along with the Moslem-leftist National Front and the Palestinians. Al Amal will thus benefit from the protection of the Syrian army.

South Korea

The tumbrils roll

Some 9,000 South Koreans have lost their jobs since May in an unprecedentedly sweeping purge, and more than 16,000 others have been arrested, by official count, in the past month alone. Spokesmen for the military government claim proudly that no previous shake-up has fallen so harshly on the highest echelons.

Korea's avenging furies, led by General Chun Doo Hwan, clearly hope to exploit the resentment many Koreans feel for the elite which grew powerful, and often grotesquely rich, under the late President Park. But they are also out to

Russia amputates an Afghan finger

In 1895, British and Russian officials created the Wakhan corridor to separate the Indian empire from Tsarist Russia. In June that corridor, an almost forgotten finger of Afghanistan pointing towards China, became in effect part of the Soviet Union. Two Russian garrisons were established at the main passes into China and Pakistan. The only entrance to the corridor from Afghanistan, at the town of Ishkashim near the Soviet frontier, had already been occupied by the Russians, and the road to Qala Panja on the Soviet frontier widened and strengthened. Wakhan was sealed off, except from Soviet central Asia.

The corridor's main inhabitants, the Kirghiz tribesmen, left their homeland more than a year ago. They had fought two campaigns against communists—Russians in the 1920s and 1930s and Chinese in the 1940s. When word reached them of Kabul's communist revolution in April, 1978, they feared a new onslaught. Led by their chief, Rahman Qul Khan, they walked across the Baroghil pass to Pakistan. Several hundred of them have since returned to the huts they abandoned in the high valleys of the Pamirs, their movements closely monitored by Soviet helicopters and army patrols. The remaining 1,500 Kirghiz are encamped around Gilgit in northern Pakistan where Rahman Qul Khan runs a handicraft shop in the Kashmir bazaar. They are waiting for permission from the United States to emigrate as a community to Alaska.

The passes out of Wakhan, which once were the silk route to China, have been mined to stop any possible movement of arms from China and Pakistan to the anti-communist rebels in Badakhshan. The corridor forms part of Badakhshan province but—unlike the rest of the province, which borders the Soviet Union—it has seen no fighting. Apart from Kirghiz, the rest of the population along the Soviet frontier in Wakhan and Badakhshan are mainly Ismaili followers

of the Aga Khan in Paris. Many of them are opium-addicted and as a minority community they have suffered repeatedly from the dominant Sunni tribesmen of Afghanistan. They are not about to fight against the Soviet presence and have remained passive since the 1978 coup in Kabul which put Afghanistan's communists in power. If anything they welcomed the change.

Outside the corridor, in the rest of Badakhshan, the Russians occupy only Ishkashim and Faizabad, the province's capital. The war in the province reached its peak last winter, when the Russians sent their army into Afghanistan. What makes Badakhshan different from the rest of the country is that most of the Russian soldiers fighting there now cross over from recently expanded bases inside the Soviet Union along the Oxus river frontier, and return to their bases after each skirmish with the insurgents.

The Soviet air force is bombing the province, and local insurgents are murdering all known communists and suspected communists. But the insurgents' main source of arms—captured Russian weapons—is drying up. For the past month the Russians have been increasingly using small helicopter-borne units which scrupulously recover their dead and weapons. This suggests that Russia is using the province as a training ground for guerrilla warfare and for testing specialist units.



SACHAROV

EUROPE

Le monde 1 juil. 1980

Union soviétique

Une proposition de M. Sakharov pour réparer « l'erreur terrible » en Afghanistan

Le physicien demande une amnistie politique

De Gorki, où il est exilé depuis le 22 janvier dernier, M. André Sakharov, prix Nobel de la paix, a adressé une lettre ouverte à M. Leonid Brejnev à propos de l'Afghanistan. Nous publions ci-dessous le texte, qui a également été envoyé aux chefs des Etats membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité ainsi qu'au secrétaire général de l'ONU.

« Les opérations militaires se poursuivent depuis déjà sept mois en Afghanistan. Des milliers de Soviétiques et des dizaines de milliers d'Afghans — et pas seulement des partisans, mais principalement des civils pacifiques, des vieillards, des femmes, des enfants, des paysans et des citadins — ont péri ou ont été blessés. Plus d'un million d'Afghans sont devenus des réfugiés. On parle d'utilisation du napalm, de mines et de nouveaux types d'armes. Les informations non confirmées sur l'utilisation de gaz incapacitants suscitent une vive inquiétude. Il est possible que certaines informations soient infondées, mais il est certain que le tableau général est sinistre. La lutte acharnée, la cruauté des deux parties, augmentent constamment et on ne voit pas la fin de cette escalade.

« Il ne fait pas de doute non plus que les événements afghans ont radicalement changé la situation politique dans le monde. Ils menacent la détente, ils ont créé une menace directe pour la paix non seulement dans la région, mais partout. Ils ont rendu difficile (il est possible qu'ils aient rendu tout à fait impossible) la ratification de SALT 2, d'importance vitale pour le monde entier, surtout en tant que base pour les étapes ultérieures du processus de désarmement. Les actions soviétiques ont contribué (et n'ont pas ou ne pas contribuer) à l'augmentation des budgets militaires et à l'adoption de nouveaux programmes militaires dans tous les grands pays, ce qui exercera une influence à long terme, tout en augmentant le danger de la course aux armements. A l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, la politique soviétique en Afghanistan a été condamnée par cent quatre Etats, y compris ceux qui auparavant appuyaient sans réserve tous les actes de l'U.R.S.S.

« A l'intérieur de l'U.R.S.S., une super-militarisation menaçante pour le pays se renforce (les parolles énoncées dans les difficultés économiques) ? on ne réalise pas les réformes économiques et sociales d'importance vitale. Le rôle dangereux des organes de répression, qui ne pourront plus être contrôlés, se renforce. Je ne vais pas analyser dans cette lettre les causes de l'entrée des troupes soviétiques en Afghanistan, qu'elle soit provoquée par des intérêts légitimes de défense, qu'elle soit une manifestation d'aide désintéressée à la réforme agraire ou aux autres réformes sociales, ou qu'elle soit une ingérence dans les affaires intérieures d'un pays souverain. Il se peut qu'il y ait une partie de vrai dans chacune de ces hypothèses.

« Personnellement, je considère les actions soviétiques comme une manifestation évidente d'expansionnisme et une violation de la souveraineté de l'Afghanistan.

« Les ceux qui ont une autre position, me semble-t-il, doivent être d'accord que ces actions sont une erreur terrible qu'il faut corriger dans les meilleurs délais, d'autant plus qu'il devient de plus en plus difficile de le faire. A mon avis, on a besoin d'un règlement politique sur les bases suivantes :

« 1) L'U.R.S.S. et les partisans cessent une opération militaire ; un armistice est signé ;

« 2) L'U.R.S.S. déclare qu'elle est prête à évacuer entièrement ses troupes au fur et à mesure de leur remplacement par des soldats de l'ONU. Ce sera une action très importante de l'ONU, qui correspondra au but proclamé au moment de sa création et à la résolution de cent quatre de ses membres ;

« 3) La neutralité, la paix, l'indépendance de l'Afghanistan sont garanties par le Conseil de sécurité en la personne de ses membres permanents, ainsi que, si possible, par les pays voisins de l'Afghanistan ;

« 4) Les membres de l'ONU, y compris l'U.R.S.S., accordent l'asile politique à tous les citoyens afghans désirant quitter le pays. La liberté de l'émigration pour tous ceux qui le désirent est une condition du règlement ;

« Une base éventuelle de discussion »

« 5) Une aide économique est accordée à l'Afghanistan sur une base internationale éliminant sa dépendance de quelque pays que ce soit. L'U.R.S.S. participe à cette aide ;

« 6) Le gouvernement de M. Karmal transmet ses pouvoirs jusqu'aux élections à un conseil provisoire constitué sur une base neutre avec la participation des représentants des partisans et du gouvernement Karmal ;

« 7) Des élections sont organisées sous contrôle international ; les membres du gouvernement Karmal et les partisans y prennent part au même titre que les autres.

« Certes, ces idées ne sont rien de plus qu'une base éventuelle de discussion. Néanmoins, je comprends qu'une voie doit être trouvée. Je me rends compte des difficultés qui surgissent au cours de la réalisation d'un tel programme. La poursuite et encore plus l'intensification ultérieure des opérations militaires auront, j'en suis convaincu, des conséquences graves et irréversibles.

AFRIQUE

Un raid sud-africain sur un village angolais fait vingt-sept morts

Johannesburg (A.F.P.). — Les forces sud-africaines ont lancé, mercredi 3 juillet à l'aube, une attaque-éclair sur le village angolais de Chitudo, tuant vingt-sept soldats angolais et maquisards de la SWAPO (Organisation des peuples du Sud-Ouest africain).

Les militaires sud-africains, au nombre de quatre-vingts, ont

attaqué au mortier de la petite ville de Ruacana, en Namibie, par des guérilleros de la SWAPO. La quarantaine d'obus tombés sur cette ville le 27 juillet dernier n'avaient fait aucune victime, mais avaient démontré la vulnérabilité de cette agglomération proche de la frontière avec l'Angola, et où se trouvent les stations de pompage du complexe hydroélectrique géant du même nom. Le barrage lui-même est

quenes tragiques. Il se peut qu'aujourd'hui justement le monde se trouve à la croisée des chemins et que le cours des événements des prochaines années et même des prochaines décennies dépende du règlement de la crise afghane.

« Je juge aussi nécessaire d'attirer votre attention sur une autre question brûlante pour notre pays : depuis soixante-trois ans il n'y a eu aucune amnistie politique en U.R.S.S. Libérez les « détenus de conscience », condamnés ou arrêtés pour leurs convictions ou leurs actions non violentes, pour avoir tenté de mettre en pratique leur droit de recevoir et de diffuser une information, leur droit à la liberté de conscience, au libre choix du pays de résidence ou du lieu de résidence à l'intérieur du pays, et leur droit d'association. Parmi eux, il y a des participants à des revues défendant les droits de l'homme, des membres du groupe Helsinki, des membres de mouvements religieux et des mouvements d'émigration. Un tel acte humain de la part des autorités de l'U.R.S.S. contribuerait à renforcer l'autorité du pays, assainirait l'atmosphère à l'intérieur, contribuerait au renforcement de la confiance internationale et rendrait le bonheur à plusieurs familles malheureuses. (...)

« (...) J'ai été déporté de force à Gorki en janvier 1980, et je considère cet acte comme absolument illégal. Jusqu'à maintenant, j'ignore même quelles instances ou quelles personnes ont pris une telle décision. Voilà déjà plusieurs années que toutes mes interventions publiques provoquent des représailles contre mes proches, qui deviennent par la suite des otages.

« Aujourd'hui, c'est le cas d'Elisabeth Aleksseva, la fiancée de mon fils, lequel a été obligé d'émigrer il y a deux ans et demi. Elle n'obtient pas l'autorisation de rejoindre son fiancé ; on la menace, on pratique le chantage, on la couvre de calomnies dans la presse. Le drame personnel de ces deux jeunes gens est utilisé pour exercer des pressions sur moi. Je dois être le seul responsable de mes actes et de mes interventions (il en va de même pour cette lettre). La prise d'otages est intolérable pour tout groupement ou pour toute personne ; elle est d'autant plus intolérable et indignée d'un Etat. Je renouvelle ma demande pour qu'Elisabeth Aleksseva puisse quitter l'U.R.S.S. »

L'UNIONE Sovietica per spese militari 12-13% del suo prodotto nazionale lordo, contro il 3-5% degli Stati Uniti ed il 3-4% degli altri paesi Nato. (Nel decennio 1970-1980 l'Unione Sovietica ha speso in armamenti circa 250 miliardi di dollari, un costo pari a quello degli Stati Uniti). Questo squilibrio tra le spese per la difesa dell'Unione Sovietica e quelle del blocco occidentale costituisce una minaccia per la sicurezza della Nato e deve essere corretto.

Quarto: nel campo delle forze convenzionali, concordiamo sulla necessità che i paesi membri della Nato aumentino del 3% in termini reali i loro bilanci per la difesa e realizzino gli obiettivi del programma di difesa a lungo termine della Nato. Allo stesso tempo continuiamo a perseguire l'obiettivo di una reciproca e bilanciata riduzione delle forze convenzionali tra la Nato ed il Patto di Varsavia.

Quinto: nel campo delle forze nucleari di teatro, l'Unione Sovietica ha già schierato circa 150 missili SS-20 e continua a schierarne al ritmo di oltre uno alla settimana. Questi missili hanno tre testate nucleari, ciascuna dotata di un potere distruttivo di venti volte superiore a quello della bomba di Hiroshima, ed in grado di colpire qualsiasi città dell'Europa occidentale. Il rifiuto di Mosca di ascoltare gli appelli dell'Occidente perché cessasse questo spieghamento di nuove armi destabilizzanti ha costretto l'Alleanza a reagire. Tale reazione, espressa nella decisione della Nato del dicembre 1979, prevede lo schieramento di missili Cruise e Pershing in Europa occidentale per ristabilire un equilibrio tra le forze nucleari di teatro delle due parti, ma prevede contemporaneamente negoziati per giungere ad una riduzione di queste forze al livello più basso possibile, ed un numero uguale da entrambe le parti. Per sei mesi l'Unione Sovietica ha rifiutato di rispondere alle proposte degli Stati Uniti e dei loro alleati di a-

colombare... visita del Cav... Mosca, il Prem... Breznev avrebbe man... disponibilità ad accettare il negoziato proposto dall'Occidente senza porre quelle pre-condizioni che erano state avanzate in precedenza. Questo nuovo atteggiamento dell'Unione Sovietica nei riguardi di un negoziato sulle forze nucleari di teatro, se confermato, è meritevole di considerazione in uno spirito costruttivo.

Sesto: l'invasione e l'occupazione dell'Afghanistan da parte dell'Unione Sovietica sono incompatibili con il diritto internazionale e con il nostro concetto di distensione. L'Afghanistan deve poter riconquistare la sua sovranità, la sua integrità territoriale, la sua indipendenza politica e la posizione di non allineamento che aveva in passato. Noi siamo pronti ad appoggiare qualsiasi iniziativa in tal senso, come ad esempio quella della Conferenza Islamica. Dobbiamo altresì intraprendere misure economiche e politiche tangibili per convincere l'Unione Sovietica a ritirarsi dall'Afghanistan e per scarteggiare analoghe aggressioni anche per il futuro.

Settimo: l'Afghanistan si trova al di fuori del Patto Atlantico. Una reazione militare nell'Asia Sud-Occidentale è quindi fuori luogo per la Nato come organizzazione. Tuttavia la presenza dell'Armata Rossa a meno di 500 chilometri dalle fonti di petrolio del Golfo Persico (da cui proviene il 13% del petrolio consumato negli Stati Uniti ed il 60% di quello consumato nell'Europa occidentale) costituisce chiaramente una questione che interessa da vicino i paesi Nato. Le misure che gli Stati Uniti stanno intraprendendo per aumentare la loro presenza militare effettiva e potenziale nell'Asia Sud-Occidentale servono gli interessi della sicurezza degli alleati Nato,

micro... sia Sud... dono aiuti... Ottavo: al di fuori... ma la det... americani... nono mes... palese mi... cjascan p... Nazioni U... nazione co... strare imp... diplomatico... tentativo d... pretese po... del mondo... mille azione... sequenze... civili rela... viene invec... E' per ques... leati occide... che l'Iran... benefici di... litiche ed... quando non... obblighi nel... internaziona... staggi.

Queste... schematici... senziali sulle... in sede Nato... che siamo d... Grazie a Dio... tutti realmen... denti, nessun... altro, ciascu... il dovere... particolare d... il processo d... senza. A diff... Varsavia, no... dottrina Brez... limitata. Ma... tuale pericolo... internazionale c... l'Europa a dist... Uniti - o gli S... ciarsi dall'Eu...

ri- a esprimere varie critiche. In testa agli accusatori, al solito, viene Solzenicyn, che in un articolo dello scorso gennaio «Il comunismo è visibile a tutti ma non è capito». In La gendole russe del 21 febbraio, Parigi) demarca il periodo tra il 1945 e il 1975 «un'altra guerra mondiale» persa dall'Occidente «senza combattere. Preoccupato del proprio benessere, l'Occidente, prosegue Solzenicyn, tradi a più riprese le forze nazionali russe stracciate a farlo ancora.

Duluth, che de con un San Bern derri la casa affi ne Poppy che c questione... paga Ne L'uomo che Dorothy L legio di gialli : treno qualcuno ci compiere un assas lo dimostra...

Di suspense inst ne manca, nel vole zionato da Hitchco ci sono soltanto rag vogliono «sentirli gliando in poltrona, curo chi preferisce c

essa sono suscitati poi, e negative per il pro degli armamenti e in futuro delle relazioni cane. Con insistenza si tale sovietica di "pos-percezione" sulle reci- ni, capaci di scatenare sa illimitata agli ar- eventualmente uno scon- in effetti sembra di poli- che vengono prese nei elle giustificazioni che te, il problema della delle intenzioni e dei il funzionamento delle la assumendo una rile-

tutto è errato e provocatorio per com- portamento dell'altro. E che porta a scorgere ovunque «grandi disegni» e vaste cospirazioni, attribuendo alla controparte capacità sovrumane, a se stessi debolezze rimediabili solo moltiplicando gli arsenali. Kissinger, nelle sue memorie, paragona Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica a «due giganti ciechi armati fino ai denti che si muovono in una stanza sentendo la reciproca presenza, ciascuno ritenendosi in pericolo mortale a causa dell'altro, che si pensa possiede una vista perfetta. Ciascuno tende ad attribuire all'altro una tenacia, preveggenza e coerenza che la propria esperienza nega. «Naturalmente», osserva Kissinger, «con il

par ANDRÉ FONTAINE

1918, avait proclamé son indé- pendance, laquelle avait été re- connue par l'ensemble de la communauté internationale, y compris la Russie soviétique : les Bolcheviks n'avaient-ils pas entériné le droit à la sécession de toutes les nationalités enfan- tées par les soviets dans le « pri- son des peuples » ?

Des élections s'y étaient dérou- lées en 1919 : elles avaient donné cinq sièges sur cent trente aux bolcheviks, qui se sont empressés de distribuer la terre aux paysans et de nationaliser les transports et l'industrie. De toute l'Europe, des délégations de mili- tants vinrent admirer cette social- démocratie modèle à laquelle le Labour-Party ne ménageait pas ses encouragements.

A sa reconnaissance « sans réserve » Moscou avait tout de même mis une condition : la légalisation du P.C. local et la libération de ses chefs emprison- nés pour activités subversives. Ceux-ci en profitèrent pour dé- clencher une insurrection. Pour en assurer le succès, ils firent appel, suivant un processus déjà expérimenté en Ukraine, à l'aide de l'Armée rouge. Malgré les hésitations de Lénine, il y eut des répercussions internationales d'une agression aussi caracté- risée, l'avis de Staline et de son compatriote Ordjonikidzé préva- lut, et elle intervint massivement. L'année suivante, la Georgie devenait partie intégrante de l'Union soviétique. Partout dans le monde on s'indigna. Personne n'attendait un secours du gouver-

Gold

More from less

Consolidated Gold Fields expects the world's supply of gold for sale to fall by as much as 40% this year. It believes the next market upsurge will take the gold price above \$1,000 an ounce. If it is right, that will cheer a lot of unhappy investors who were caught at the end of gold's last bull phase and who are still waiting to take their profits. But is it right? In its 1980 gold survey, Gold Fields reckons that net sales by governments and official institutions will fall from 574 tonnes last year to almost nothing in 1980. This involves several heroic assumptions. Joker number one is the United States treasury. Last October, Washington announced that treasury sales (365 tonnes in 1979) would in future take place irregularly and would involve varying amounts of gold. No sales have been made since last November and Gold Fields does not

ECM - 28/11/1980

IL TRATTO peculiarmente — e secondo — del libro di Hélène Carrère d'Encausse (*Epilogo di un impero*, I. Edizioni e/o, pagg. 328, lire 9.000) consiste nell'aver evitato di affrontare direttamente i temi di fondo della polemica e della ricerca sull'Urss: se si tratti o meno di un paese socialista e, in caso affermativo, quale spazio la democrazia possiede (e lo possiede) in un regime che si autodefinisce, significativamente, di socialismo creativo.

L'approccio, o il taglio di questo libro, è diverso. Data per scontato che il progetto fosse con l'Occidente '77, e successivamente perseguito, forse, nelle intenzioni, socialista, l'autrice si propone una verifica, oltre sessant'anni dopo, delle vicende del suo sociale incontro le diverse nazionalità che, più componenti della spirigione di popoli dell'impero sovietico, sono poi diventate parti costitutive della Unione delle repubbliche socialiste sovietiche.

