

Memoria 16 agosto 1957

Caro Umberto,

Ho venuto a casa tua e poi alla
sindacato: ho riferito il risultato
dei colloqui avuti con Cromoni, Baldo-
ghin, Barbieri e Liaccio. Un solo risultato
a trovarli e dicendo riferire per legge-
dole di tutto in breve punto e stato
il risultato di tali colloqui -

- 1) Cromoni e favorevole proprio che si
bando in il concorso ed anche punto -
- 2) Baldoighin, che mi ha a volte mi una
volta a settimana, mi ha autorizzato
a riferire che egli non si è parlato con nessuno

che si bandiva la patologia che riguarda
ma che doveva formare il suo punto
l'vista il giorno in cui si riuniva
la facoltà non interverrà... per
un dolore al processo. Postu-
mente e' quindi proposta -

3) Barberi si e' espresso negli stessi
termini, dandoci la sua parola
che non muoverà alcuna parola
contro la richiesta da emettere
e che si aberra dal venire anche
in facoltà -

4) Ciaccio si fa osservare che
il processo si deve finire. Del

nesso ha altre peculiarità. In
particolare mi fa saltare:

Ho incontrato Aragona che
è più inclinato a mezzogiorno -
Come ved' ho summat el'acqua.

Adesso decido tu.

Ti prego riformare l'opinion della
deposizione che riterrai più opportuna
di prendere. L'idea Aragona
mi è d'aver di averne inteso a
Cagliari - per conto dell'ammiraglio
di Napoli - richiesta di un'azione
dentro ad un certo termine
incaso a mezzogiorno.

Om annu sempre gabo
h. dno plus. r. p. u.

ap. p. u.

Tur

P. p. u.

Roma, li 22 dicembre 1951
Via Frattina, 89

Prot.n.7565/51/BV/dp

Caro Martino,

desidero innanzitutto ringraziare te, Saija e gli amici tutti per le cordiali accoglienze.


Sono ripartito, ammirato di Messina, e fiducioso per Catania.

Scrivo contemporaneamente a Zingali, Di Stefano e Majorana.

A mio modo di vedere, per quanto riguarda l'esponente politico, credo che ci convenga puntare su Zingali piuttosto che su Condorelli, il quale, malgrado le sue oneste intenzioni, mi sembra difficilmente riducibile. Credo che anche tu sia della mia opinione.

Auguri e saluti affettuosi.

Tuo



S.E.On. GAETANO MARTINO
Piazza Duomo, 1
Messina

Rome, April 2.nd, 1951

My dear Secretary Acheson,

We all agree that we must orient towards the problem of regaining the initiative on the world political and propaganda levels, while standing firm and going full speed ahead with our program of Atlantic rearmament.

In this connection, and for the purpose of doing something to strike a blow at communist propaganda and to try to give some contribution to the necessary activities aimed at recovering the initiative also in the psychological sphere, I have outlined a very general plan of a move which might fulfil these requirements. Of course, it is a plan which should be thoroughly studied in all its details in order to weigh its positive and negative facets. I have, however, deemed it advisable to forward this plan to you in a most personal manner, so that you may examine it and let me know your opinion.

In this spirit I beg you to take under consideration the attached memorandum which, I must add, I recommend solely to your judgement.

Your first reaction may be perhaps one of perplexity. I must admit with you that more than once I felt the same way. However, when I think of the advantages which we could secure through the disorientation and surprise which would result at Moscow, I am convinced that the matter is really worth of consideration. What else could we do in the field of psychological war? I do not see.

Carlo Sforza

Mr. Dean Acheson
Secretary of State
Washington

1. It is advantageous to recognize that, in this latest period, the initiative on the threefold level, military, diplomatic and psychological-propagandistic appears to be in the hands of the USSR. The Atlantic Powers have so far concentrated on the adoption of countermeasures aimed at replying to Moscow's moves, with the consequences that:

a) the choice of the moment and the object of the various developments seem to be in the opponent's hands;

b) during the more or less short periods during which the countermeasures are worked out, prepared and enacted, difficult moments of inferiority are experienced;

c) it is necessary to make, in a short time, an exhausting effort, relatively greater than the opponent's, in order to restore the balance.

Hence, the advisability of wresting from the USSR the advantages of the initiative by some sudden and unexpected move calculated to reverse the present situation.