Al centro del discorso non si trovano gli aspetti statali-istituzionali, pur sommarariamente ricordati, del problema, e nemmeno dissertazioni generali sul rapporto fra internazionalismo e nazionalismo. Al loro posto il lettore troverà

uno studio sulle vicende reali delle diverse nazionalità, il tentativo prudente di valutare le modificazioni di peso all'interno dei loro rapporti; un'indagine sui rapporti fra nazionalità (etnie, tradizioni, lingue, stabilità geografica) e demografia; l'analisi dell'incidenza sull'una e sull'altra dei processi di modernizzazione, in particolare dello sviluppo industriale.

E' evidente come anche questo tipo di approccio rischierà in fin dei conti, sia pure attraverso un largo giro, di problema di fondo, storico-politico, del socialismo. Solo che qui sulla viene dedotto da un principio, al contrario, la ricchezza e la diversità dei risultati della ricerca tendono a densificare ogni tesi preconcetta e a sottoporre a revisione anche taluni giudizi fatalmente ricavati dal lessico della storia.

È dato che emerge in modo preminente è la diffusione del processo di russificazione attraverso strumenti di integrazione come la lingua, il partito, l'esercito, la burocrazia statale. Un potere che si è imposto in un paese dotato di un alto livello di contrattazione. Il processo, tuttavia, sembra sia andato attuandosi in modo

tutt'altro che omogeneo, sia perché tende ad investire soprattutto le élites urbane (quindi della burocrazia, della tecnica, della cultura) con assai scarsa forza di penetrazione nelle campagne (tipico il caso dell'Ucraina), sia per il differente grado di coesione e di penetrazione delle tradizioni locali-nazionali. Si distinguono a tale riguardo gli Stati baltici (Estonia, Lettonia, Lituania), che sono stati, dal resto, quelli più recentemente inglobati nell'Urss. Ciò vale in particolare per la Lituania, dove più forte si è conservata la radice del culto cattolico.

Costose affermazioni particolarmente ed finiscono più rilevante segnalando dall'autrice, e cioè la straordinaria vitalità e resistenza alla russificazione dimostrata dalle repubbliche dell'Asia centrale, e soprattutto da quelle di tradizione musulmana: Azeri, Kazachi, Kirghizi, Tadzhiki, Turkomeni, Uzbeki. Il elemento di questa resistenza non sembra essere tanto la pratica della religione islamica, quanto la perpetuazione di modelli di cultura, comportamenti rituali, ed a momenti collettivi che, tradotti entro la vita sociale e pubblica sovietica, rivelano tuttavia una disaffezione e una persistenza mar-

mona. Pochi ammetteranno di essere credenti, ma alla domanda: volete musulmani? la risposta è un sì deciso.

La comunità conserva la sua impronta musulmana; i segni esteriori del culto islamico sono ridotti, ma le sue pratiche sociali vengono conservate in perfino rafforzate, si dice ritornandole e adattandole al quadro generale della vita sovietica. Rievocare puntualmente in forme simboliche, il digiuno del Ramadan (duramente osteggiato dalle autorità), come pure la festa comunitaria che ne segna il compimento.

Le cinque preghiere quotidiane possono essere ritirate ad una sola, quando i doveri sociali lo esigono. Il sacrificio animale può essere sostituito da un'offerta che lo sostituisce (variazioni in Azerbaïdjan sono sufficenti per quattro animali) eccettuato, riconoscendole agli effetti rituali. Festa pubbliche, come quella per la nascita del Profeta, vengono celebrate in riunioni di famiglia in casa privata. Perfino il pellegrinaggio alla Mecca viene praticato per procura. Diffuso è il pellegrinaggio ai Luoghi santi locali. Se da una parte il potere non aggrava frontalmente le esasperazioni religiose per estirparle, dall'al-

tra le comunità musulmane si è dimostrata capace di preservare la propria identità. Questo strato una notevole elasticità di adattamento, perfino praticando una sorta di restrizione legale.

L'indebolimento delle pratiche religiose e la diminuzione del numero dei credenti sono i componenti dell'integrazione dei precetti della religione musulmana all'interno dei comportamenti sociali e della tradizione nazionale. Tipico è il rifiuto di uscire dal gruppo mediante il matrimonio, cioè la diffusione dell'endogamia: questa, peraltro assoluta per le donne musulmane, continua ad essere praticata finanche dal 90 per cento degli uomini di certe repubbliche (Kazachi, Kirghizi).

Questa peculiarità tipica, ma non esclusiva, del gruppo nazionale musulmano va collegata con il suo accento democratico-democratico. Mentre in questo doppiare si è verificato complessivamente nell'Urss un calo della natalità (dal 28,7 al 17,4 per mille), il fenomeno ha invece diversamente sulle diverse nazionalità, cominciando a modificare, sia pure lentamente, il peso specifico di ognuna di esse. L'Urss occi-

dentale si presenta come una zona di declino demografico, mentre l'Urss orientale (Asia dell'Est e Caucaso) continua a presentare una popolazione in rapida crescita. Ad avvantaggiarsi sono anzitutto i popoli musulmani, la cui presenza percentuale rispetto ai popoli russi e slavi tende a crescere continuamente (da 24 a 35 milioni in un decennio). E' stato calcolato che 4,52 milioni dei 1.880 (15,9 per cento), saranno nel 2000 (23 per cento). Questa cifra rappresenta il 20 per cento di un quarto della popolazione prevista dall'Urss, ma costituirà il libro più importante e completo dopo quello russo.

Il socialismo creativo riuscirà a integrarlo? Certo, l'impero non è ancora esplosa (come premettamente afferma il titolo francese del volume: *L'empire éclaté*), ed la sua esplosione sembra imminente. Ma fino a quando i fermenti che agitano il mondo islamico resteranno bloccati al di là della frontiera? Questo libro offre argomenti seri per tentare di rispondere ad una domanda che sempre più si va ponendo come uno dei più grandi problemi del prossimo futuro.

Aguil

Raymond Aron

Isolationnisme et finlandisation

J'ai passé quelques jours à Washington, la semaine dernière, et une question, presque une seule, m'était posée par mes interlocuteurs : où est l'Alliance atlantique ? Un des vieux sages de la diplomatie américaine, et qui fut l'un des architectes du Traité de l'Atlantique-Nord, John McLoy, n'hésite pas à envisager le retrait d'une importante fraction du corps expéditionnaire stationné en Europe depuis une trentaine d'années, décision qu'il avait toujours combattue. Pour une fois je ne m'adresse pas à mes lecteurs habituels, je reproduis les propos que j'ai entendus ou tenus dans la capitale de la République naguère impériale.

Ce qui ébranle l'Alliance atlantique d'abord et avant tout, c'est la modification du rapport des forces. Que Salt 2 soit ou non ratifié, le fait est que l'Union soviétique se trouve au moins à égalité avec les Etats-Unis, en fait d'armes nucléaires stratégiques. D'ici à deux ou trois ans, les SS 18 auront la capacité, sur le papier, de détruire tous les Minuteman, c'est-à-dire les missiles intercontinentaux, terrestres. L'Union soviétique dispose de divisions aéroportées et de bases en Asie et en Afrique. Admettons que la Marine et l'Aviation américaines conservent encore une certaine supériorité sur les armes correspondantes de l'Union soviétique : qualitativement et quantitativement l'Armée américaine risque d'être surclassée par l'Armée soviétique.

A en croire tous les critiques militaires, la décision prise par Nixon de faire confiance à une armée de professionnels se révèle désastreuse. Les volontaires, en trop grande proportion, se recrutent dans les couches les plus défavorisées de la population. Or, l'équilibre nucléaire donne une signification décisive au rapport des forces classiques. Les Etats-Unis ne sont plus le numéro un.

Le rapport des forces économiques, à l'intérieur du monde occidental, s'est modifié, lui aussi, aux dépens des Etats-Unis. Ceux-ci demeurent la première puissance du monde, mais la production par tête n'y dépasse pas celle de la Suède, de la Suisse ou de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Bien plus, les Etats-Unis de 1980 ne ressemblent plus aux Etats-Unis de 1950. En dix-huit mois, au moment de la campagne coréenne, l'équipe

Truman réussit à tripler le budget de défense sans imposer de sacrifices aux citoyens. Aujourd'hui, une augmentation de 3 % du budget de défense n'embarrasse pas moins le Congrès que le Président.

L'Alliance atlantique a toujours été géographiquement limitée. Washington ne se considérait pas engagé par des opérations britanniques ou françaises au Proche- et en Extrême-Orient. L'opinion américaine s'étonne que les Alliés ne soutiennent pas la politique de leur gouvernement en Iran et en Afghanistan. Les Européens, qu'ils aient tort ou raison, ne manquent pas à leurs obligations.

Des différends profonds condamnent-ils l'Alliance atlantique ?

Ils n'ignorent pas que leur sécurité dépend de la présence américaine sur le Vieux Continent, du « parapluie nucléaire ». Mais leur dépendance n'est plus telle que le président des Etats-Unis puisse évoquer une « révision déchirante » pour convaincre le président français ou le chancelier allemand.

Bien plus que les relations franco-américaines, ce sont les relations germano-américaines qui ont changé. Laissons même de côté le statut et le rôle du mark, d'ailleurs mis en question par le déficit des paiements courants de la République fédérale. L'Ostpolitik inaugurée par Willy Brandt a progressivement créé des intérêts nationaux propres à Bonn, éventuellement contradictoires avec les intérêts américains tels que les évaluent les dirigeants de Washington.

Certes, les Allemands ont payé les avantages humains qu'ils ont obtenus de Moscou par la reconnaissance des frontières issues de la guerre. Mais ils ne peuvent s'empêcher de craindre que les Soviétiques ne reviennent sur les concessions faites.

Aux accusations de finlandisation, les Allemands ont beau jeu de répondre qu'ils boycottent les jeux Olympiques (à la différence des Britanniques et des Français), qu'ils financent la Turquie et le Portugal, qu'ils acceptent les Pershing et les

missiles de croisière sur leur territoire. Il n'en reste pas moins que le chancelier allemand, quel qu'il soit, fera de son mieux pour concilier l'impératif premier — l'alliance américaine — avec les bonnes relations avec Moscou, impératif provisoirement subordonné au premier.

L'opinion américaine reproche souvent aux Européens de ne pas prendre la part du fardeau militaire qui leur incombe. Le budget américain de défense se situe, en effet, autour de 5 %, alors que celui des Allemands ou des Français oscille entre 3 et 4 %. Mais l'Otan n'incite guère les Européens à de grands efforts de réarmement. Les Américains, à l'intérieur du commandement intégré, se réservent le monopole des armes nucléaires, qu'elles soient tactiques ou stratégiques. Le renforcement des armes classiques auquel les Américains invitent les Européens n'a de sens que dans l'hypothèse d'une bataille livrée sans utilisation des armes nucléaires tactiques. Hypothèse que l'on ne peut exclure radicalement, mais que les livres soviétiques de stratégie écartent.

Faut-il conclure que l'Alliance atlantique est désormais condamnée par des malentendus en profondeur que, d'un côté comme de l'autre, on s'ingénie à camoufler ? Les Européens ont-ils encore foi dans la force et la volonté des Etats-Unis ? Ceux-ci ne sont-ils pas las de protéger des alliés qui leur reprochent tour à tour leur passivité et leur réaction excessive ? Ces tensions ne s'atténueront que le jour d'un redressement spectaculaire de la République américaine.

Quelle autre politique s'offrirait aux uns et aux autres ? Les Américains pourraient, en effet, se résigner à la « forteresse America ». Dans un monde qui leur serait hostile, ils trouveraient encore, dans l'hémisphère occidental et en Afrique, les matières premières indispensables à leur appareil industriel. Quant aux Européens, ils se berceraient de l'illusion que l'Union soviétique leur accorderait une condition comparable à celle dont jouissent les Finlandais. Isolationnisme d'un côté, autofinlandisation de l'autre, cette perspective apparaît-elle encore improbable ?

Chi ha l'oro non lo vende

Il rapporto annuale della Consolidated gold fields, una delle maggiori società che operano sul mercato dell'oro, con sede a Londra, prevede per il 1980 una drastica riduzione dell'offerta di metallo giallo. La caduta dell'offerta dovrebbe raggiungere il 40%. Ciò dipenderà in gran parte dalla cessazione delle vendite di oro effettuate dal tesoro degli Stati Uniti, che nel 1979 avevano alimentato l'offerta disponibile per gli investitori. Sono cessate anche le vendite all'asta del Fondo monetario internazionale previste nel programma quadriennale ormai esaurito. Le vendite dei paesi comunisti dovrebbero ridursi dalle 229 tonnellate del 1979 a 150 tonnellate soltanto e la produzione sudafricana rimarrà grosso modo ai livelli del 1979 (700 tonnellate circa), che sono assai inferiori ai massimi produttivi raggiunti dal Sud Africa nel passato (mille tonnellate circa nel 1970). La diminuzione della produzione sudafricana è dovuta alla scelta di sfruttare le zone di estrazione meno produttive, divenute tuttavia profittevoli grazie agli aumenti di prezzo, conservando più a lungo quelle di maggior rendimento.

Nel complesso, l'offerta scenderà, secondo le previsioni del rapporto, dalle 1.765 tonnellate del 1979 a 1.100 tonnellate circa, uno dei più bassi livelli dell'ultimo decennio. Come reagiranno le quotazioni dell'oro, che nell'ultimo semestre hanno oscillato tra gli 850 ed i 470 dollari l'oncia per assestarsi di recente attorno ai 550-600 dollari l'oncia? La caduta dell'offerta lascerebbe prevedere nuovi forti rialzi delle quotazioni, ma va tenuto conto che la domanda di oro è altamente instabile e governata da spinte speculative, che traggono la loro origine da preoccupazioni politiche o da aspettative sui cambi e sull'inflazione e più in generale sull'evoluzione congiunturale. Si tenga presente che nei quattro anni precedenti la prima crisi petrolifera gli investitori privati furono venditori netti di oro, mentre nel 1973 e nel 1974 acquistarono circa 1.400 tonnellate; nei quattro anni successivi gli acquisti netti si assestarono a un livello di circa 350 tonnellate l'anno per risalire l'anno scorso a 740 tonnellate.

L'esplosione della domanda di oro è stata incoraggiata nel 1979 e nei primi mesi del 1980 dalla crisi iraniana, dalla sfiducia nel dollaro, dalle aspettative di accelerazione dell'inflazione. Nella situazione attuale di avvio di una fase recessiva negli Stati Uniti, secondo le previsioni del rapporto il mercato dell'oro nonostante la caduta dell'offerta, dovrebbe essere più tranquillo. Ma le previsioni in questo settore sono più che mai difficili e incerte e soggette a essere rapidamente superate dai fatti. Inoltre, un fattore di stabilità nella domanda di oro viene non dagli investitori privati ma dalle banche centrali: il ruolo dell'oro quale componente delle riserve internazionali si è nuovamente rafforzato.



A Sparkler for Mary Marvich

GEORGE F. WILL

In 1873, three years after Gen. Robert E. Lee died in Virginia and three years before Gen. George Custer died in Montana, Mary Zynovich was born in Belgrade, Serbia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. U. S. Grant was U.S. President, there were 37 states and 40 million Americans, and Mary was sixteen years from joining them.

Recently, in a courtroom in Fairmont, W. Va., Mary Marvich, 107, became a citizen, 91 years after arriving in New York on a wooden sailing ship. She had much on her mind in 1889, and decades passed before she sought citizenship. When she did, she had problems, such as with a rule requiring her to recall the name of her ship. More decades passed—time flies when you're having fun—but as she entered her second century she decided to tidy up her citizenship. And when at last she took the oath, the governor was on hand. He is descended from French Huguenots who, fleeing religious persecution, changed their name from Roquefeuille to something similar but less French and arrived in America, via Germany, in 1723. His name is John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV.

(As often happened, a Polish tailor who arrived in 1903 had his name shortened and "Americanized" at Ellis Island by immigration officials who could not cope with the name Marciszewski. Today, the tailor's son is Secretary of State.)

New World: The oath of citizenship says: "I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty . . . that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic . . . that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States . . . so help me God." It is stirring, especially the part about princes and potentates, but the judge exempted Mrs. Marvich from the clause about bearing arms.

In 1892, three years after the apple-cheeked Mary set a button-top shoe on American soil and went to work in a cigar factory, Thomas Bailey Aldrich, who probably liked cigars, wrote a poem for the Atlantic Monthly. Aldrich had been fastidious in his choice of ancestors, who got here

before the riffraff began pouring through the nation's gates. His poem, which expressed widespread views, was called "The Unguarded Gates":

*Wide open and unguarded stand our
gates,
And through them presses a wild motley
throng—
Men from the Volga and the Tartar
steppes,
Featureless figures from the
Hoang-ho,
Malayan, Scythian, Teuton, Kelt, and
Slav,
Flying the Old World's poverty and
scorn;*

*As she entered
her second century,
she got interested
in tidying up
her citizenship.*

*These bringing with them unknown
gods and rites,
Those, tiger passions, here to stretch
their claws.
In street and alley what strange tongues
are these,
Accents of menace alien to our air,
Voices that once the tower of Babel
knew!*

I'll wager dollars against doughnuts that Mary Marvich has kept her tiger passions tolerably well leashed. West Virginia, according to the song, is "almost heaven," so it has survived her claws. The wonder is that the immigrants survived as well as they did the hostility and other hazards of the New World.

Harried immigration officials had to decipher such written destinations as "Pringvilliamas" (Springfield, Mass.) and "Lin-kinbra" (Lincoln, Neb.). Before many immigrants could head for "Szekenevno Pillsburs" (Second Avenue, Pittsburgh) and points west, they had large letters chalked on their clothes: "H" for suspected

heart trouble, "L" for lameness, "X" for mental defects. Or "E" for eye trouble, such as trachoma, a disease which blinded and killed until a cure was found—by a Japanese immigrant. Many who, after the rigors of a transatlantic voyage in steerage, failed an often slapdash medical examination were deported. Families were broken. An adult was sent back with any very young child, but some 10-year-olds were simply sent back alone and turned loose in the port from which they had embarked.

'Motley Throng': Consider these numbers when someone says America is in danger of being "inundated" by today's "flood" of immigrants. In 1907 alone, 1.2 million immigrants arrived, 1 million of them at Ellis Island. On April 17, a record 11,745 were admitted there. Almost exactly ten years later, the United States declared war, and some of the new citizens were dressed in khaki and sent back to put the kibosh on the Kaiser and on the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When there were wars to be fought or railroads to be built, or when the servant problem became acute, uses were found for the "wild motley throng."

Mary Zynovich married an immigrant named Marvich from Belgrade. She has lived for 86 years in Marion County, W. Va., where her daughter, Betty Nicoletti, lives with her husband, whose parents were born in Italy. "Once," wrote Oscar Handlin, a Harvard historian, "I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America. Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history."

They still are. Individuals with the grit and families with the cohesion to make their way here from Indochina and Cuba are going to be, many of them, over-achievers, leavening and invigorating America. Before long there will be, if there are not already, a lot of high-school valedictorians named Nguyen and Lopez.

It is said that many immigrants who have recently arrived are having trouble adjusting to American life. I believe it. I arrived in 1941, and I'm having trouble adjusting to American life. But the newest citizens have the clearest idea of what we're celebrating when we raise a red-white-and-blue ruckus on the Fourth of July. So this year, light a sparkler for all the Nguyens and Lopezes, and Mary Marvich.



Photos by Herman Kokojin—Black Star

In the midst of last month's House debate on admitting Cuban and Haitian refugees to the United States, Texas Democrat Sam Hall Jr. threw up his hands. He saw hundreds of thousands of "boat people" descending on the nation, arms outstretched in need; and behind them millions more, Cubans and Haitians, Mexicans, Colombians, Filipinos, Indians, Jamaicans, Chinese and Southeast Asians with their unpronounceable names, having in common with the great mass of Americans nothing but the need to eat. "How long is this country going to be the recipient of people from all over the earth?" Hall demanded, in a tone that mingled belligerence with plaintiveness. "When is this going to end?"

There is no end in sight. They are coming, in numbers that mock the limits written into our laws—coming as fast as they can be admitted, or as fast as they can escape their homelands. Four million people get on line to come here every year; over the past decade, an average of a million a year have entered, a third or more illegally. Their reasons are as basic as those that brought 50 million others here since 1820. Haitians are no more resigned to starving than the Irish in the famine of 1845-1849. War in Asia turns peasants into refugees just as surely as war in Europe. Fifty years after the last great pogroms, Jews are still oppressed in Russia. It was naïve to think that the engines of human misery would stop just because we are running out of convenient room for their victims.

They are changing the American landscape, proliferating into unexpected niches, each following an irresistible ethnic call. Korean greengrocers have sprouted all over New York City, nestling bins of knobby and unexplained roots next to red Delicious apples, while Greeks have all but taken over the coffee shops, conquering the quick-lunch business under their ubiquitous symbol: the drink container with a picture of a discus thrower. In New Orleans, Vietnamese immigrants have converted their housing-project lawns into vegetable gar-

Breathing free: U.S. citizens Porfirio and Annie Perez of San Antonio; swearing-in in Texas; Samoans at a California cricket match; Cuban refugee in Pennsylvania



Lester Sloan—Newsweek



©Steven Falk

Immigrants

dens, irrigating them with the same long-handled canvas buckets they once dipped into the Mekong. The amplified call of the muezzin echoes through the south end of Dearborn, Mich., five times a day, calling the faithful to prayer at their mosque. Just as Americans have finally digested the basics of soccer, cricket has emerged as the avant-garde immigrant sport, played by exuberant Samoans on the fields of Carson, Calif., and earnest Jamaicans and Trinidadians in Brooklyn's Prospect Park.

The national debate over immigration has barely begun; it will be fought in earnest next spring, when a national study group will recommend building a new policy practically from scratch—possibly including a national work-identification card to control

ness to us: more and more, they are viewed as competitors for food, jobs and scarce resources. Differences of culture, religion and ideas have provoked no violence; clashes over fishing rights, between Gulf Coast shrimpers and Vietnamese immigrants, ended in murder and arson. Ecologists fear that a decade of slow progress toward zero population growth could be quickly washed away in a tide of hungry immigrants. "The economic future of the United States is being mortgaged to its population policy," warns Roger Conner, of the ecological spinoff group FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform). "The overriding issue in immigration policy is not race, not ethnicity, not even job skills. It's sheer numbers."

But how do we choose a number—how do we weigh overcrowding in the schools of Sam Hall's East Texas hometown against overcrowding in the prisons of Port-au-Prince? The U.S. Committee for Refugees counts 16 million refugees worldwide—Haitians in the Dominican Republic, Bulgarians in Turkey, Palestinians all over the Mideast. Officials worry that the Indian population may soon explode outward, sending millions on foot out of the subcontinent in search of a better life. A senior White House official, not usually regarded as a sentimentalist, calls it "a massive moral problem," reminiscent of the Holocaust. "Years from now," he predicts, "they'll be writing books on how the West sat around and ignored human suffering."

Oppression: And who, among the teeming millions, should we take? The "huddled masses yearning to breathe free," specified in Emma Lazarus's poem on the Statue of Liberty? What about an Iranian millionaire, fleeing Khomeini? Until last May, the law provided for accepting as refugees huddled masses at the rate of 17,400 annually—and generally only if it was Communism they yearned to breathe free of. In an effort to meet the worldwide problem, Congress raised the limit to 50,000,

historically not insensitive on matters of race—has uneventfully made room for 120 Hmong tribesmen from Laos. Among nearly 2,000 Tai Dam in Iowa, the most serious racial incident involved a North Vietnamese who had by mistake arrived in the midst of his ancient enemies.

But if we have stopped despising the newcomers because they are different, we increasingly fear them for their very like-

The new melting pot: Cuban celebrates in Pennsylvania; Vietnamese youngster studies English in New Orleans; Russian child samples pizza in New York



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Points of the compass: Hmong women strolling in Providence, a Vietnamese garden in a New Orleans suburb, Arabs gossiping outside their mosque in Detroit



Ira Wyman—Sygma

and ruled that it was all right to be fleeing any type of political oppression. But even before the law took effect, it was subverted by the invasion of 114,000 Cuban boat people, and U.S. refugee policy and foreign policy became intertwined. "How can we restrain outlaw countries?" asks Victor Palmieri, coordinator for Refugee Affairs. "If a dictator aims people at us instead of bullets . . . how can we control immigration?"

The new refugee law did not foresee enormous fleets of refugees landing directly on our shores. In the face of a variety of domestic and international pressures, the Administration threw up its hands and offered to "parole" the Cubans (and, incidentally, 15,000 Haitians) for six months—in the expectation that Congress will pass a law allowing

them to stay permanently. Thus, an extraordinary precedent: when a huddled mass reaches a critical mass, it can expect special treatment.

Refugees are only part of the problem. The United States also admits, under quota, 272,600 immigrants a year—no more than 20,000 from any one country, chosen according to a baffling system of preferences based on family connections and job skills. It is better to be the unmarried son of a resident alien than the married son of a U.S. citizen, for example; better to be a dietitian or physical therapist than a bus conductor or an usher. In addition, certain categories of close relatives of U.S. citizens are admitted without quota; these numbered 125,000 in 1978.

Besides administering these regulations, the chronically short-staffed Immigration

Alien culture: Mexican kids soak up TV, Vietnamese shrimpers on the gulf

Photos by Herman Kokojan—Black Star



and Naturalization Service must keep track of some 8 million nonresident aliens in the United States, including diplomats, tourists and students. The INS is also charged with overseeing the vast problem of illegal immigrants, whose numbers can only be guessed at: authorities cite a range of 3.5 million to 6 million. About half of these are border-jumpers from Mexico; another large segment is believed to consist of Haitians who entered through Canada; most of the rest are visitors who came here under legal visas and just never left. "The INS is a mixed blessing," sighs Allen E. Kaye, a prominent New York immigration lawyer. "Sometimes we want to hurry things up, and we can't get them to do it. But sometimes we want the government to go very slow . . . and they oblige us by [unintentionally] losing the files."

The best way to deal with this tangle of laws—"at least two generations out of date," complains Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who helped amend them in 1965—seems to be to scrap it and start all over. That tricky job has fallen to the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University and chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Hesburgh is trying to strike a delicate balance between our generous impulses and our instinct for self-protection. "We have to have a law that is respected," says the commission's executive director, Lawrence H. Fuchs. "A bad law undermines the confidence in the United States to control its own destiny."

Work: The commission's work will affect citizens as well as immigrants. The place to draw the line against illegal aliens, Hesburgh believes, is not at the border but at the work place: a national work-identification card is the only chance we have of enforcing our immigration laws. Only citizens and legally admitted immigrants would be eligible for such a card, but anyone hired for a job would have to produce one. The card would have no other purpose, Hesburgh is quick to add, and would not have to be carried or shown except once, at the time of hiring. Its use would be directed not against aliens, but against the employers who hire—and frequently exploit—them; it would make it possible to enforce the existing laws against knowingly hiring immigrants without papers. Civil libertarians—and Hesburgh counts himself as one—are not happy at the prospect. "Give me a better solution, and I'd be for it," he says.

Along with the work card, Hesburgh plans to propose a one-time amnesty for

illegal aliens who are already here, regularizing their status as immigrants with the right to work and eventually become citizens. For years, this has been an obvious step, which has been met by the equally obvious objection that the beneficiaries would quickly be replaced with millions of new illegals. A work-card system, Hesburgh believes, "is the price of getting [amnesty] through Congress." Experts agree that there is ultimately no alternative to some form of amnesty; illegal aliens are too deeply embedded in the American economy to pull them out painlessly. "Clearly we're not going to have massive roundups and deport people," says David Crosland, acting commissioner of the INS.

The commission will almost certainly

cially illegal ones, wind up with the jobs Americans mostly don't want—as casual farm workers, in nonunion textile and garment shops, as busboys, dishwashers and domestic help. "Labor people came to our hearings," Hesburgh says, "and told us, 'We can't find work.' Then an employer would come in and say he advertised for 200 workers and got five, because no one except Mexicans will pick avocados in the 100-degree heat. Now, how do you reconcile that?" The answer, according to organized labor, is that if the job paid enough, Americans would pick poison ivy; the aliens undercut wages and working conditions. "An illegal immigrant can't complain to the boss about his working conditions," observes David S. North, director of the Center for Labor and Migration Studies. "He's less likely to join a union. Some employers actively prefer illegals because they're docile."

Civics: For most of the legal immigrants, the outlook is different. The same mysterious economic law that decreed the Irishman should wield the billy club, the Jew the needle and the Chinaman the kitchen knife, will work its way on the newcomers. The friendly Samoan on the beat, perhaps; the Haitian laundryman; the Vietnamese barber. For some, the process will be easy—like the energetic Tai Dam, a Southeast Asian tribe that appears to have spent 25 years, while on the run from the North Vietnamese, studying American civics texts in preparation for their move to Des Moines in 1975. "The Tai Dam," observes Marvin Weidner, manager of the Iowa Refugee Center, "have a strong sense of how the American game is played—what is expected, what is to be done and not done."

The Tai Dam are frank about their own beliefs—which run to animism and ancestor worship—and pragmatic about their children, enrolling them in Baptist and Methodist churches. They have quickly caught on to the secret of minority political power, which is to place their own people on the public agencies that serve them; Houg Baccam, one of the Tai Dam leaders, works for the Iowa Refugee Center and Des Moines's Central Advisory Board. His third job is as one of the managers of Tai Industries, which produces leather key cases. Other Tai Dam work in factories and private or government offices. They may not be members of country clubs yet, but they have founded the Society of Tai Dam-American Friendship. "The more I have materially," says Baccam, who is 39 and married, with three children, "the more relationships I have



drop the 20,000-per-country limit on immigrants, and it is leaning toward eliminating the fixed over-all ceiling on immigration and replacing it with a variable cap, which could be adjusted every few years as economic conditions change. "When you've got 8 million unemployed," Hesburgh says, "I think it's idiotic to take more people in." A permanent high-level commission could set the figure within a range approved by Congress, probably in the neighborhood of 750,000 annually for immigrants of all types, including refugees.

Immigrants have always been susceptible to the charge that they steal work from Americans; the only sight more horrifying than an immigrant on welfare was one with a job, especially if it was a job an American might have wanted. Luckily, that doesn't happen often. Immigrants, espe-



David Kennedy

Indocumentados crash the border at El Paso: Doing jobs Americans don't want

with Americans, the happier I become."

Yet even in their pastel-colored houses, with their lawns as crisp and green as snow peas, there is a sense of something missing from their lives, something left behind in the Indochinese hills. A Tai Dam takes delight in explaining to Americans the courtship customs of his people: the ritual gifts of food, the different hair styles that signify whether a woman is available or taken. But even for him, it begins to take on the quality of an anthropological exercise; already the women are cutting their hair in Western styles. There seems reason to believe the next generation of Tai Dam will conduct their courtships at the movies and in high school. "There is so much sexual freedom here," muses Faluang Bac-cam, who shares with Houng one of the seven surnames in the tribe, "maybe too much."

Bizarre Mutation: It is a common complaint among Indochinese: the powerful centrifugal tug of Western culture pulls children loose from the family orbit. It was a process that may already have begun in Vietnam; how can it be resisted in Mississippi where there are three television networks for the kids to choose among? The Tet celebration in Biloxi drew 400 Vietnamese this year; it began with folk dances in costumes, then ended with the blare of disco music when the youngsters took the floor. "They say everything is out of control," sighs the Rev. John Noone, a Catholic priest who has worked with many Vietnamese on the Gulf Coast. The Vietnamese tend to think of themselves as refugees, rather than immigrants, and some cling to a hope that someday they will be able to return to their home. In a bizarre mutation of assimilation, many have named

their children after their American places of birth: Arkansas Bo; Fort Chaffee Nguyen; Nola (for New Orleans, La.). But a more heartfelt name may be the one bestowed on his young son by Tran Van Kinh, a 31-year-old sewer worker. He named his boy Tran Pilot—because he may grow up and fly his parents back to Vietnam.

The gene for adaptability is an elusive one; those who have it survive, and those who lack it may not. The simple Hmong people, Laotian neighbors of the industrious Tai Dam, seem to have been passed by. Five years after several hundred were settled in Providence, R.I., and in Selma, they are still living largely on welfare, still struggling to learn English. Some have picked up just enough to express wistfulness; one man seems to have mastered one phrase: "I miss the mountains." While the Tai Dam labor at their factories, the Hmong produce almost nothing of utilitarian value. All they make is Pa N dau, squares of cloth embroidered with intricate geometric patterns, somewhat like American patchwork quilts. The only virtue of Pa N dau is that it is beautiful. Even in Laos, it had no economic function; the squares were exchanged as gifts, or used as burial cloths. A group of Providence women are trying to figure out how to market Pa N dau, but it is difficult. "We had a meeting with the design staff of Bloomingdale's, and they wanted a definable product," one says. "Meanwhile, the women are sitting at home, making more squares." They don't quite fit in, like the Hmong themselves.

America is a big and complex country, and it can fail people in unexpected ways. About 70,000 Russian Jews have immigrated to the United States since 1969, nearly half of them last year alone. They would

seem to have a better chance of success than most newcomers: they are often skilled in a trade or profession, and they have a network of fellow Jews in America. But even with them there is a lack of understanding, a mismatch of expectations. "They hear it's so good here," says one Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society staffer, "they think they're falling into a honey nest." Russians exult in their new freedom, but it is hard for them to get the knack of independence. They have never learned to look for jobs and apartments on their own. "They think we can open all the doors for them," says an official of the New York Association for New Americans. "It's a cultural conflict from the day they land."

Upward Mobility: Most of the Russians eventually find work here, but it often is a struggle. They have no concept of upward mobility. So they will turn down a job if they suspect it isn't as good as the one they held in Russia; once a cabdriver, always a cabdriver is their experience. To the Americans who work with them, they seem hypersensitive to class and status. Immigrants who were professionals in Russia often expect to receive bigger living allowances than manual workers. "They're different from what Americans are used to seeing in immigrants," says one patient caseworker. "They're not ready to sweep and wash floors."

It is hard to imagine how the Russians would have fared if they had arrived unheralded, uninvited and without a network of voluntary agencies to support them—the situation of millions of Mexicans who have been crossing the border in both directions since long before it marked the boundary of two nations. By sheer numbers and perseverance, they have carved a significant role for themselves along the 1,500-mile arc from South Texas to the Pacific Ocean—notably in San Antonio, whose population of more than 800,000 is just over half Mexican-American. (In Los Angeles, Latinos are expected to make up one-third of the population within four years.) By conservative estimates, one out of eight Mexicans in San Antonio is an illegal, but enough are citizens to have elected four Mexican-Americans to the eleven-member city council.

'Stepping on the Flag': It has been a slow development. Mexicans by and large have taken a *mañana* attitude toward U.S. citizenship. In San Antonio, a city that once was part of Mexico, thousands of Latinos have lived for decades as legal aliens. Applying for citizenship in the United States is sometimes considered unpatriotic—"stepping on the Mexican flag," in one Latino's words. One wrinkled old woman recalled that she crossed the Rio Grande with her parents when she was a year old—"all it cost was 5 cents for the bridge, and there was no need for papers"—and is only now enrolled in citizenship class. She has no sentimental wish to die a Yankee, but as a citizen, it will be easier for her to

An erosion of saving

Ever since World War II, policymakers under the influence of John Maynard Keynes have focused on demand management. The idea was to spur consumer spending at the expense of saving to create the huge markets that in turn would generate business investment.


But now it is becoming increasingly evident that this emphasis on consumption is a key factor in the declining U. S. ability to compete in the world marketplace and is causing losses in productivity and growth. Says Lawrence R. Klein of the University of Pennsylvania, a leading Keynesian: "We have lived high on the hog and failed to modernize our plant and equipment. We must go from being a high-consumption economy to being a high-saving economy if we are to reindustrialize and improve our standard of living."

This, of course, will not be an easy job. Personal saving as a percentage of disposable income in the U. S. has been stuck for at least 15 years around a trend line of 6%. And during the inflation-fueled buying spree of late 1979 and early 1980, it plummeted as low as 3.4%. This is in stark contrast to average household saving rates of about 20% in Japan, 14% in West Germany, and similarly plump rates for other U. S. trading partners. In the same period U. S. investment in plant and equipment as a percentage of gross national product averaged just 7.5%, while Germany

averaged 8.8% and Japan topped 17%.

The nation's tax system may hold the key to the lag in saving. The income tax has an inherent bias against saving and rewards consumption. The tax rate on a dollar of income spent today is less than that on a dollar saved because the inter-

The shortfall in U.S.



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SPECIAL ISSUE

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The effects of the obsolescence of economic psychology in the U. S. have been devastating. Overall economic growth slid to 2.9% per year in the 1970s from 4.1% in the 1960s and 3.9% in the 1950s. The U. S. standard of living now ranks only fifth in the world; it ranked the highest as recently as 1972. The U. S. inflation rate was higher than the average of all industrial countries in 1979 for the first time in history.

Nor do these macro statistics tell the whole story. At a deeper level, the U. S. economy is showing signs of the kind of fatigue that causes industrial powers such as 19th century Britain to go into an irreversible slide. Investment in the U. S. stands at some 10% of gross national product as compared with 15% in Germany and 20% in Japan. Lacking the stimulus of new capital plant, U. S. productivity growth had declined. Indeed, instead of using more and more capital in production, the U. S. is becoming more labor intensive in its production methods. Since 1976, the capital stock has increased at a 3% annual rate and hours worked by a larger 3.8%. The statistics for Germany and Japan are exactly the opposite. An increase in the labor intensity of output is not a sign of vigor but of decay.

In what may be an optimistic portent, the decline in the U. S. economy has advanced so far that the public as a whole has begun to sense a need for change. "The state of mind of the public is worried sick and in a panic," says Daniel Yankelovich, chairman of the public opinion polling firm of Yankelovich, Skelly & White Inc. "In that condition, people know there is something wrong. That pushes them into working out accommodations that make economic sense."

If Yankelovich is right, the question of whether the U. S. will reindustrialize depends on whether the business, bureaucratic, and political elites can get together to provide the leadership. An enormous amount has to be done, and the time to do it is running short. So much has to be done that it may not be possible to do it all. But the U. S. has to make a start. Certainly the jolt provided by the current recession has created an environment in which the public is ready to reindustrialize America.

abroad, but the decline actually has been accelerating.

In the 1970s the U. S. lost 23% of its share of the world market, compared with a 16% decline during the 1960s. U. S. manufacturers' share of the domestic market also fell more in the most recent decade than earlier. The losses in the 1970s are particularly telling, because they came in the wake of a 40% depreciation in the value of the dollar, which made U. S. exports cheaper and foreign imports more expensive. The decline in the U. S. position in the 1970s alone amounted to some \$125 billion in lost production and a loss of at least 2 million industrial jobs.

Few industries have been exempt from the erosion of U. S. industrial power. Even sectors where the U. S. still racks up tremendous trade surpluses have been losing their share of the world market steadily. The aircraft industry, for example, exported nearly \$10 billion worth of products last year, while only \$1 billion worth of planes and parts were imported. Yet U. S. domination is by no means as complete as it once was. America's 58% share of world airplane exports last year represented a significant decline from the 66% share of a decade ago. Further erosion is almost inevitable as the European airbus attacks the U. S. monopoly of widebodied jets.

Other research-intensive industries also are having trouble holding their own, although the depreciation of the dollar has improved their price-competitiveness. The U. S. share of plastics ex-

How U. S. share has

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Vertical

Diverse settimane fa, due fra i più «grossi» giornalisti politici americani stavano viaggiando in macchina per il Midwest degli Stati Uniti, dov'erano in programma parecchie elezioni primarie. Ormai era chiaro che i candidati democratico e repubblicano per l'elezione presidenziale del 1980 sarebbero stati Jimmy Carter e Ronald Reagan, e due veterani del giornalismo politico si guardarono fra di loro malinconicamente, chiedendosi: «Come è potuto succedere?».

Naturalmente, non sono i soli a porsi questa domanda. In realtà, per la maggior parte degli americani, l'enigma è tale che una barzelletta sta facendo il giro degli Stati Uniti, in cui un cittadino, avvicinato da un uomo armato che gli punta addosso una pistola e gli chiede minacciosamente: «Carter o Reagan?», non sa altro che rispondere, disperatamente: «Non so; spara pure, se vuoi».

Anche gli europei si stanno domandando, sconcertati, come sia possibile che la più grande e ricca potenza del mondo si sia ridotta a nominare quali suoi principali candidati due personaggi così privi di carisma come il presidente Carter e il governatore Reagan. Non molto tempo fa, per esempio, il settimanale conservatore *The Spectator* scriveva: «Per quanto uno sfiori la propria immaginazione, difficilmente la scelta che il sistema elettorale americano ha finito con l'offrire all'elettorato statunitense può essere considerata ispirata, generosa, ampia o soddisfacente. Lo scetticismo non circonda soltanto il presidente Carter ma, in ugual misura, il governatore Reagan». E i commenti della stampa nei maggiori Paesi europei riflettono un'analoga preoccupazione.

La sensazione generale è che gli Stati Uniti dovranno aspettare almeno fino al 1984 per avere la prospettiva di una reale leadership. Ma, mentre gli europei si interrogano su questa deludente situazione, alcuni americani si danno da fare per capirne le ragioni. In effetti, la disamina del problema sta già facendo balenare possibili soluzioni. David Broder, uno dei due sopraccitati giornalisti che viaggiavano in macchina per il Midwest ed uno dei più reputati analisti politici, ha presentato alcune interessanti osservazioni e suggerimenti in vista di un cambiamento.

Quanto mai ironica è la sua convinzione che la causa principale dell'attuale impasse debba essere ricercata proprio nella vasta e consistente democratizzazione del sistema americano della nomination, che ebbe luogo tra il 1960 e il 1976.

Il procedimento della nomination, nel sistema elettorale americano, è un procedimento complesso con cui pochi europei hanno familiarità. I candidati dei due maggiori partiti americani sono scelti nel corso di convenzioni che si svolgono nell'estate che precede l'elezione presidenziale. I delegati che partecipano a dette convenzioni, vale a dire gli uomini e le donne che scelgono effettivamente il candidato alla convenzione dei partiti, sono scelti dalle organizzazioni di partito dei cinquanta Stati americani. Dove il sistema è veramente complicato è nella varietà di metodi su cui si basano le organizzazioni di partito dei vari Stati per selezionare questi delegati. Fondamentalmente sono tre: una convenzione della sezione del partito in ciascuno Stato; un caucus (cioè una riunione dei dirigenti del partito) della stessa sezione statale; un'elezione primaria della sezione statale, nella



Jimmy Carter fotografato a Roma e Ronald Reagan (a destra) durante la campagna



quale i votanti sono gli iscritti al partito.

Nel corso degli ultimi vent'anni, il numero delle primarie è cresciuto al punto che oggi l'ottanta per cento dei delegati alle convenzioni è scelto in questo modo. Una volta considerato una vittoria della democrazia, il sistema primario è attualmente oggetto di critica non soltanto da parte di analisti come Broder, ma da parte degli stessi dirigenti di partito, in quanto ritenuto inadeguato per la scelta di un candidato veramente qualificato.

I difensori del sistema sottolineano che, senza di esso, John F. Kennedy non avrebbe potuto dimostrare che i protestanti sono disposti a votare per un cattolico, quando occorre, e Jimmy Carter non avrebbe potuto provare che settentrionali e negri sono, se necessario, disposti a sostenere un bianco meridionale. La primaria, in effetti, offre ai candidati meno noti o a quelli che combattono pregiudizi o prevenzioni, una reale possibilità di competere. Ma, mentre Kennedy nel 1960 partecipò soltanto a quattro contrastate primarie, sedici anni più tardi Carter gareg-

giava in ventisei primarie.

Quest'anno, la «rivoluzione» del procedimento di nomina è culminata nello svolgimento di ben trentasei primarie. Sulla carta suona bene, ma Broder e altri sono giunti alla conclusione che i cambiamenti possono essersi dimostrati controproducenti.

In una serie di articoli sulla «Washington Post», per esempio, Broder sottolinea che, dopo che ebbe vinto alcune primarie chiave nel 1960, Kennedy fu ancora costretto a lavorare non poco per convincere i dirigenti del partito e gli esponenti eletti negli Stati non primari che egli era effettivamente adatto a portare il vessillo del partito democratico. Senza di essi, egli non avrebbe avuto i voti necessari, ma, cosa più importante, dice Broder, questo procedimento lo obbligò a costruire alleanze con altri importanti democratici, alleanze che gli servirono egregiamente una volta arrivato alla Casa Bianca. Carter, al contrario, dice Broder, nel 1976 ottenne virtualmente tutti i delegati di cui aveva bisogno per vincere la nomination, nelle primarie. Il risultato fu che egli diventò

presidente senza l'appoggio di quegli alleati che avrebbero effettivamente potuto aiutarlo a raggiungere quella carica.

I cambiamenti del sistema della nomination risalgono alla convenzione del 1968, in cui gli *insiders* (affiliati) del partito democratico respinsero Eugene McCarthy, vincitore delle primarie, e al suo posto scelsero Hubert Humphrey. Il risultato, alimentato dalla disperazione generale per l'assassinio di Robert Kennedy, avvenuto nell'agosto del 1968, fu un pronunciato senso di ingiustizia che condusse ad una revisione delle procedure selettive dei democratici. A ciò bisogna aggiungere l'istinto di autodeterminazione che dominava negli anni Sessanta insieme con l'ostilità verso le istituzioni e i dirigenti del periodo del Vietnam. Dice Broder: «La convinzione era che "il popolo", e non i politici, dovesse scegliere i candidati». Ciò suonava bene ma il risultato è stato un sistema che ignora crescentemente le capacità di guida di un candidato (e la reputazione che gode fra i suoi pari) e che tende invece a premiare «la volontà di spendere anni a viaggiare nei piccoli gruppi di votanti negli Stati delle primarie presidenziali (questa fu la fortunata tecnica usata da Carter nel 1976), specialmente quelle che si svolgono all'inizio dell'anno».

I candidati, dice Broder, hanno imparato che la tecnica più felice è una specie di candidatura permanente (George McGovern annunciò che avrebbe corso la campagna elettorale per diciotto mesi prima della convenzione del 1972; Carter, che a quel momento non era più governatore della Georgia, fece 260 giorni di campagna nel 1975; e Ronald Reagan negli ultimi sei anni non si è più occupato d'altro, a tempo pieno, che della sua campagna per la nomination repubblicana). Ciò ha portato a strategie politiche fondate sul tentativo di vincere le elezioni primarie della prima tornata e poi lasciare che la pubblicità dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa crei la spinta per le competizioni successive.

Broder riassume l'effetto complessivo di tutto ciò, dicendo che «nell'attuale sistema di nomina, i fattori determinanti del successo sono le dimensioni dell'ambizione del candidato, l'entità del suo tempo libero, e la tolleranza che la sua famiglia, il suo bilancio e il suo lavoro hanno per i suoi viaggi quasi ininterrotti». Queste «caratteristiche», è ormai evidente, non hanno nulla a che fare con le qualità che fanno un vero e proprio presidente.

Detto questo, è cominciata la ricerca di rimedi atti a contro-

Bin, Ortessa e Zellini «opere prime»

Assegnato il Viareggio '80 a Terra, Erba e Fachinelli

Viareggio, 27 giugno

I vincitori della cinquantunesima edizione del premio «Viareggio» sono: per la narrativa, Stefano Terra con «Le Porte di ferro», edito da Rizzoli; per la poesia, Luciano Erba con «Il nastro di Moebius» (Mondadori); per la saggistica, Elvio Fachinelli con «La Freccia ferma» (ed. L'Erba voglio). I vincitori delle «opere prime» sono: per la narrativa, Olivo Bin con «Storia di un boia» (ed. Città armoniosa); per la poesia, Cosimo Ortessa con «Il Bagno degli occhi» (Società di poesia); per la saggistica, Paolo Zellini con «Breve storia dell'inflitto» (Adelphi).

Il premio internazionale «Viareggio-Versilia» è andato a Cesare Musatti per «Il Principe di Giulio Cesare» (Mondadori) e per il complesso della sua opera, con cui ha inserito l'Italia, per gli studi freudiani, a livello europeo; infine, il «Premio del presidente» è stato attribuito a Leo Solari, economista, esperto di problemi ecologici e in particolare di quelli della sovrappopolazione nel mondo, per il libro «Eugenio Colaninzi ieri e sempre», edito da Marsilio.

Il libro è il primo che sia dedicato all'illustrazione ed alla figura di un uomo che, oltre ad essere stato un insigne

filosofo, fu uno dei più suggestivi protagonisti della lotta antifascista.

La gloria del «Viareggio» ha votato quest'anno quasi al completo: erano presenti 19 dei 21 giudici. La decisione per la vittoria di Stefano Terra è stata presa a netta maggioranza, ma dopo un lungo e accanito dibattito del suo sostenitore con quelli di Francesca Savitale, che era giunta in finale con il suo secondo romanzo, «Madre e figlia», edito da Einaudi. L'«avversario» più temibile per Luciano Erba è stato Maurizio Cucchi, il trentacinquenne poeta milanese al secondo libro, pubblicato nello «Specchio» di Mondadori; «Le meraviglie dell'acqua». Il libro contro cui ha dovuto battersi quello di Fachinelli è stato soprattutto «La Repubblica del leone» di Alvisio Zorzi, (Rusconi).

Per le «opere prime», l'«avversario» di Bin è stata Romana Pucci, con «La Volanda» (Einaudi), mentre nella sezione della poesia, «Non per chi va», di Gianni D'Elia, ha contrastato a lungo la vittoria del libro di Ortessa; nella saggistica, il libro più pericoloso per Zellini è stato quello di Francesco Porzio, l'«Universo illusorio di Arcimboldi», edito da Fabbri.

Tutte le «opere prime» sono state quest'anno, secondo i giudici, di «ottima qualità».

3) Mediocris (sic) indivisa
3) Age 50, 1'82 pe catu dei betelli
pe l'industria tecnologica. Dopo l'uscita della tecnologia super a dipend
francese, la parte americana dei betelli è stata al 55 pe catu. Ma
l'industria americana è perita per una crisi (crisi)
tecnologica, che ha ridotto il mondo di vita economico del mondo
industriale. (L'idea)

As the international oil consultant, Walter Levy, writes in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, even now there is no move toward effective national and international systems of allocating the oil at hand. Thus, even when supplies are adequate, the smallest portent of shortage sets off panic buying at almost any cost. And in time, of course, the exporting nations raise their prices to recapture the profits of this wild market.

Even assuming oil prices that rise at less than the rate of inflation, Levy observes, the OPEC countries might accumulate \$115 billion during 1980 and between \$350 billion and \$450 billion by 1985. And they will not again, as in 1974-78, accept payment in depreciated currency. The debt will have to

Sagging spending for research and development plus lackluster investment has reduced U. S. productivity significantly. From 1948 to 1968 output per hour worked increased at an annual rate of 3.2%. But from 1968 to 1973 the annual increase came to 1.9%, and over the next six years the rate fell to a minuscule 0.7%. Faltering growth has been partly due to the huge increase in employment in the service industries, especially in health and social services, where productivity gains are harder to come by.

No a tasse ridotte

(Segue dalla 1ª pagina)

d'America. La California è la nona potenza economica al mondo, con un prodotto annuo lordo di 30 miliardi di dollari, superiore quindi a quello del Canada o a quello dell'Australia. I suoi 23 milioni di abitanti sono benedetti dalle risorse naturali, specialmente il petrolio: dall'agricoltura, che rappresenta per dimensioni solo il 3 per cento di quella della nazione, ma ne raccoglie il 10 per cento dei proventi monetari; e dalle industrie più avanzate, elettronica, aeronautica e navale, che evade il 20 per cento delle ordinazioni militari. La California nel '78 ha imboccato la strada della riforma del fisco con un attivo di bilancio di 7 milioni di dollari.

Un numero crescente di economisti, tuttavia, propone la riduzione delle tasse quale motore del rinnovamento economico. Il primo, in ordine di preminenza se non cronologico, è stato Arthur Laffer, che ha dato il nome alla celebre «curva Laffer». Egli insegna all'università della California meridionale. La sua tesi è che le tasse, continuando a salire, depauperano gli investimenti, gli incentivi, l'occupazione; e che al contrario, da un certo livello, incominciando a scendere, li arricchiscono. Il boom dell'economia, in questo secondo contesto, si autofinanzia, e mette in moto i meccanismi del mercato. Il fisco finisce per avvantaggiarsi, ed incassare con imposte modeste più di quanto incassava in precedenza. L'esperienza californiana, conclude Laffer, è valida, anche se forse più felice di quanto non sarebbe nell'intera America.

Dopo le «propositions» 13, 4 e 9, e con la caduta del Paese nell'inflazione e nella recessione, la «curva Laffer» è diventata l'oggetto del più violento dibattito di politica economica del dopoguerra americano. Esso si svolge a un duplice livello, teorico, con la chiamata in causa dei principi keynesiani sin qui applicati, in particolare dal governo democratico, e pratico, con l'invito al presidente Carter ad abbracciare il nuovo strumento. Sono per lo sgravio fiscale tutti i possidenti nuovi economisti, quindi il professore di Harvard Martin Feldstein, considerato il loro caposcuola, e numerosi esponenti repubblicani, tra cui il deputato Jack Kemp, un ex giocatore

di football che nelle elezioni al Parlamento del '78 noleggiò un aereo per propagare il verbo. Se l'ex governatore della California Reagan sconfiggesse Carter a novembre, ridurrebbe subito le tasse.

Ascoltiamo Feldstein, un uomo brillante, di circa 45 anni, un reaganite che andrebbe indubbiamente al governo. «Il regime fiscale americano è tale — afferma — che penalizza lo sviluppo dell'economia. Il tasso d'aumento annuo del reddito disponibile è stato del 3,9 per cento tra il 1947 e il 1973. Ma negli ultimi sette anni si è fermato sull'1,4 per cento. Questo regime, inoltre, favorisce l'inefficienza della burocrazia, e lo spreco delle spese». «I keynesiani — aggiunge Feldstein — per stimolare l'economia hanno agito quasi sempre sulla sola domanda, nella convinzione che la sua crescita avrebbe fatto anche crescere la produzione. Le conseguenze sono state disastrose: i consumi interni sono esplosi a danno delle esportazioni, i risparmi sono scesi al 3-4 per cento del reddito, la percentuale più bassa dell'Occidente, la produttività è calata. L'effetto complessivo è stato inflazionistico».

Lo storico dell'economia Lester Thurow mette l'accento sul rilancio della produttività e degli investimenti. «La nostra produttività — dice — è aumentata del 3 per cento annuo dal 1947 al 1965, e del 2,1

per cento dal 1965 al 1973. Adesso rischia addirittura di declinare. Quanto agli investimenti, i nostri costituiscono il 10 per cento del prodotto nazionale lordo, contro il 15 per cento della Germania Occidentale e il 20 per cento del Giappone». Thurow definisce «scriteriato» il progetto legge «squalo 2», ma è d'accordo con Feldstein sulla necessità che il governo agisca anche sull'offerta. «E' ora che incourage i risparmi esentandoli dalle tasse, che pareggi il bilancio americano lasciando maggiore disponibilità all'industria privata per i finanziamenti, che discrimini tra imprese forti e imprese malate».

Nell'attuale congiuntura, ossia con il ristagno della produzione e un tasso inflazionistico elevato, secondo i nuovi economisti un taglio fiscale puro e semplice sarebbe a lunga scadenza controproducente. Risolverebbe infatti l'economia per un breve periodo, facendola poi precipitare però in una nuova grave crisi. Con le elezioni a novembre, il presidente Carter, in difficoltà di fronte al voto operaio, potrebbe optare per tale scelta. Il deputato Kemp è più selettivo: «Uno sgravio fiscale — sostiene — deve sorreggersi sulla restrizione del credito e la limitazione della liquidità, e rivolgersi a obiettivi ben individuati. Non si tratta di effettuare un salto, ma di compiere un passaggio graduale». Kemp aggiunge: «Le tasse sono un freno alla offerta di beni e di servizi, se imposte in misura eccessiva».

I nuovi economisti ammettono che avrebbero gradito una verifica del loro dettami in California, ovviamente con un progetto legge più equilibrato di quello di Howard Jarvis. Ma non nutrono dubbi sulla bontà delle proprie proposte. Essi osservano che la California non è esente da grossi problemi: l'inflazione si aggira sul 15 per cento e la disoccupazione sul 7 per cento, e la concorrenza giapponese si avverte soprattutto nella «Vallata silicosa», il centro dei computer della contea di Santa Clara. Ma i loro calcoli dimostrano che anche col dimezzamento dell'imposta sul reddito, le entrate dello Stato californiano sarebbero state inferiori alle uscite solo del 3 per cento. E in ogni caso, con l'alleggerimento fiscale, la California sembra destinata a fornire all'America il 15 per cento del totale dei nuovi posti di lavoro negli Anni Ottanta.

Ennio Caretto

Da lunedì Colombo negli Usa

ROMA — Il ministro degli Affari Esteri, Emilio Colombo, effettuerà una visita di lavoro a Washington dal 9 all'11 giugno prossimi, su invito del governo degli Stati Uniti d'America.

Il viaggio di Colombo a Washington precede di appena dieci giorni la visita in Italia del presidente degli Stati Uniti Jimmy Carter che, prima di recarsi a Venezia per il vertice dei paesi industrializzati (in programma per il 22 e 23) si fermerà due giorni a Roma per colloqui con Cossiga e per un incontro in Vaticano con Papa Wojtyla.

La missione di Colombo si inserisce nella fase preparatoria dei due avvenimenti, la visita in Italia di Carter, e il vertice occidentale di Venezia, per il quale in questi giorni si è tenuta una riunione a livello tecnico a Parigi e vi sono vari contatti bilaterali.

Détente divisible ou indivisible ?

Sous une forme ou sous une autre, la question posée par le titre de cet article fait l'objet de conversations, privées et publiques, diplomatiques, officielles ou discrètes. En quoi vous concerne l'affaire de l'Afghanistan ? disent les Soviétiques aux Occidentaux, tantôt avec brutalité (« Peu nous importent vos récriminations »), tantôt avec une insinuante compassion (« Pourquoi compromettez-vous la détente sous prétexte de solidarité avec un président américain imprévisible ? »). A quoi les Américains répliquent : croyez-vous que notre opinion acceptera à la longue que les Européens se vouent à la détente et laissent aux Etats-Unis la charge de la résistance à l'offensive soviétique — offensive en direction du golfe Persique qui menace les intérêts vitaux de tous les Occidentaux, des Européens au moins autant que des Américains ? A la rigueur, les derniers, repliés sur la forteresse America, pourraient survivre en dépit de l'extension de l'empire soviétique à l'ensemble euro-asiatique que le géographe anglais Mac Kinder appelait l'île mondiale.

En Allemagne aussi bien qu'en France, il ne manque pas d'hommes, dans la rue et dans les chancelleries, qui souhaitent une détente divisible ; les relations Est-Ouest se poursuivraient telles quelles : des échanges commerciaux, la tranquillité à Berlin et les visites des Allemands de l'Ouest en République démocratique allemande.

Au reste, les pays d'Europe orientale redoutent le retour à la guerre froide parce qu'ils en seraient les premières victimes. Argument qui mérite d'être pris en considération, mais qui prête à discussion : si la Pologne ou la Hongrie jouissent d'une relative tolérance de la part des autorités soviétiques, elles ne la doivent ni exclusivement ni avant tout à la diplomatie des Occidentaux. Les dirigeants de ces deux pays parviennent à persuader les Soviétiques que le gant de velours (si l'on peut dire) répond à l'intérêt de Moscou lui-même.

Les Soviétiques ne facilitent pas la tâche des avocats de la détente divisible, même s'ils en chantent les charmes. Les Soviétiques n'ont même pas présenté une version légalement et politiquement plausible de leur action, puisqu'ils n'ont fait connaître ni quel

gouvernement afghan les avait appelés à l'aide, ni quelles interventions étrangères les soldats soviétiques avaient le devoir de combattre. Plusieurs mois se sont écoulés. Les gouvernements européens constatent que la position diplomatique de Moscou ne change pas d'un pouce. « L'inacceptable » de Giscard d'Estaing répond « irréversible » de Brejnev et de Gromyko.

L'ampleur de la résistance afghane commande aux Occidentaux de témoigner, eux aussi, de courage.

L'ampleur de la résistance afghane bouleverse les calculs soviétiques ; elle commande aux Occidentaux de témoigner eux aussi de courage, au reste moins dangereux que celui des moudjahiddin. Selon les dernières informations, des renforts seraient transportés par air pour suppléer aux insuffisances du corps expéditionnaire soviétique. L'héroïsme d'un peuple presque sans armes défie la plus grande puissance militaire du monde. Les Européens ne peuvent pas ne pas prendre parti pour un peuple qui combat pour sa liberté.

La diplomatie soviétique n'enjoint pas seulement aux Européens de détourner les yeux de la « pacification » de l'Afghanistan, elle s'efforce de les intimider, afin qu'ils refusent la modernisation des armes nucléaires tactiques. Selon certains observateurs, Couve de Murville, par exemple, l'installation des Pershing et des missiles de croisière en Europe occidentale irriterait les dirigeants soviétiques plus que toute autre affaire. Aucune des armes nucléaires tactiques entreposées en Europe occidentale depuis une vingtaine d'années ne possède une portée suffisante pour frapper des cibles sur le territoire soviétique. Les Pershing et les missiles de croisière, en revanche, peuvent atteindre les provinces occidentales de l'Union soviétique. Du coup, déclarent les Soviétiques, sept ou huit minutes, au lieu de trente, s'écouleraient entre le lancement du missile et l'arrivée au but. La décision européenne, qui ne

sera appliquée qu'en 1983 (les missiles prévus ne sont pas au point), serait contraire à l'esprit de Salt 2 et rendrait impossible toute négociation sur le désarmement en Europe.

Sincères ou non, ces protestations témoignent d'une incroyable méconnaissance du point de vue de l'autre. Les Soviétiques tenaient l'Europe occidentale, depuis le début des années 60, sous le feu de quelques centaines de missiles à moyenne ou intermédiaire portée. Selon eux, les SS 20 constituent non une addition, mais une substitution de l'appareil soviétique, le remplacement des missiles anciens par des nouveaux. Or, les anciens ne sont pas nécessairement retirés, mais, à supposer même qu'ils soient retirés, le développement des SS 20, mobiles, armés chacun de trois têtes nucléaires, au tir précis (quelques dizaines de mètres plutôt que quelques centaines de mètres), modifie le rapport des forces. Si l'on tient compte aussi des Backfire, dont quelques dizaines sont déjà opérationnels, la conclusion s'impose : la modernisation des armes nucléaires tactiques de l'Otan répond à un déséquilibre sur le plan des euromissiles, elle tend à le corriger. Or, les diplomates soviétiques — et Brejnev le répétera au chancelier Schmidt — s'obstinent à exiger que les Européens reviennent sur la décision qu'ils ont prise (accepter les Pershing et les missiles de croisière).

Si les Européens se ralliaient à la thèse de la détente divisible, autrement dit s'ils se désintéressaient de l'offensive soviétique dans des régions vitales pour eux, ils confirmeraient le jugement de Henry Kissinger : les ex-grandes puissances d'Europe sont devenues régionales. L'abdication, au reste, n'assurerait qu'un sursis ou une sécurité illusoire. Les Soviétiques, en raison même de leur formation marxiste-léniniste, pensent leur stratégie dans un cadre mondial.

En s'isolant des tempêtes lointaines, l'Europe occidentale se rapprocherait en apparence du rêve de l'Europe unie de l'Atlantique à l'Oural. Réalité toute différente de celle que le général de Gaulle envisageait : non pas la conversion du régime soviétique, mais la soumission des démocraties au diktat de Moscou. ■

Exten 21 ju 1980

...la revisione dell'indennità di congedo, la soppressione della corsa in accavallamento, la perequazione del trattamento economico tra gli ufficiali destinati al collegamento e gli ufficiali che esplicano servizio a bordo.

Lo ha annunciato il presidente Weiber, il quale ha anticipato che anche gli utili sono diminuiti, ma non ha fatto cifre. Secondo il presidente le vendite dovrebbero riprendersi nel secondo semestre, stimolate dall'introduzione del nuovo modello «Escort», che verrà lanciato alla fine dell'estate. Il lancio del modello, nel quale la Ford ha investito oltre 2 miliardi di marchi, è stato ritardato di un anno per motivi tecnici e finanziari, fra cui la crisi dell'industria automobilistica americana e le elevate necessità finanziarie della casa madre.

...affermare la Fiat — è dunque nella realtà delle cose. Secondo il sindacato, ormai si sono delineate le forze che vogliono la fermata degli stabilimenti perché ne hanno precedentemente deciso la loro

L'indebitamento del blocco sovietico con l'Occidente è di 65 miliardi di dollari

Presto anche l'Urss dovrà importare petrolio

DAL NOSTRO CORISPONDENTE

NEW YORK — In meno di dieci anni l'indebitamento netto del blocco sovietico con l'Occidente si è più che decuplicato. Da quasi 6 miliardi di dollari nel 1971, esso è salito a quasi 65 miliardi nel 1979. Contrariamente a quanto si crede, il maggior debitore non è però più l'Urss ma la Polonia, che negli ultimi anni ha chiesto ingenti prestiti per superare la crisi economica. Il debito netto polacco con l'Occidente nel '79 era di ben 20 miliardi di dollari, quasi il doppio di quello sovietico. Il terzo debitore è la Germania Orientale la potenza industriale dei Paesi satelliti, con 8 miliardi e mezzo di dollari.

Questi dati sono stati forniti dalla Cia o Central Intelligence Agency i servizi segreti americani, e fanno parte di uno spesso volume intitolato *L'escalation del debito in Russia propria dell'Urss e dell'Europa Orientale*. Il volume raccoglie studi di diversi anni, che gettano luce anche sulle

avventure bancarie dei Paesi del Patto di Varsavia nella finanza capitalista. Le previsioni della Cia sono nette: questo debito è destinato a crescere. E' netta anche la sua critica: l'Occidente finanzia lo sviluppo economico comunista senza chiedere contropartite politiche, soprat-

Prepensionamento poligrafici nuove norme

ROMA — Il decreto legge n. 167, pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale del 15 maggio, nel prevedere una particolare forma di prepensionamento a favore dei lavoratori poligrafici dipendenti da imprese editrici e stampatrici di giornali quotidiani e da agenzie di stampa e diffusione nazionale, ne stabilisce la copertura anche con il versamento, a carico delle aziende, dell'aliquota dello 0,15% di cui alla legge 511/1968.

Lo fa presente in un comunicato la sede romana dell'Inps.

tutto nel caso dell'Urss.

Gli studi distinguono il debito netto e il debito lordo. Quest'ultimo, per l'insieme del blocco sovietico, ammonta a 65 miliardi e mezzo di dollari circa nel '71 ed è aumentato a 78 miliardi e rotti di dollari nel '79. Sotto il suo profilo interno, l'Urss non è molto lontana dalla Polonia: l'anno scorso il suo debito lordo ammontava a 17 miliardi 200 milioni di dollari contro i 21 miliardi 100 milioni di dollari dell'alleanza.

Nel '79 l'Urss doveva agli istituti finanziari dell'Occidente 7 miliardi 200 milioni di dollari. La Cia sostiene presto ne dovrà di più alle tecnologie a suo favore. L'Urss si troverà infatti a dover comprare anche le prime in particolare per i servizi americani ritardi che essa smetterà di cercare a importarne nella situazione sovietica, la opinione sarà dannata dal rallentamento

tasso di sviluppo: meno dello 0,7 per cento realizzato nel '79.

L'Urss sembra aver tentato la strada capitalista con le sedi estere della Banca Nazionale, la Narodny Bank. Nata nel '19 per finanziare i commerci con l'Occidente la banca nel '72 aprì due filiali, una a Beirut una a Singapore, in aggiunta a quella «storica» di Londra. Pratico però una politica creditizia eccessivamente libera. Nel '74, la filiale di Singapore denunciò una perdita di 100 milioni di dollari che aumentò nel biennio suc-

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ment policy aimed at reindustrialization must be grounded on a clear appreciation of what modern technology is about, its implications, and especially its accelerating pace. Lacking such understanding, they fear that any cure devised in Washington could be worse than the disease.

Some executives in California's citadel of high technology, Silicon Valley, are pushing hard on Washington. Chairman David Packard, for one, feels that the U. S. lead in computers will face a strong challenge by the 1990s. In other fields, the U. S. lags in implementing technology is already slipping. A study of innovation between 1953 and 1973 for the National Science Foundation (NSF) produced these statistics: In the 1950s the U. S. was the first to market 82% of all major innovations; by the late 1960s, though, the share had dropped to 55%.

One explanation of the apparent downturn, says Robert M. Coquillette, executive vice-president at W. R. Grace & Co., is that U. S. industry has been living off technology conceived during the Depression, when there was scant incentive to exploit new knowledge, and World War II, when the emphasis was on military applications. Jacob E. Goldman, senior vice-president and chief scientist at Xerox Corp., sees a similar pattern. Most of the major technological forces that are shaping today's world, he observes, stem from discoveries made before 1970—the whole microelectronics revolution, color television, a host of new drugs, the Polaroid camera, and of course xerography. To drive home his point, Goldman notes: "One is hard put to compile a list of innovations in the last few years that matches any equivalent span of time in the 1950s or '60s."

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del sindacato è ben diversa.

D. È la politica dei redditi.

R. Nella forma del controllo dei prezzi e dei salari, così come propone Edward Kennedy in America, non serve a nulla. Serve solo a congelare una situazione di squilibrio. Appena si levano i controlli, tutto scappa di mano e la situazione torna come prima. Ora alcuni economisti americani stanno studiando dei miglioramenti alla politica dei redditi: si chiamano Tips (Tax based income policies), cioè politiche dei redditi basate sulle tasse.

D. In che consistono?

R. Nella versione bastone, prevedono un'imposta per le imprese che superano un certo margine di profitto, oppure che concedono aumenti salariali eccessivi: in questi casi il costo del lavoro extra non può essere incluso nei costi dell'impresa, facendo quindi aumentare le tasse da pagare allo stato. Nella versione carota, l'economista Okun ha proposto una sorta di assicurazione contro l'inflazione per i lavoratori che accettano di contenere gli aumenti salariali entro un certo limite. Se l'inflazione supera gli aumenti ottenuti, poniamo il 6%, i lavoratori ottengono una detrazione fiscale che li compensa della perdita che hanno subito.

D. E in Italia, qual è la situazione?



Worker in a machine-tool manufacturing plant in Georgia

taught in local languages, but they know—and their parents know—that upward and outward mobility in Soviet society depends on being able to converse fluently with a Muscovite. In Frunze, capital of the Central Asian republic of Kirgizia, middle-aged government officials speak heavily accented Russian; occasionally they need help in translating expressions from their native language, which is related to Turkish.

In the provinces, visiting Russians are still toasted as "our respected elder brothers," but Soviet propaganda plays skillfully on the theme that the country as a whole—the entire brotherhood of nationalities—is doing spectacular things in the world, and that all ethnic groups are benefiting. Says Harvard Professor Adam Ulam: "There is a consciousness of national greatness, a sense that the Soviet Union is now one of the two superpowers, that its influence is rising while the West's is declining. Psychologically, that has been a very strong factor in the average Soviet's attitude toward the regime. He is conscious of his prestige in the world."

Will Moscow's two-track policy of Russification and Sovietization enable the U.S.S.R. to survive as the world's last multinational empire? Some Western experts, with more than a touch of wishful thinking in their speculation, predict that the U.S.S.R. will come apart along its Muslim seams in the south in the '80s. Others, including National Security Adviser Zbigniew

Brzezinski, also look for trouble in Eastern Europe, particularly in Brzezinski's native Poland. Columbia University's Seweryn Bialer agrees. Until now, he says, the Soviets have been fortunate that uprisings have broken out in only one country at a time in Eastern Europe—East Germany, 1953; Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968. "They will not be so lucky in the '80s," he predicts.

At the moment, however, there are no signs that any unrest is getting out of control, nor would a fresh outbreak of trouble necessarily threaten to break up the empire. In Eastern Europe the presence of 31 divisions of Soviet troops discourages excessive independence or disorder such as the food-price riots that rocked Poland in 1970. There are also garrisons outside the capitals of the Central Asian republics. The soldiers stationed there, in the main, are from other parts of the country rather than local boys; if they were ever ordered to quash an uprising, they would not be firing on their ethnic kinsmen.

There were scattered but serious anti-Russian riots by the Uzbeks of Tashkent in 1966 and 1969 and the Tadzhiks of Dushanbe in 1978.


In those cases, the Soviet army garrisons outside those cities were put on alert and used for crowd control. A U.S. Government Kremlinologist has hypothesized that if it were not for the presence of Moscow's military and security forces, as many as seven of the 15 Soviet republics would exercise their constitutional right to secede from the U.S.S.R.

But it is not just force of arms that keeps the union whole. The central government has deliberately pursued a policy of relative permissiveness toward Islamic culture, which unites about 43 million Soviet citizens, nearly one-sixth of the total population. Since Lenin's time, the Kremlin has been sensitive to the danger that heavyhanded atheistic propaganda and cultural repression might trigger a replay of the 1916 Muslim revolts that broke out against the Tsar in Central Asia. With Islamic militancy embroiling the Soviet Union's southern neighbors, from Turkey to Pakistan, the Kremlin leadership is treading carefully lest it stir up restlessness among its own Muslims.

Officials insist that Marxism-Leninism respects the separation of mosque and state. Religion, they say, must be given a chance to die a natural death; they will do nothing to hurry it along. Nonetheless, Khelyam Khudaiberdiyev, an official of Uzbekistan's radio and television station in Tashkent, insists that "only one in 100 of us is a practicing believer." In a big family, there might be an old aunt who will still pray. My mother prays, for instance. She's 80." Salyk Zimanov, a member of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan, sums up the official view, with its overtones of condescension: "Religion seems to exercise its strongest influence at funerals. That's when these people who call themselves mullahs turn out."

Zimanov may miss the point of his own observation: a cultural or spiritual force that is strongest in society when people deal with death is not necessarily a dying force. Perhaps the contrary. In Central Asia, local authorities have tried to give military funerals to soldiers killed in action against the Afghan rebels; on

"There are no reliable figures on religious observance in the U.S.S.R., but in their own propaganda pamphlets, printed in Arabic for distribution in Islamic countries of the Middle East, Soviet authorities claim that more than half of the country's Muslims are believers. That statistic may be an exaggeration, intended to enhance the Soviet claims of religious tolerance, but the percentage of practicing Muslims is certainly many times greater than 1%.



A phalanx of humming generators in a hydroelectric plant in Bratsk, Siberia
An advanced, and still advancing, society of human and natural richness.

EUROPE

Union soviétique

Les difficultés du ravitaillement provoquent des manifestations de mécontentement

De notre correspondant

Moscou. — Des rumeurs de grèves dans deux des principales usines automobiles d'U.R.S.S. ont été accueillies avec prudence par les observateurs et sans surprise par les nombreux Soviétiques, rapidement mis au courant par les émissions des radios étrangères. En effet, ces bruits n'ont pas pu être confirmés par des témoins directs, et les précisions qui sont données par des sources généralement bien informées sont souvent contradictoires. Mais, d'un autre côté, personne ne s'étonne que le mauvais ravitaillement provoque des manifestations de mécontentement.

Que s'est-il passé exactement à Togliattigrad et à Gorki, au début du mois de mai ? Selon des informations révélées par le *Financial Times* (le Monde du 14 juin), les ouvriers de l'usine automobile VAZ (Volga avto zavod), qui produit sept cent mille véhicules par an, soit 55% de la fabrication soviétique, auraient cessé le travail le 6 mai, pendant vingt-quatre heures, pour protester contre la pénurie persistante de viande et de produits laitiers. Selon d'autres sources, le débrayage aurait eu lieu fin avril, ou tout au début de mai, et aurait touché soixante-dix mille ouvriers sur les cent mille qui travaillent à la VAZ. Mais c'était peut-être un mouvement de solidarité avec les conducteurs d'autobus urbains qui protestaient contre un alourdissement de leur charge de travail. Tout serait rentré dans l'ordre après que les autorités eurent satisfait les revendications des conducteurs. Une délégation d'hommes d'affaires français qui a séjourné la semaine dernière à Togliattigrad n'a cependant entendu parler d'aucune grève.

Selon un des animateurs des syndicats libres, une grève des conducteurs d'autobus aurait déjà eu lieu en octobre 1979, dans la même ville. L'usine VAZ de Togliattigrad, qui a pris en 1964 le nom de l'ancien dirigeant du parti communiste italien, a été construite avec l'aide de Fiat et elle produit essentiellement des modèles dérivés de la Fiat-124, vendus en Occident sous la marque Lada. Elle fabrique aussi une voiture tout terrain qui a été introduite il y

a un peu plus d'un an sur le marché européen sous le nom de Niva. Ces automobiles sont très recherchées par les citoyens soviétiques qui doivent attendre plusieurs années par les citoyens soviétiques, qui les payent trois fois plus cher que leur prix de revient.

Des tracts à Gorki

A Gorki, le mouvement aurait touché les deux cent mille ouvriers de l'usine GAZ (Gorskiy avto zavod), qui produit des voitures particulières Volga et des camions. Il aurait duré deux jours, également au début de mai. Deux mille tracts manuscrits auraient été distribués en ville. Les grévistes protestaient, selon certaines sources, contre le mauvais approvisionnement : selon d'autres, contre le fait que des logements neufs destinés à des employés de l'usine auraient été attribués à des gens chassés de Moscou à l'occasion des Jeux olympiques.

Mme Helena Bonner, épouse de l'académicien Sakharov, qui est assigné à résidence à Gorki depuis le 22 janvier dernier, n'a pas entendu parler de ce mouvement alors qu'elle se trouvait à Gorki pendant la période incriminée. Elle a cependant confirmé la pénurie chronique de nombreux produits dont les habitants de la ville souffriraient depuis bientôt cinq ans.

Bien que le droit de grève ne soit pas inscrit dans la Constitution de l'U.R.S.S., les arrêts de travail comme forme d'expression de mécontentement, pour être exceptionnels, ne sont pas totalement inconnus. Sans remonter à la fin de l'époque khrouchtchévienne, où le soulèvement de la ville de Novotcherkassk, près de Rostov-sur-le-Don, fut noyé dans le sang en 1964, des grèves ont été signalées au cours des cinq dernières années dans le port de Riga, capitale de la Lettonie, et à Toula, ville industrielle au sud de Moscou. Au début de 1977, les ouvriers de Toula protestaient déjà contre le mauvais approvisionnement. M. Brejnev s'était rendu alors à Toula, à laquelle il avait remis

le titre de ville héros pour son attitude pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale (les villes soviétiques sont classées pour l'approvisionnement selon un ordre strict : après Moscou et Leningrad viennent les autres villes héros puis les capitales des républiques fédérées).

Cette année encore, les magasins d'alimentation sont vides dans la plupart des grandes villes. A Moscou même, qui jouit pourtant d'une situation privilégiée, chacun se plaint de ne pouvoir trouver qu'avec peine les produits les plus essentiels à la vie de tous les jours, et plus d'un million de personnes viennent quotidiennement des villes de la grande couronne (jusqu'à 250 ou 300 kilomètres) se ravitailler dans la capitale, où il n'y a pourtant guère de fruits et légumes. Sur les marchés kholkoziens les prix s'envolent — 10 roubles le kilo de fraises, 10 roubles le kilo de tomates et jusqu'à 3 roubles le kilo de pommes de terre nouvelles (1).

Dans les entreprises, les salariés, selon leur place dans la hiérarchie et les résultats de leur travail, reçoivent régulièrement des « colis » de produits alimentaires, mais il n'est pas exclu que ces rations supplémentaires aient été également réduites. En effet, l'année dernière, le plan n'a pas été réalisé pour la production de viande, de charcuterie, de produits laitiers, de conserves de poisson, etc. Au cours du premier trimestre, la production agricole a à peine augmenté et elle a même diminué en ce qui concerne le lait. Aux difficultés générales et chroniques de l'agriculture soviétique s'ajouteraient les effets de l'embargo américain sur les céréales et ceux des stocks que les autorités auraient faits pour pouvoir nourrir les touristes des Jeux olympiques. Mais on peut se demander si, en faisant courir ce bruit dans la population, on n'a pas trouvé un bouc émissaire facile pour une situation dont les causes sont beaucoup plus profondes et qui ne disparaîtra certainement pas après la cérémonie de clôture des Jeux olympiques.

DANIEL VERNET.

(1) 1 rouble = 6,50 F au cours officiel.

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Few Soviets accept Solzhenitsyn's messianic vision of a Russia straining against its chains, yearning for some spiritual revolution that will throw off Communist rule and replace it

most Soviet citizens submissive. As a consequence of the U.S.S.R.'s current social and economic ills, there is even a certain amount of popular sentiment that the leadership is not cracking down hard enough.

RIGELD

Most Equal of the Equals

The political system that eventually will choose Leonid Brezhnev's successor as leader would appear to be a model democracy. It is headed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., which is composed of 1,500 members and which elects a select body of 39 representatives known as the Presidium. In fact, political power rests with a gigantic, self-protecting and self-selecting bureaucracy that is effectively controlled by a small and cautious elite.

The constitution adopted in 1977—the fourth in the history of the U.S.S.R.—was the first to assert the primacy of the Communist Party in Soviet government and life. The country's only legal party is identified as the "nucleus" of the system and its sole authority on ideology. To maintain control, the party tightly restricts its membership: a candidate must have been a member of Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, be recommended by three people who have each been members for three years, and pass other screening procedures, including serving a year on probation. Of the 193 million citizens who were 18 and older in 1979, only 16 million, or 9%, were party members. (In Khrushchev's day the figure was 6%.) Except for a few scientific administrators, virtually every responsible official in

the Soviet government is a party member. Although it is impossible to separate party from government, one point is clear: the party makes policy.

At the top of the party pyramid is the Central Committee, whose 287 members include the most powerful individuals in the nation. Fourteen of the most equal among the equals on the Central Committee constitute the policy-setting Politburo, which has been carefully controlled for most of the past 16 years by Brezhnev and his circle.

The Central Committee chooses the General Secretary of the Communist Party, the most powerful position in the nation. The authority of the office that Brezhnev now holds is not defined by the constitution, nor is its term. Stalin, who never held the presidency, was a dictator from 1929 until he died in 1953; Khrushchev was largely able to run things his way until he made a number of blunders (harming Soviet agriculture, widening the split with China) and the Central Committee threw him out. Brezhnev has relied on a coterie of allies and exercised his power much more discreetly.

Decisions of the Politburo are, in effect, adopted and carried out by an elaborate system of local, regional and national governments whose apex is the

Supreme Soviet, an elected parliament. This body consists of the Soviet of the Union, composed of 750 members, each of whom represents a district of about 350,000; and the Soviet of the Nationalities, also composed of 750 members, including 32 from each of the 15 republics. The Supreme Soviet, which meets twice a year in the Kremlin, can raise and debate issues, and hence may affect the decisions of the Central Committee. Officials claim that the general attitudes of a newly elected Supreme Soviet sometimes influence the Politburo. But the legislators would never advocate a position known to be at variance with the views of the leadership. Indeed, members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet often also belong to the Central Committee.

The Soviet masses who are not party members can work through local organizations, such as trade "unions" and newspapers, to influence policy; but these too are controlled by the party. The Supreme Soviet is elected every five years; there is just one slate of candidates: the party's. In March 1979, when the Supreme Soviet was last chosen, 99.99% of the eligible voters were said to have cast their ballots. TASS, the Soviet news agency, declared: "By their unanimous voting for the candidates, the Soviet people expressed complete support for the domestic and foreign policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet state."

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The electric car's long haul from lab to road

NEW YORK

Progress towards the battery-powered car—which had been inching along at an expensive and disheartening crawl—has suddenly spurted forward a couple of important yards. Engineers at Gulf + Western Industries, the New York-based conglomerate, last week took the wraps off the results of its eight-year energy-storage programme. Revealed: a battery based on liquefied zinc and chlorine that allegedly never wears out, is less than a third the weight of a conventional (lead-acid) battery but packs power enough to propel an electric car at least twice as far and at half the cost.

Do not expect to buy one tomorrow, however. American motorists are unlikely to be offered battery cars before 1985. The same goes for ordinary motorists in Britain, even though it already has more battery-powered vehicles than the rest of the world put together.

Some 40,000 electric vans have been delivering milk and merchandise around British cities with little noise and no smell for over 30 years. Their trudging stop-start driving habits—on routes never far from central depots—are ideally matched to the characteristics of the simple electric motor and conventional lead-acid battery. But with a top speed of less than 30 mph and a range of only 25 miles or so, they are hardly practical alternatives to petrol-powered vehicles. Hence the hunt for more efficient electric motors, more advanced electronic control systems and, above all, for much better batteries.

A couple of dozen different battery types have been carefully examined over the past decade—most have now been ditched. The search has narrowed to a handful of the more promising. They

include the following:

● **Nickel-iron** batteries date back to Thomas Edison. Advantages: they have the longest life of any known rechargeable battery, withstanding well over 1,500 recharging cycles without breaking. Snags: they are even less efficient at storing electricity than lead-acid batteries; they give off a lot of hydrogen when being charged, and they need a cooling system. So they are expensive (see table).

● **Nickel-zinc** systems store a much bigger charge and promise to be as cheap as conventional batteries. Their big problem has always been recharging. One trick being used to extend their recharging lives is to vibrate them continuously. General Motors, which intends to be the first major manufacturer of electric cars, is backing the nickel-zinc battery. But it is alone in doing so.

● **Metal-air** arrangements offer lightness and good energy density. The two favourite varieties at the moment are iron-air and zinc-air. But both are limited in terms of the peak power they can deliver. Peak power is needed for climbing hills and for acceleration. A more distant, but intriguing, prospect uses aluminium-air.

● **Sodium-sulphur** systems (along with other "hot" batteries) could still prove to be the ultimate of batteries. Ford in America and British Rail and the Electricity Council in Britain have pioneered the sodium-sulphur cell. General Motors has developed a lithium-iron sulphide cell. But both types of cell work only at temperatures above 350°C. So formidable technical hurdles remain.

● **Zinc-chlorine** batteries have always looked attractive because they offer long life as well as exceptional energy storage.

Their drawback has been the difficulty of storing the chlorine gas safely and cheaply. Chlorine gas is lethal even in small (parts per thousand) concentrations; in non-lethal quantities, it can cause blindness. Gulf + Western claim to have licked these problems by making its system air-tight and by using a solid hydrate form of chlorine instead of a gas.

Gulf + Western has installed its zinc-chlorine system in an ordinary Volkswagen Rabbit (called a Golf in Europe) and a couple of Japanese light vans. The vehicles have been getting over 150 miles per charge when driven at 55 mph. When driven more slowly, they go even farther. A four-passenger car is in the process of being built. It is expected to get at least 200 miles per charge.

One of the best things about the zinc-chlorine battery is its ability to deliver its rated power for 95% of its discharge cycle. (Lead-acid batteries are down to nearly half their power by the time they are half drained.) Gulf + Western says a full recharge takes six to eight hours. But if the vehicle has been driven for, say, just 50 miles, recharging takes only a couple of hours. The battery has withstood over 1,400 recharging cycles, supposedly the equivalent of 200,000 miles of motoring. Few conventional car components would last half that long.

"Tanking up" the electric Volkswagen costs 46 cents per "electric gallon" compared with \$1.30 per gallon of petrol. (The calculation assumes the car does the equivalent of 20 mpg, with electricity costing 4.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.) To buy something like the electric Volkswagen would cost around \$8,500, reckons Gulf + Western. But if the car were especially designed for the zinc-chlorine battery pack, the firm believes it could sell for \$6,500 (at today's prices).

American motor manufacturers would like to start selling electric cars as soon as possible. Each electric car they sell will carry a bonus (worth 185 mpg) to help them offset the below-average fuel economy from their bigger but more profitable gas-guzzling cars. (By law, American motor manufacturers have to meet an increasingly tough average fuel economy figure for the cars they sell; the average set for this year is 20 mpg, rising to 27.5 mpg by 1985.)

Purdue University consultants reckon that 120,000 electric vehicles could well be on the roads of America by 1985, 1.3m

Battery options compared

Battery	Energy (Watt-hours/kg)	Life (recharging cycles)	Cost (\$/kilowatt hour)
Lead-acid	25-50*	700	80
Nickel-iron	40-60*	1,500	120*
Nickel-zinc	70-90*	300	50*
Metal-air	80-120*	300	80*
Zinc-chlorine	65-165*	1,400	30*
Sodium-sulphur	90-170*	200	40*

Source: Department of Energy, Washington, DC; *projected values

particularly since Soviet law allows for compulsory commitment by the courts when the accused has been classified as mentally ill. Indeed, the proceeding may be held without the dissident because he is considered too sick to attend. Thus, as Reich says, "dissenting views are pronounced the sick products of sick minds."

Roughly 1,000 dissidents have been misdiagnosed as latent or active schizophrenics and confined to mental institutions. After the World Psychiatric Association condemned the Soviet Union's psychiatry in 1977 for its political abuses, many Western doctors believed that the Kremlin would find less embarrassing ways of dealing with dissenters. They were apparently wrong. Amnesty International reports that incarceration of political dissenters as mental patients is just as prevalent as ever in the Soviet Union, and may even be increasing.

The politicization of psychiatry has in fact produced a kind of schizophrenia of the profession itself. As Bukovsky points out: "It is not easy for the ordinary person to get admitted for treatment in a psychiatric hospital. For a political case, though, it is very easy. They are taken to a hospital without making any request."

TIME, JUNE 23, 1980

LE MONDE DES LIVRES

histoire

Sept mille ans

« Nous sommes dans une phase de retour aux empires », nous déclare Maurice Duverger.

Le Concept d'empire, ouvrage collectif, est la première pierre, déjà volumineuse, d'un projet plus vaste du Centre d'analyse comparative des systèmes politiques, fondé en 1974 par Maurice Duverger, Georges Duby et Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, et devenu en 1978 laboratoire associé au Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Maurice Duverger expose ici la nature de ce projet et le caractère de ce premier ouvrage, dans lequel la science politique se promène de la Mésopotamie antique à l'Empire britannique, de Rome à Moscou, du système mongol à la double monarchie austro-hongroise. Puis il élargit sa réflexion au monde contemporain.

« Quel est le but du Centre d'analyse comparative des systèmes politiques ? »

— La recherche en sciences politiques a un défaut considérable : elle concerne essentiellement l'époque contemporaine. Elle se développe « à plat ». On a jusqu'à présent surtout essayé d'étudier en détail certains aspects des sociétés modernes, sans utiliser ce formidable réservoir de faits qu'est l'histoire. Le problème, si l'on veut utiliser les données du passé, c'est d'apprendre aux historiens à poser des

la plupart des empires ont voulu se concevoir comme *totalité*, ont rêvé de s'étendre au monde entier ; des empires assyriens où le souverain s'appelait « roi de la *totalité* », jusqu'à Gengis Khan, « roi jusqu'à la mer », c'est-à-dire jusqu'à la limite du monde.

« Tous ^{ont eu tendance} à considérer ce qui leur était extérieur comme inférieur, comme barbare dans le cas de Rome. Pour les Égyptiens, leur monde était ordre, l'extérieur chaos. Mais simultanément, quand un empire constatait qu'il ne pouvait pas conquérir les autres, il essayait de s'isoler. Et c'est le phénomène du mur : mur d'Hadrien, muraille de Chine...

Le retour aux empires ?

— Y a-t-il un rapport entre le mur d'Hadrien et le mur de Berlin ?

— C'est tout à fait différent, quoique nous voyons peut-être aujourd'hui dans une phase de retour aux empires. Au fond, les deux Grands en sont. L'empire soviétique s'étend sur une partie du monde, l'empire américain aussi et l'on pourrait parfaitement lui appliquer les concepts romains. Quant au mur de Berlin, ce n'est pas simplement une frontière. C'est une limite entre deux ordres, phénomène plus rare.

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A Roma convegno sulla psichiatria come repressione in Urss

«Lei è pazzo, ha la mania delle riforme»

ROMA. I problemi connessi con il coinvolgimento della psichiatria tra i mezzi correnti nella lotta contro l'opposizione politica, già dibattuti in vari congressi internazionali, sono stati discussi sabato, nel corso di un convegno di studi su «Uso politico della psichiatria - formazione del consenso e repressione del dissenso». Alla riunione, svoltasi con il patrocinio di Amnesty International e della Società italiana di psichiatria, nell'aula Brasca del Policlinico Gemelli, hanno partecipato sette autorevoli organizzazioni, tra le quali la Cattedra di Clinica psichiatrica dell'Università cattolica, l'Associazione dei medici cattolici italiani, il Centro Russia ecumenica e l'Unione dei giuristi cattolici italiani.

Tra gli interventi, dedicati in gran parte alle condizioni attuali dell'Unione Sovietica, è stata di particolare efficacia la testimonianza di Leonid Pijusc, il matematico liberato nel 1976 dal manicomio criminale di Dnepropetrovsk e re-

sidente a Parigi. È chiaro, egli spiega, che sia l'internamento coatto dei dissidenti sia la «cura» e il rilascio, dipendono completamente dal Kgb (la polizia segreta).

Tipico anche il caso di Plichotnjuk, che, interrogato nel manicomio di Dnepropetrovsk da agenti del Kgb circa una radio clandestina ucraina, tentò di eludere la risposta adducendo la propria «pazzia»: «Non fa nulla — si senti rispondere — le faremo fare una nuova perizia, e dopo i Giochi Olimpici sarà liberato». Pijusc stesso ricevette tre diagnosi: poiché a Kiev lo avevano dichiarato psicopatico, e quindi non giudicabile, fu mandato a Mosca all'Istituto di medicina legale Serbskij, dove lo trovarono prima affetto da mania delle riforme, poi da quella del messianesimo, dedotta da un suo diario, nel quale, a 18 anni, aveva scritto: «Vorrei risolvere la matematica». Durante il viaggio a Dnepropetrovsk, Pijusc conobbe alcuni criminali comuni, che aveva-

no simulato malattie mentali per non essere e riposare un po' in manicomio, credendo che, come ai tempi di Stalin, si trattasse realmente di un ospedale.

Il giorno successivo all'internamento a Dnepropetrovsk, questi criminali che provenivano da terribili lager, pur di sfuggire ad un luogo ancora peggiore, confessarono il loro inganno. Per piegare il dissidente, proseguì Pijusc, nel manicomio si fa pesare «la minaccia di una psicosi familiare» che potrebbe colpire non solo i figli, ma anche la moglie, e quindi esporti a loro volta al rischio dell'internamento coatto. La cosa più grave, secondo Pijusc, è che il sistema dei manicomio speciali si vede estendendo: «Negli ultimi otto anni, su 10 sono diventati 15, con circa mille internati, mentre altri mille sono detenuti nei manicomio comuni». Per facilitare gli internamenti dei dissidenti in occasione di visite nell'Urss di personaggi ufficiali dall'estero, le formalità si

sono semplificate: ora basta il certificato di uno psichiatra e l'azione della milizia (polizia).

Un altro testimone russo è Evghenij Vaghin, arrestato a Leningrado nel 1967 insieme con Igor Ogurcov per aver fondato l'Unione socialcristiana panrusa per la liberazione del popolo, ed espatriato in Occidente dopo otto anni di lager. Nel suo intervento su «Conformismo e dissenso in un'antropologia esaurita nel sociale», Vaghin, che insegna letteratura russa all'università di Venezia, ha posto in rilievo come «nel modello dell'uomo sovietico l'aspetto spirituale venga messo in disparte, poiché è negata l'esistenza di valori sovrapersonali. L'aspetto naturale è sostanzialmente travisato... Sono duramente criticate la psicoanalisi e la psicologia del profondo. L'aspetto sociale viene ingannato a dismisura, così che la persona appare un simbolo sociale».

Lia Wainstein

down the budget... 242 to 141. Only 97 Democrats voted for it; 146 turned thumbs down. Republicans also voted against it, 96 to 44, in part because some believed there was no point in helping Democrats to produce a supposedly balanced budget that the Democrats could then brag about during the campaign. But the Republicans made the confusion total by slipping through a motion—passed after many Democrats had left the chamber—instructing the House delegates to a new conference to hold out for exactly the increase in military spending that had just been rejected.

The new conference will have to patch together some kind of further compromise. Meanwhile, the budget quarrel is delaying an extension of the time during which the Government can exceed the statutory ceiling on the national debt, needed soon if the Government is to continue paying its bills. At week's end the fractious Congress voted for an extension, but only for five days.

Nixon believes that ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been engaged in an undeclared Third World War with the Soviet Union, and we are losing it. The Soviets are relying on a grand strategy to undermine the West. He quotes Leonid Brezhnev telling Somali President Siyad Barre: "Our aim is to gain control of the two great treasure houses on which the West depends—the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."

The primary purpose of American foreign policy, writes Nixon, should be to prevent this from happening. All other causes are secondary: arms negotiations, relations with less developed nations, enforcing "human rights" around the globe. Nixon has Machiavellian contempt for people who find excuses for Soviet aggression, like those who justify the invasion of Afghanistan on

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Carter's objection got a quick response from House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, who had reluctantly endorsed the committee compromise and then joined in opposing it. "I kind of vacillated a bit myself," he said. New York's hawkish Democrat Samuel Stratton, on the other hand, summoned the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify before his House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations on Thursday morning, just before the scheduled floor vote. The chiefs usually support a President's budget recommendations publicly, whatever their private reservations. But this time they agreed—not very reluctantly—that they need and could use all the money the conference committee wants to give them.

Nonetheless, Carter got the liberal Democratic support that he had encouraged. On Thursday night the House voted

The Real Nixon

He writes a primer on power

In case anyone is still searching for the real Richard Nixon, he may be found in the former President's latest book: *The Real War* (Warner Books; 341 pages; \$12.50). This impassioned call to arms expresses Nixon's combative view of the world. In his way, Nixon has updated Machiavelli's *The Prince* and written a primer for power politics. "World leadership," he warns, "requires something in many ways alien to the American cast of mind. It requires placing limits on idealism, compromising with reality, at times matching duplicity with duplicity, and even brutality with brutality."

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Theo Sommer

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WILTED DREAMS

The calendar is an arbitrary thing. Years, even decades, are rarely the clearly definable benchmarks, the neatly cut slices of history that journalists or their lead-footed colleagues, the professors, portray them to be: "The year doth nothing else but open and shut," said George Herbert in his compendium of outlandish proverbs. What significance attaches to a particular year is rarely revealed to the contemporary observer. We register the dramatic flare-ups, yet the geological changes underfoot often escape our notice. We revel in linear extrapolations of existing trends, but we are inclined to forget that every trend begets its own countertrend, every vision its revision. We cling to a tawdry belief in the calculability of events, yet deep down we know that it is the incalculable, the imponderable and the unforeseeable that rule the course of history. With all these caveats, what might the significance of world events in 1979 be? What is the hidden pattern of change and progress? What is the drift of human affairs?

One outstanding feature of the year was the bouncy re-emergence of the United States as an assertive superpower, one not meekly suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, but once again actively defending its interests and trying to give direction to events. The Vietnam trauma that had scarred a whole generation of Washington's policymakers, and scared them into adopting as small a silhouette as that of a hedgehog run over by a steamroller, was suddenly over. It was bound to happen one day. No one familiar with Frank Klingberg's 1951 theorem about historical alternation of moods in American foreign policy could ever suffer any illusions on that score. According to Klingberg's fascinating theory, periods of introversion (average duration: 21 years) cyclically alternate with periods of extroversion (average duration: 27 years). The phase of withdrawal from the world started in 1967; renewed involvement was not, in keeping with the theory, to be expected before 1988. But the new assertiveness reared its head much earlier, rather incongruously under President Carter. It was made respectable, no doubt, by what many Americans perceive as Russia's "geopolitical advance" in recent years, and probably made inevitable once the Ayatollah Khomeini started pushing the United States around.

This leads straight to the second salient event of 1979: the revolt of Shiite fundamentalism against what seemed to be the dominant tide of the past hundred years—the relentless, all-encompassing and all-devouring Westernization of the world. Westernization in this case means the industrialization, secularization and demystification of life, the destruction of traditional patterns of society and the liberalization of ancestral norms and values to the point of outright permissiveness—in short, modernization. The ayatollah's defiance highlights a resentment against two centuries of Western cultural overlordship that is fairly widespread throughout the Muslim world, but not confined to it

by any means. Many in the problem-ridden young states of Africa and Asia share Khomeini's revulsion. It is fueled by the screaming inequities of modernization in most developing countries: the plight of the lowly caused by the decline of agriculture and the cancerous growth of ungovernable big cities; the pauperization of the middle class by rampant inflation; the corruption of the upper class by foreign ways of life. This spiritual revolt against the West and all it stands for is bound to fan the North-South confrontation which has long been looming on the horizon of the '80s. The have-nots are clamoring more loudly for a share in the wealth of the industrial world, and the Lords of Oil—greedy so long as they revere free enterprise, revengeful as they fall prey to Islamic revivalism—are turning the thumbscrews tighter.

The third big event of 1979, one which gives rise to dire fears about the near future, is the minefield of disarmament and arms control. To be sure, Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed

SALT II in Vienna, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations continue, albeit in a fruitless routine, and talks about reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe are high on the agenda for 1980. But the fact is that the disarmament effort is dwarfed by formidable new arms spending in the United States, in the Soviet Union,

in Europe. Everywhere, arms-control talks have become the excuse for defense-budget increases. At the same time, the philosophical premises of the delicate balance of terror have again come under attack—by Henry Kissinger, for example. The eventual demise of "extended deterrence" could not but trigger an additional shopping spree for military hardware, quite apart from a dangerously destabilizing scramble for reliable cover.

Consolation, anyone? It sounds trite enough. One cannot trim all problems or subdue all passions. History is process, never steady state. Although there may be advances, there will never be perfection. Conversely, while regression cannot be ruled out, catastrophe is certainly not inevitable. In the fullness of time, the new orientations will call forth countervailing tendencies and forces capable of stopping the mad rush to disaster. Let's hope so, at least.

During the '70s many a beautiful dream died. We lost the hope of a world guided by notions of meekness, not by naked interest; for a less troubled relationship between the industrial democracies of the North and the developing nations in the South; for an easing of the armaments burden and an end to the arms race. The dreams wilted, the hopes withered. Heinrich Heine's line seems pertinent: "Gone is the world that was kind to us." We might as well brace ourselves for a rough passage. The future, as we stand on the threshold of the '80s, looks bleaker than it did ten years ago.

Theo Sommer is editor-in-chief of Die Zeit

We cling to a tawdry belief in the calculability of events, yet deep down we know that the incalculable and the unforeseeable rule the course of history.

mai un se parvati... s'er hoto a... p'ndu... Poth... NEWSWEEK/JANUARY 7, 1980

Nonna
 non al massimo livello per non urtare la suscettibilità dell'elettorato eurocomunista. Ma Pajetta ormai sembra deciso a rendere anche più chiara la sua protesta per l'assenza parziale dell'Italia e oggi andrà al villaggio olimpico per incontrare gli atleti nostri.

Il conto finale vede dunque 81 Paesi presenti, contando anche Portorico che nazione non è. 14 presenti con vergogna e senza bandiera, 60 assenti per ragioni varie, dal disconoscimento del trattato (Usa, Germania, Cina, Giappone, Canada, Kenya, Norvegia ecc...) al mancato arrivo per ragioni meno chiare. Alla TV sovietica, che ha trasmesso tutto in diretta, il commentatore ha spiegato che alcune nazioni sono

Ingresso «boccia» Carter alla supertassa su benzina

TON — Il Congresso bocciò la supertassa su benzina voluta da Carter: la schiacciata con le mani e con i piedi. Per tutti i dubbi anche tutte e due i rami della Usa sono decisi a schiacciare il veto che già annunciarono in un disperato tentativo di una nuova riforma politica di rinvio dei prezzi da lui voluta.

Le votazioni politiche appaiono già per scontate e definite la

La sconfitta della politica energetica del governo di Washington.

Le votazioni che hanno respinto la supertassa di 10 cents (85 lire) su ogni gallone di benzina hanno avuto luogo mercoledì, ma sono state comunicate in forma ufficiale alla Casa Bianca ieri dopo che il Congresso ha rapidamente superato gli ultimi ostacoli procedurali. Mercoledì il voto è stato di 376 contro e di 210 a favore della supertassa. Camera dei rappresentanti e di 73 contro 16 a favore al Senato.

Se Carter insiste nel porre il veto sarà il primo presiden-

te democratico a vedere respinto il proprio veto in quasi 30 anni da quando, cioè, nel 1962, il Congresso approvò una legge sull'immigrazione contro la volontà di Harry Truman.

"Taglio" alla Opel di 4000 dipendenti

BONN — La Opel, del gruppo General Motors, ha annunciato che intende ridurre le maestranze dello stabilimento di Rueselsheim di 4000 unità dalle attuali 41.600. In totale la Opel impiega 66.500 persone.

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ha animato l'atmosfera più turistica che politica dell'incontro parmensino.

Dal punto di vista formale i dati del '78-80 sono ancora previsionali. Ma la campagna di commercializzazione si chiude in tutto il mondo in luglio-agosto. I contratti sono già sottoscritti e le ultime navi caricano nei porti. Più che di previsioni si può dunque parlare ormai di consuntivi. Ed eccone i risultati come sono stati calcolati nel corso di una riunione dei maggiori paesi esportatori svoltasi due settimane fa a Bruxelles in gran segreto.

L'Unione Sovietica è riuscita ad importare nella campagna ormai agli sgoccioli ben 31 milioni di tonnellate di cereali coprendo interamente il suo fabbisogno. Si tratta di una cifra record alla quale si può avvicinare solo quella del '75-76 quando però Mosca importò 25,9 milioni di tonnellate, cioè quasi cinque in meno di quest'anno. Il Canada, riso-

gli uomini di Washington hanno potuto insistere in maniera convincente, visto che la forzatura dell'embargo è passata soprattutto attraverso l'attività incontrollabile delle multinazionali americane del settore, dalla Continentale Grain (nella quale hanno una presenza gli eredi di Ferruzzi) a Cargill, a Bunge, a Dreyfus, a Cook che hanno fatto tutte affari d'oro.

In mancanza di argomenti convincenti i funzionari di Washington hanno dovuto fare buon viso a cattiva sorte: hanno dovuto digerire (un po' a fatica) l'annuncio che la Cee aprirà con due mesi di anticipo (invece che a settembre) le tradizionali annuali per le esportazioni reali senza escludere l'Unione Sovietica e si sono solati accettare la Commissione fine dell'anno.

razzole non potendo confutare il fatto che dagli USA — destinazione Mosca — sono partiti 15,4 milioni di tonnellate di grano, mentre il presidente Carter aveva pubblicamente assicurato che all'Unione Sovietica, almeno per quest'anno, non sarebbero state vendute più di otto milioni di tonnellate di cereali.

Sotto accusa sono state messe alcune multinazionali — dalla «Dreyfus» alla «Continental Grain» alla «Cargill» alla «Bunge» — che, per aggirare l'embargo, avrebbero tentato il cosiddetto «triangolo» che triangolare passando attraverso il Canada, l'Australia o l'Argentina prima

di tornare in Europa.

the end of March, the midpoint in fiscal 1980, the four services had 2,032,000 men and women volunteers in uniform, 96% of the Pentagon's objective. Even more encouraging have been the recruiting results for the first half of the fiscal year. The Pentagon achieved 99% of its goals, with 91% last year.

But the loss is a good thing, hardly reason for this sudden upswing in the economy's downturn. Said Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Pige Jr. at TIME's seminar: "There is no question about the fact that the growing unemployment helps recruiting. Our senior Pentagon official put it less delicately: "If the economy could hold, we could be in fat city."

Though the Pentagon's recruiting its quota of numbers in the ranks, there is a broad consensus in Congress and the Pentagon that the members of today's armed forces do not match those of the day before the volunteer force. The education level of recruits has been dropping as the services strain to meet recruiting quotas. While 68% of the enlistees without military service had high school diplomas in the first half of fiscal 1979, only 58% do. Although some combat officers argue persuasively that a ninth-grade dropout may still make a good soldier, top military leaders to-

de la France

tection des réfugiés et des apatrides, recense quinze mille personnes ayant un statut de réfugiés politiques d'origine russe ou soviétique. Si l'on décompte les quelques centaines de princes déchués qui sentimentalement, ont souhaité garder leur statut depuis 1918 et n'ont pas demandé la nationalité française, et l'on décompte ceux de la deuxième vague (les enfants sont français, les parents pas toujours), on évalue le nombre de réfugiés politiques depuis 1968 à cinq mille environ. Il faut ajouter à cela ceux qui n'ont pas de statut de réfugié politique, c'est-à-dire ceux qui ont épousé des Françaises et ont la nationalité française. Certains d'entre eux ont même été obligés de conserver un passeport soviétique par

L. DELWASSE, Les exilés de Moscou, in "Le Monde", 25 sept 1980

problema e ad esprimersi con

Ha 18 mila cellule

Aereo vola a energia solare

LOS ANGELES — Un piccolo aereo ad energia solare è stato perfezionato da Paul MacCready, inventore del Gossamer Albatros che l'anno scorso superò il Canale della Manica, primo aereo a compiere la trasvolata con la sola forza muscolare del pilota. E' pure di MacCready il primo aereo capace di volare con la forza dell'uomo, il Gossamer Condor.

Il nuovo aereo, battezzato Gossamer Penguin, ricava l'energia da 18.000 cellule alineate sulla superficie alare. Ha una apertura d'ali di 22 metri e pesa 31 chili. Può sollevarsi da terra fino a quattro metri e raggiungere i 24 chilometri all'ora di velocità. Ha compiuto una cinquantina di collaudi, guidato dal figlio tredicenne dell'inventore, Marshall, il quale pesa 36 chili, e da una maestrina di 31 anni, Janice Brown, esperta di volo a vela.

Don Doll.

U.S. Inflation Rate Cools; Prices in April Rise 0.9%

WASHINGTON, May 23 (UPI) — The U.S. inflation rate slowed considerably in April with consumer prices rising 0.9 percent as energy costs stabilized and prices for food, clothing and housing grew more moderately, the Labor Department reported today.

The increase for April in the Consumer Price Index — a barometer of the cost of living in the United States — was the smallest in 15 months and followed three consecutive monthly hikes of 1.4 percent.

The rate of inflation, compounded on an annual basis, stood at 11.4 percent in April. This is well below the steady 18.1 percent inflation rate during January, February and March.

The inflation report was an encouraging sign for President Carter, who has promised that rising prices will ease in early summer. Government economists have predicted the inflation rate will drop to 10 percent by year's end.

The administration's chief inflation fighter, Alfred Kahn, was encouraged but cautious.

He told Congress's Joint Eco-

nomics Committee today, "While I'm relieved that we're moving out of double-digit rates — showing that we've stopped or even reversed the almost hysterical fear of inflation — the underlying [inflation] is still there."

But even though inflation eased in April, the real spendable income of a typical American could not keep pace with the cost of living. The Labor Department said spendable income plunged 1.2 percent last month.

The overall retail price index was 242.5 in April, which means \$100 worth of goods 13 years ago cost \$242.50; or, the 1967 dollar is now worth 41.2 cents.

The most encouraging news in the Labor Department report related to energy prices, which had been rising at a phenomenal pace during the first three months of the year.

"Gasoline prices were unchanged in April (after seasonal adjustment)," the Labor Department noted. The transportation index, which includes the price of gasoline, the cost of cars, both new and used, and the cost of public transportation, rose only 0.6 percent — its smallest increase in almost two years.

CHARLESTON (South Carolina) — «Giuriamo indietro le lancette dell'orologio americano per cercare di ritrovare sensazioni e stati d'animo che il passaggio del tempo ha sottratto alla memoria di noi tutti: siamo nel 1929, alla fine dell'estate». Così, all'inizio di «The American Clock», per bocca di uno dei protagonisti, Arthur Miller introduce il tema del suo nuovo lavoro teatrale presentato in prima mondiale allo «Spoleto festival» di Charleston, nella Carolina del Sud.

All'America del 1980 egli propone una «recherche du temp perdu», lacerante ma necessaria, in un passato lontano ormai mezzo secolo, una rievocazione degli anni del crollo a Wall Street e della «Great depression». È un tema a cui gli sviluppi più recenti sembrano aver ridato improvvisamente attualità: i timori di un ritorno degli «Hard times» che la lunga prosperità postbellica aveva dissolto nella psiche degli americani, riaffiorano adesso nel clima di malessere e di incertezza sul futuro economico. Miller nega che siano state queste ragioni contingenti a suggerirgli la scelta del soggetto e tiene a precisare che questa «risale ad un'epoca in cui nulla faceva prevedere le difficoltà attuali. Ho cominciato a lavorare ad un dramma sulla «depression» già nel 1970, da allora l'ho interrotto e poi ripreso varie volte, non mi riusciva di trovare il «filo unificatore», avrà scritto un duemila pagine in questi anni prima di giungere ad una versione soddisfacente».

Nessuna intenzione, quindi, da parte sua, di «fare il profeta di sciagure», di tracciare paralleli tra gli anni Ottanta e gli anni Trenta. La genesi di «The American Clock» ha un motivo diverso e più profondo. «In duecento anni di storia degli Stati Uniti soltanto due eventi hanno avuto il carattere di una vera crisi collettiva, di una esperienza traumatica a cui nessun americano è potuto sfuggire, che ha toccato tutti gli individui, tutti i gruppi, tutte le regioni del Paese: la guerra civile tra Nord e Sud nel secolo scorso, e la «depression» degli anni Trenta. Non vi è nulla che possa paragonarsi ad esse, neppure le due guerre mondiali, neppure il Vietnam. Sono state le due «crisi di fondo» dell'America, che hanno posto in questione e messo alla

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The Kremlin's Siren Song

CLAUDE IMBERT

No matter how much we Europeans criticized American leadership in the past, we never ceased relying on it. So now that the United States appears to be failing in its mission as leader and champion of the European alliance, we are suddenly aware of our own weaknesses vis-à-vis the Soviet Union—politically, economically and, most importantly, strategically. This awareness is heightened since most of us assume that the U.S. failure is not just a temporary problem of mediocre leadership. Realistically, we worry that the United States may not resume its full world role for a decade—if not longer.

In Europe, the prospects of a new relationship with the Soviet Union take several forms. They are all, however, underlined by the fear of a weak Europe compared to an increasingly strong, arrogant and self-assured Soviet Union. We are not yet directly threatened—but we anticipate such a threat. As a result, doom-laden, self-fulfilling prophecies are spreading among growing numbers of Europeans who view the future in fatalistic terms.

Heavy-handed: I don't share this reaction, but I do understand it. The Soviet Union no longer attempts to spread its influence by ideological example, projecting its system as one attractive enough for the rest of the world to follow. The current message is quite different, and it is conveyed with unprecedented heavy-handedness. The Soviet Union now deliberately—and ostentatiously—displays its power. In recent talks with French diplomats, Soviet leaders didn't bother to conceal their new arrogance. Yes, they said, with positively Hitlerian brutality, we moved into Afghanistan. So what? It's no concern of yours what we do there. If you don't like the way we put our feet on the dining-room table, you can always go eat somewhere else.

The Soviets use the same tactics over the question of nuclear weapons in Europe. Never mind about our SS20s, the Kremlin now says. They are not your concern. Just don't put Pershings in Europe. There is no bargaining climate anymore, no more talk of equilibrium—simply a bald assertion of the bully's might.

This behavior is the prelude to a bid for the neutralization of Europe, a long-term Soviet goal. Indeed, we get hints of this

from the utterances of the French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais; his own increasingly blunt, brutal vocabulary mirrors the Soviet Union's change in tactics. And inherent in this change is the probability that, at some point or another, the Soviet Union will up the ante, confronting us with the choice between military conflict or Finlandization.

To say that such a choice would be disquieting is a serious understatement, especially since Soviet behavior has already had a grave impact in Europe. Finlandization may enthrall many Europeans. It is a siren song, because it implies that in almost all respects Europe could carry on its affairs as before. The premise is that the Soviet

The Soviet Union's current bully-boy behavior is the prelude to a bid to neutralize Europe.

Union, given its problems with China and the United States, wants simply to neutralize Europe, not to intervene directly. In these circumstances, I am convinced that a large majority of Europeans might ask: would Finlandization be so catastrophic after all?

This question may be particularly pertinent in West Germany, where I detect some marked changes. Those Germans who used to put their faith in U.S. world leadership no longer believe in the protective U.S. defense umbrella. Those who once taunted me for my Gaullism are becoming caricature Gaullists themselves. As Henry Kissinger once noted, Germans are capable of rapid pendulum mood swings, and this may well be one of them. So far, the change seems to be confined to intellectuals. But the Günter Grass manifesto, in which he accused the United States of heating up international tensions over Afghanistan, is a plea for Finlandization if ever there was one. The manifesto must be seen as a dangerous straw in the wind, especially because of Grass's influence on major political fig-

ures like former Chancellor Willy Brandt.

In France, too, we are not inoculated against the temptation of Finlandization. There are plenty of influential neutralists around, and our foreign policy is already unusually cautious. A number of other forces also urge us to follow this path. Apart from the weight and propaganda of the French Communist Party, there is the prevalence of inflation and unemployment, which means that we are increasingly dependent on East-West trade. We will do anything for a little oxygen, and the Soviet Union knows this full well.

Dissidents: What would the Finlandization of Europe actually entail? Certainly it would mean a greater sensitivity to the Soviet point of view, although the French press, with some exceptions, is already less critical of the Soviets than it should be. Giscard could no longer play an active role in places like Africa, but most French people probably would not care very much. The plight of Soviet dissidents and other victims of totalitarianism would become a cause of the past, but even now we don't listen to Solzhenitsyn the way we once did. We know Solzhenitsyn's message is still valid, but we shy away from the consequences of what he is saying.

For all these reasons, we need to take stock of ourselves before it's too late. We must remember that de Gaulle only took an independent line because he knew that he was, in the last resort, secure within the over-all U.S. defense orbit. When U.S. strategic interests were threatened, as they were over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, de Gaulle was the first to side with the United States. We also need to remember that Finlandization, as it applies to Finland today, is only a moderate form of neutralization because of the existence of a non-neutralized Western Europe.

European fears and apprehensions may well lead to a salutary and unexpected response. Europe is only now becoming conscious of how alone it is. A stretch of solitude is always beneficial if it is used to reflect on ultimate goals and aims—especially if they involve our ultimate spiritual survival.

Claude Imbert is the chief editor of the Paris-based news magazine *Le Point*.

modificabile, mentre la produzione di grano può aumentare dovunque c'è terra nella misura in cui aumenta il suo prezzo.

[Così l'embargo ~~parziale~~ parziale del grano, deciso da Carter contro l'espansionismo sovietico verso il Golfo Persico, non può avere conseguenze simili a quelle del blocco petrolifero ~~dopo il~~ ^{dopo il} Kippur, e forse nemmeno un'efficacia paragonabile. Se, per esempio, la quantità di cereali non venduta ai sovietici per "non nutrire più l'armata rossa" venisse riversata sul mercato, i prezzi subirebbero un crollo rovinando gli agricoltori. Già il semplice timore che in qualche misura questo possa accadere ha provocato una corsa dell'agribusiness americano al ribasso, che ha imposto ~~all'amministrazione~~ ^{all'amministrazione} Carter di sospendere ~~parzialmente~~ le quotazioni sui mercati di Chicago, Kansas City e Minneapolis, per avere il tempo di chiarire come verrà usato il surplus. Si tratta di ^{quasi} 17 milioni di tonnellate ^{di solo} la differenza tra le ~~normali~~ ^{annuali} vendite previste dall'accordo commerciale russo-americano del '75, ossia 8 milioni di tonnellate al massimo senza speciali autorizzazioni del governo di Washington, e i complessivi 25 milioni di tonnellate che Carter aveva concesso per quest'anno ai sovietici.

[Ora una quota del surplus granario sarà venduta alla Cina. A confermare che il grano è un bene strategico, ne ha discusso in questi giorni a Pechino il ministro della difesa Harold Brown. Un'altra quota sarà comprata dal governo federale per soccorrere le nazioni del Terzo Mondo povero, anzitutto il Pakistan. Ancora una quota sarà destinata alla produzione di gasohol, il carburante con alcool ~~derivato~~ ^{derivato} di cereali al 10 per cento. Ma che succederà l'anno prossimo ^{nel Mid-West} fra la "cintura del mais" e la "cintura del frumento"? L'agricoltura americana, che occupa meno del 4 per cento della popolazione attiva e riesce a esportare in un anno per 32 miliardi di dollari, è ormai un'industria di alta tecnologia con giganteschi investimenti, che richiedono mercati giganteschi e non limitati.

[Dalle grandi pianure, dove i silos rigurgitano dopo il quinto raccolto record della storia americana, viene ^{già} l'eco di grandi proteste, amplificate dai megafoni della campagna elettorale. "Tutti noi - avverte il candidato Edward Kennedy - vogliamo un'azione decisa contro i sovietici, ma l'embargo dei cereali non può funzionare. Le truppe sovietiche non lasceranno l'Afghanistan e l'agricoltore americano pagherà il prezzo d'una politica estera debole". Il candidato George Bush corre a proclamare a Des Moines nell'Iowa, lo Stato del mais: "Abbiamo colpito noi stessi più che i sovietici". Bob Dole aggiunge dal

Kansas: "Abbiamo perso non solo vendite per 17 milioni di tonnellate, ma un mercato ~~di~~ ^{dopo} un decennio di lavoro". E Philip Crane conclude dall'Illinois: "Era l'ultima delle cose da fare. Permettere ai russi di spendere i rubli in prodotti alimentari, anziché in armi per il Corno d'Africa o l'Afghanistan, era dopo tutto nell'interesse nazionale".

[Eppure i sovietici, mentre importavano grano, esportavano per l'appunto armi ~~in~~ ^{armate} nel Corno d'Africa ~~e~~ ⁱⁿ nell'Afghanistan. ^E quali altre cose gli americani potevano fare? Non una guerra, non "morire per Kabul". Non potevano, secondo il giudizio di Kissinger, armare la Cina sfidando il massimo pericolo, né armare il Pakistan fino ^{al rischio di} ~~a~~ ^{provocare} un'altra guerra indo-pakistana, o mettersi a distribuire armi "in giro per il mondo". E le sole parole non servono, ^{quando} ~~quando~~ all'ONU i sovietici hanno reso inoperante ogni decisione usando per la centotredicesima volta la loro facoltà di veto. Carter non poteva facilmente sfuggire all'imperativo del ~~non fare~~ ^{"fare} comunque qualcosa, ^{"dinanzi a"} ~~mentre con~~ un'invasione aperta di 80 mila soldati e ~~una~~ una valanga di aerei, elicotteri, carri armati, ~~veniva sottomessa al controllo~~ caduta in cinque anni sotto il controllo sovietico, ^{dopo} ~~lo~~ ^{l'}ottava nazione in cinque anni. Nell'ordine cronologico: ^{l'}Angola, ^{il}Mozambico, ^{l'}Etiopia, ^{il}Benin, ^{il}Yemen del Sud, ^{il}Laos, ^{la}Cambogia, ^{l'}Afghanistan.

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INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune

Published with The New York Times and The Washington Post

Page 4 Saturday-Sunday, May 10-11, 1980

Helping Russia Drill for Oil

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Lenin once said that Western capitalists would sell the Soviet Union the rope with which the Russians would hang the West. He knew that capitalism heads for profits and new markets, leaving politics to the politicians. The founder of the Soviet state was a man of vision, but it is unlikely that the rope he had in mind was oil drilling equipment. Nor could he have foreseen the dilemma facing the West over the sale of such equipment to the Soviet Union in a world of diminishing energy supplies.

The United States has just approved the sale of a drilling rig that will be used for exploration off the coast of Sakhalin Island near Japan. The decision was made despite an embargo on the sale of high-technology equipment to the Russians in response to their invasion of Afghanistan. The rationale for the deal is that CIA and other studies forecast that the Soviet Union will become a net importer of oil sometime during the 1980s. The United States is trying to avoid Soviet competition for Gulf oil.

That might seem reasonable, but other studies contradict the CIA analysis and there are those who suggest that the Soviet Union is playing the disinformation game in an attempt to manipulate the oil market. It also seems paradoxical that the United States, which if not always the Soviet Union's adversary is at least its competitor, would put the

Russians in a position to exploit a critical resource more efficiently. The Soviet Union has plenty of oil in Siberia. It's just hard to get at. Is U.S. drilling technology so advanced that if the Russians invest some of their engineering talent in energy instead of arms they won't be able to duplicate it in five to ten years?

There seems to have been some dispute within the Carter administration over the sale, with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in favor of blocking it to give the United States more leverage over the Soviet Union in the Gulf area. The Commerce Department, presumably, supported it on the ground that what's good for business is good for America. This sale was approved in a one-shot compromise, but the broader conflict has not been resolved. What is U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the field of energy competition? Will helping the Soviet Union extract its own oil keep the Russians from buying in the Gulf? A policy is needed, but it should be farsighted enough to take account of Soviet goals that might transcend what for the moment seems obvious, but could prove ephemeral or wrong. Oil is a strategic material. Any shift in the balance of energy supplies is a shift in the balance of power.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

Handwritten notes:
Lenin once said that Western capitalists would sell the Soviet Union the rope with which the Russians would hang the West. He knew that capitalism heads for profits and new markets, leaving politics to the politicians. The founder of the Soviet state was a man of vision, but it is unlikely that the rope he had in mind was oil drilling equipment. Nor could he have foreseen the dilemma facing the West over the sale of such equipment to the Soviet Union in a world of diminishing energy supplies.

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Message of a Million Afghans

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The State Department now estimates the number of people who have fled Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion five months ago at a million. Most live in camps in Pakistan; more are arriving every day. Iran has received at least 100,000.

One million people represent about 7 percent of Afghanistan's entire population. That would be equivalent to 700,000 Cuban refugees. Or to 15 million Americans. Who can imagine an exodus of 15 million Americans?

The flood of Afghans is an irrefutable

commentary on the Soviet invasion. Whatever the pretext that is offered, either by Moscow or by the Kremlin's puppets in Kabul, the displacement of so many people can only be considered brutal. Even if the Russians have no designs on the Gulf, even if they plan to pull out their troops someday soon — which seems unlikely — there would still be those million people driven into exile. Even in a world inured to refugees, they are ghastly evidence of injustice and suffering.

THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Le nouveau glacis soviétique

par RENÉ DABERNAT

Info. L'expédition militaire que l'U.R.S.S. poursuit en Afghanistan a maintenant perdu le caractère local et circonstanciel sur lequel le Kremlin avait cru pouvoir mettre l'accent. Son ampleur, sa durée, le phénomène de « je ne sais quelle » chez le peuple afghan, enfin l'inquiétude internationale, en témoignent. Au contraire, les conséquences et la portée, il ne s'agit plus seulement de l'équilibre en Asie centrale. Il s'agit, selon un premier bilan dressé en Europe, d'une opération que l'Union soviétique a entreprise dans le cadre d'une nouvelle phase de sa stratégie mon-

diale » et qu'elle tente de faire avaliser par une conférence régionale (projet du « gouvernement » de Kaboul) ou même un sommet planétaire (plan Brejnev).

Les principes directeurs de cette stratégie sont simples. D'une part, l'U.R.S.S. semble avoir rompu, en 1917, la chaîne des temps et pris, la tête d'un monde transformé qui, sans conflit global contre l'Occident, fera, de proche en proche, basculer l'univers du capitalisme vers le socialisme, sous le poids des forces populaires. D'autre part, elle regarde comme naturelle, justifiée et définitive toute expansion du communisme réalisée avec son appui, pourvu que celle-ci s'effectue au nom d'un mouvement de libération nationale, quelle qu'en soit la représentativité réelle. Mais — voilà le fait majeur d'aujourd'hui — l'affaire afghane montre que le Kremlin, dans le cadre de cette stratégie, ne cesse sa poursuite et se fixe un objectif précis : la constitution d'un nouveau glacis.

Le coup de Kaboul ne peut être isolé, en effet, de l'édification par l'U.R.S.S., aux flancs sud de son empire et à des carrefours essentiels du tiers-monde, d'une série

de bastions englobant, à titre principal, l'Ethiopie, Aden et, dans le sillage vietnamien, l'ancienne Indochine. Mais il manque un pivot central entre l'axe afro-arabe et l'axe asiatique du dispositif. C'est l'Afghanistan qui doit combler ce vide. Si l'opération réussit, Moscou disposera d'un levier pour constituer, plus tard, le glacis afro-asiatique destiné à compléter celui que Staline forçait en Europe orientale, également par la force et sans guerre ouverte contre l'Occident.

Le Kremlin avait dès lors besoin, à Kaboul, d'un Etat satellite, donc asservi, et non plus de gouvernements « amis » tels qu'en formaient le roi Zaher jusqu'en juillet 1973, puis, de juillet 1973 à avril 1978, son cousin le prince Daud. L'élimination de ce dernier marque, effectivement, le début d'une nouvelle phase d'expansion russe en Afghanistan, que va confirmer, le 27 décembre 1979, l'entrée ostentatoire des troupes et des tanks de l'armée rouge.

(Lire la suite page 4.)

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Le nouveau glaci sovietique

(Suite de la première page.)

Mais, note l'un des récents interlocuteurs de M. Gromyko, ce n'est pas le rouleau compresseur russe qui se met en mouvement à l'échelle de la planète, avec des divisions bientôt lancées contre l'Allemagne ou la Yougoslavie, c'est une dynamique mardiste où coexistent les armes, dans les secteurs éloignés de l'Occident, et la diplomatie, dans les secteurs proprement européens ou américains.

Faut-il pour autant négliger les raisons tantôt locales, tantôt conjoncturelles de l'intervention en Afghanistan ? Assurément pas. Certains facteurs, au contraire, ont joué un rôle important, parmi lesquels : échecs répétés des régimes imposés après avril 1978, désertions militaires, soulèvement d'une partie de la population, mise à profit du choc provoqué par la prise des otages de Téhéran. Cependant, l'affaire afghane illustre aussi la conviction soviétique que le rapport mondial des forces penche désormais en faveur du camp socialiste, dirigé de Moscou. Cette conviction imprègne les quatre documents fondamentaux divulgués par l'U.R.S.S., en juin 1978. Les deux premiers, publiés dans la Pravda, concernent la Libye (13 juin) et les Etats-Unis (19 juin). Le troisième, consacré à l'Afrique, prend la forme d'une déclaration gouvernementale (23 juin). Le quatrième émane de M. Brejnev lui-même et porte sur l'Europe (discours de Minsk du 24 juin).

Que, en l'espace de douze jours, le Kremlin ait fait connaître son analyse de l'évolution mondiale, annonçait, on le mesure maintenant, un tournant. Encore n'est-ce pas tout. Cette analyse ne reprend pas uniquement les arguments habituels : crise du capi-

talisme, contradictions et rivalités entre les Etats-Unis, l'Europe et le Japon ; collusion Pékín-Washington contre nature ; danger de la course aux armements, spécialement pour l'Allemagne ; montée des forces populaires dans le monde, etc. Elle tient également compte des pays dans lesquels, bien avant le coup de Kaboul, le camp socialiste s'est implanté ou renforcé sans aucune riposte occidentale.

Un premier groupe comprend précisément l'Ethiopie, Aden et l'ancienne Indochine. Selon des sources sérieuses, l'U.R.S.S. possède en Ethiopie, au bas mot, 700 chars (T-34, T-54, T-55), 450 véhicules blindés, 400 pièces d'artillerie, 85 avions de combat, 3 vedettes, 1 bâtiment de débarquement. On dénombre, en outre, au moins 3.000 conseillers russes, 15.000 soldats cubains, 500 experts allemands. A Aden, l'Union soviétique aligne 300 chars et automitrailleuses (T-34 et T-52), 120 à 160 avions Mig-17 ou Mig-21, 2 groupes de bombardiers Sukoy-22 et IL-28, 6 transporteurs Antonov, 6 appareils de reconnaissance maritime IL-38, quelques hélicoptères de transport Mi-8 et d'assaut Mi-16, 7 vedettes ou patrouilleurs. On y trouve également plusieurs centaines de coopérants civils et 4.000 conseillers militaires russes, 1.000 conseillers cubains, presque autant d'allemands.

Quant au Vietnam, il reste jaloux de son indépendance, mais a besoin de Moscou pour étendre sa domination à toute l'Indochine. Utilisant cette dépendance, l'U.R.S.S. prend pied dans certaines anciennes bases américaines, dont Cam-Ranh, Da-Nang et Bien-Hoa. Pour la première fois, ce royaume du Pacifique, dotée de sous-marins nucléaires, bénéficie à Cam-Ranh de facilités qu'elle n'avait pu obtenir jusqu'ici. D'autre part, le Tonkin et le nord du Laos abritent des missiles soviétiques. Enfin, l'U.R.S.S. utilise certains aéroports à des fins militaires. Actuellement, son aide au gouvernement de Hanoï frôle 1 milliard de dollars par an. Ses coopérants, conseillers et autres « volontaires » deviennent plus nombreux, y compris au Sud-Vietnam. Jamais, dans l'histoire, la Russie n'avait disposé d'un tel point d'appui en Asie du Sud-Est.

Dans aucun de ces trois cas, le Kremlin n'a rencontré d'opposition occidentale. Or, en Afghanistan, l'absence d'opposition a été encore plus nette, pendant près d'un quart de siècle. Dès 1954, l'Amérique s'est largement dégageée de ce pays en lui refusant les armes qu'il réclamait pour tenter de récupérer sur le Pakistan une partie du Pachtounistan et du Balouchistan. Khrouchchev exploita ce refus lors de son escale à Kaboul, en décembre 1955, au terme d'un voyage en Inde. En vingt ans, l'U.R.S.S. livra la quasi-totalité de l'équipement militaire, construisit des routes nord-sud (on voit maintenant pourquoi), forma des centaines d'officiers et de sous-officiers, instruisit sur son sol vingt mille soldats afghans, bâtit, pour concurrencer l'université américaine, une école polytechnique où passèrent cinquante mille étudiants, auxquels un enseignement marxiste fut dispensé.

Mais l'Afghanistan n'était pas totalement satellisé, alors que Moscou voulait franchir cette ultime étape, en fonction du glaci afro-asiatique prévu dans le cadre de la nouvelle phase de sa stratégie mondiale. Cette étape commence avec la mise à l'écart du prince Daoud. Un parti unique prend le pouvoir, multiplie les cellules communistes, endoctrine les « jeunesses communistes », remplace le vert islamique par le rouge. Puis, le 27 décembre dernier, c'est la brutale accélération que l'on sait. Mais, d'avril 1978 à aujourd'hui, l'objectif reste inchangé : créer un parti-Etat omniprésent afin que l'Afghanistan devienne, pour le Kremlin, une solide courroie de transmission capable de relayer un jour, au moins en partie, les troupes soviétiques.

L'affaire afghane s'inscrit ainsi dans une perspective globale qui est, selon le communiqué Brejnev-Marchais du 10 janvier, « celle du passage du capitalisme au socialisme ». C'est pourquoi de nombreux milieux internationaux en mesurent aujourd'hui les dangers. Le Kremlin devra donc choisir entre le maintien de ses objectifs actuels — au risque de sacrifier la détente et de s'enlisier en Afghanistan, où la résistance s'affirme — et une négociation d'ensemble, notamment avec l'Occident.

RENÉ DABERNAT.

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reale», pubblicato nel 1975. Amnesty International fa seguire ora un nuovo volume sul medesimo tema (*Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR*), dove lo stato dei diritti civili nella più grande dittatura del mondo è aggiornato fino alla metà del 1979.

Dall'indagine, che è stata condotta con lo stesso sistema degli analoghi studi sui prigionieri politici detenuti in Cile, Sudafrica, Brasile, Argentina, Corea, Filippine, Cina e altri Paesi, risulta confermata la natura autoritaria e repressiva del regime dell'URSS. Deludendo le speranze di coloro che, al di là delle cosiddette degenerazioni burocratiche nell'apparato di potere sovietico, credono di scoprire i primi segni di una lenta evoluzione pluralista, il documento di Amnesty mette clinicamente in risalto una realtà ben diversa. Dottrina dello Stato sovietico e libertà di manifestazione del pensiero, alla prova dei fatti, non risultano fra loro compatibili.

I dati e le testimonianze raccolti non soltanto hanno permesso di identificare nell'Unione Sovietica oltre 400 nuovi casi ben documentati di prigionieri politici. Per la prima volta, essi consentono di ricostruire nei particolari la vita negli istituti di pena, nei campi di lavoro forzato e nei manicomiali, che è caratterizzata non soltanto dall'uso degli psicofarmaci causanti allucinazioni e dai maltrattamenti fisici (come già si sapeva), ma anche dall'applicazione della fame come «correttivo».

La casistica è talmente precisa e particolareggiata, che non può essere attribuita a «diffamazioni antisovietiche» con facilità, secondo la spiegazione rituale di Mosca, la quale d'altronde riecheggia le accuse di fiancheggiamento del «terrorismo marxista» mosse ad Amnesty International da parte dei regimi sudafricano, cileno, argentino e brasiliano per analoghe ragioni. Fra gli episodi più incredibili, che illustrano le condizioni a cui sono sottoposti i prigionieri sovietici, il rapporto cita la morte per soffocamento di 17 detenuti rinchiusi in un vagone ferroviario piombato e privo di finestre (il nome russo è *voronok*, corvo) diretto al lager di Kazan e rimasto fermo per ore sotto il sole che ne arroventava le lamiere; la tragedia, testimoniata da altri detenuti della stessa casa di pena, avvenne nell'aprile 1979. Indicativa è pure la seguente cronaca tratta da un *samizdat*, del trasferimento ferroviario di un gruppo di prigionieri dal campo di lavori forzati di Mordovia alla regione di Perm, avvenuto durante un'ondata di calore nel luglio '72: «Quindici persone in uno scompartimento. Fiumi di sudore. Cibo putrefatto. Per due giorni i prigionieri non sono stati accompagnati al gabinetto e sono stati costretti a usare i corridoi... Finestre chiuse ermeticamente; solo verso la fine è stato permesso di aprire uno spiraglio... La gente si sdraiava nuda sul pavimento. Sporizia e tanto soffocante. Un uomo è morto durante la deportazione».

Autore: [firma] data 30/10/79

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Roller-Coaster Bullion Prices Left Mining Stocks Unscathed

By H.J. Maidenberg

NEW YORK (NYT) — "Gold is of interest only to French hoarders, Middle East oil sheiks, and underworld gangsters," wrote Paul Samuelson, the Nobel Laureate in economics, almost a decade ago. Last week, Mr. Samuelson, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was asked if the recent turbulence in the gold markets had affected his thinking.

"I still hold that view," he said, "because gold has no future in the monetary system. Its volatility precludes its consideration as a safe asset. Gold is still a commodity for hoarders and speculators."

On the other hand, the Nobel Laureate in economics added: "It now makes sense for prudent investors to place a portion of their assets in the metal as a hedge against declines in the value of their other assets. For investors of modest means, gold bullion coins certainly make sense."

"So do shares in gold mining companies," Mr. Samuelson said, "but I don't want to get involved in a discussion of South African gold shares because it is a sensitive subject in any university."

Mining Stocks

Not everyone is so shy. As Andre Sharon, first vice president of Drexel Burnham Lambert, a major Wall Street brokerage house, pointed out, the yields on mining stocks are attractive indeed.

What would Mr. Samuelson expect from investments in bullion? "If you hold the metal or gold shares or gold certificates, such as those issued by banks and bullion dealers, the investment must return between 15 and 18 percent a year in order for you to break even," he replied.

Mr. Sharon added: "The most negative factor impacting the price of gold is the 'opportunity cost' of holding it."

He referred to the recent high yields on Treasury bills and other extremely low-risk securities that were providing investors with as much as 18 percent yields on an annual basis. "Obviously, an investor who can get, say, 16 percent on Treasury bills without risk would not be encouraged to buy bullion, which entails such added charges as storage, insurance and other costs," Mr. Sharon noted.

But Drexel Burnham's international investment specialists pointed out that, while the price of bullion has plunged from a record \$875 an ounce in January



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— Paul Samuelson

to the \$500 range last week, many South African gold mining shares continue to yield 20 percent or more.

Overall, the roller-coaster bullion experience has left the mining stocks relatively unscathed, with most at or above their values in December, when the gold price was also in the \$500 range.

The ups and downs of the underlying bullion price, however, are only one of several factors that are constantly in play, pushing the stock prices one way or the other.

For one, there is the estimated remaining life of a mining property, which must, under South African law, be mined evenly, rich veins and poor. Here, the tradeoffs include total life, average wealth of the veins and the sharp rises in wages and other costs in South Africa.

Second, South African mining companies traditionally pay out almost all their earnings in the form of dividends, because the government owns the mines and only leases them to the operators at fixed rents and for specific periods of time. Thus, the companies have little incentive to reinvest earnings, aside from expanding or improving ore bodies on their leased properties.

Third, the share prices are traditionally linked to the twice-yearly dividend payouts, which usually take place in April and October. These dividends are calculated on earnings over the previous six-month period, rather than shorter-term gold market prices.

Fourth, there are currency factors to take into consideration. Shares denominated in South African rands, for example, slumped heavily in dollar terms during February and March when rebel forces were gaining control in neighboring Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Those denominated in British pounds also responded to that currency's strength.

'Financial Rand'

For example, the discount on the so-called financial rand, which refers to South African money held outside the country, widened by 20 percent during February and March. This helped account for most of the 25 percent decline in South African gold shares in that period. Apparently, the steep drop in gold bullion prices had relatively little impact on the shares during this period.

Finally, South African gold companies are expected to again keep output at about 700 million ounces

this year, or roughly half the world's new mine production. But their government, which buys and markets the metal, plans to step up sales of the one-ounce Kruggerand coins, which account for about a fourth of the nation's current gold sales, and smaller-size bullion coins. This would sharply widen the market for the mines' product.

As Nicholas Deak, president of the Deak-Perini Group, pointed out, only 2 or 3 percent of Americans now own bullion coins, according to his market surveys. "That's still 4 to 6 million people," he said. "If another 1 percent of the population buys at least one Kruggerand or Maple Leaf it could easily take up more than an entire year's worldwide new mine output."

Canada's one-ounce Maple Leafs are being joined by bullion coins of various weights from Mexico, which has recently begun a marketing program.

Gold 'Off-the-Books'

This does not surprise Professor Samuelson. "Kruggerands and other gold bullion coins have become an important part of the expanding subterranean economy in our country that eludes the tax collector and distorts economic statistics," he said.

Mr. Deak, whose firm is one of the largest retailers of bullion coins, agreed that the anonymity of gold did indeed facilitate off-the-book trading in this investment medium.

"Much of our bullion coin business is conducted on a cash basis," he said. "We are not required to report to the Treasury on any transactions, that is, purchase or sale of, say, bullion coins that involve less than \$10,000. We do request the names, particularly of those selling the coins to us, but we don't believe many of the names we are given."

Mr. Deak also found some fault with the strategies of small investors. "When prices were rising before the market break last January, the small investor was buying, not selling. When prices broke, they were almost all sellers. This is quite the opposite of what the more sophisticated gold traders do."

As for the trend in gold prices, Drexel Burnham's Sharon said: "It would be pretentious for an investment analyst to draw dogmatic conclusions on the trends in gold prices. I can say, however, that many market analysts of South African gold shares seem to be calculating values on a price of about \$450 an ounce. Personally, I think that any price over \$300 an ounce is factoring in more political considerations than market fundamentals of supply and demand."