2. While the rearmament programs of the Atlantic Community represent the only countermeasure which it is possible to take in order to restore the balance on the military level, much is still to be done on the diplomatic and propagandistic planes which, although interdependent with the military factor, may present lesser difficulties of a material character and permit quicker results. On the propaganda level, the approach is solely to refute the arguments of the so-called "partisans of the peace" who charge the members of the Atlantic Alliance in general and the United States of America in particular with having aggressive aims and of stiffly maintaining dangerous war-furthering positions, whereas they really aim at wrecking the collective effort for the rearmament of the West, at creating perplexity in a part of continental Europe's public opinions and at arousing bones-of-contention among the various Allied Governments. It must not be forgotten that the campaigns

for peace and against the atomic bomb, although they have not had the effects which the communist promoters desired, have not failed to make some inroad on European public opinion. Also, the slogan continually confirmed by communist propaganda, that the Atlantic Pact is an offensive means of aggression and that the United States particularly are not adverse in the end, to bring about deliberately an armed conflict, exercises some attraction also in some non-communist circles. It must also be kept in mind that now and then rumour (perhaps purposely circulated by communist elements) is heard that the USSR, in order to affirm her will to peace, has the intention to offer non-aggression pacts to some members of the Atlantic community.

What can be opposed to this propaganda? Is it possible to recover the psychological initiative from the hands of the communists in the same way as the United Nations succeeded during the last war in maintaining a constant advantage over Nazi propaganda?

3. Among the various moves which could be made in order to counter communist propaganda and possibly to restore the initiative to the Democratic world, the following plan is submitted, which, embracing at once the diplomatic and the psychological fields, seems to offer good prospects. This plan concerns the advisability of an offer by the Atlantic Alliance of a non-aggression pact to the USSR and to the communist States.

4. Before proceeding to a critical assessment of the positive and, possibly, negative elements to be found in this plan, it is well to attempt summarily to outline what could be the contents of such an offer the terms of which, once the general idea has been accepted, should be more thoroughly examined and therefore are here formulated merely in an indicative way. The text might run as follows:

a) Preamble - A re-statement of the desire for peace and

international collaboration on the part of the propounders, with an express reference to the Charter of San Francisco.

b) Contracting Parties - On one part all the States which are members of the Atlantic Alliance and, on the other, the USSR and all the other communist Powers.

c) Contents - A definition of the aggressor based upon, and improving the doctrinal discussions and the subsequent experiences, of that which was inserted in the collective agreements of London of 1933 (Litvinoff formula).

The mutual undertaking: not to carry out any acts of aggression; not to interfere in internal affairs; to respect territorial integrity and national independence; not to try to modify the limits of the occupation zones of the territories of the former enemy States, which were established at the end of the second World War.

An undertaking not to give any assistance whatsoever to an aggressor.

The validity of all pre-existing public agreements which are declared as not incompatible.

The immediate and collective denunciation of the Pact in case of acts of aggression accomplished even by only one of the contracting parties against any State, even if it should not be a signatory of the agreement.

d) Duration - This might, for instance, be made to coincide with that of the Atlantic Pact.

5. The advantages of such a move should be examined in connection with the following possibilities:

a - a simple refusal on the part of the USSR and of the other communist States;

b - an acceptance-in-principle and the beginning of laborious and inconclusive negotiations;

c - an acceptance-in-principle and the conclusion of the

agreement;

d- the conclusion of the agreement and its subsequent violation on the part of the USSR.

A)- In the case of a simple refusal on the part of the USSR, the advantages which would follow are obvious. The public opinions of the various countries which entered into the Atlantic Pact would see in the rejected offer of a non-aggression pact an extreme attempt at pacification; the confirmation of the pacific intentions of their own Governments and the revelation of Moscow's aggressive designs with the consequent debunking of her propoganda for peace and against the Atlantic Pact; the necessity of maintaining and accelerating the sacrifices which must be made in order quickly to carry out the rearmament programs which, in any case, must remain unaltered.

In case of a refusal, each Government of the Atlantic Community could therefore expect a greater internal and international compactness, a factor not to be disregarded, which would be the result of the psychological effects of the showdown. On the diplomatic plane, in addition to recovering the initiative, they would immediately gain a valuable element for the assessment- including also the possibility of military action- of Moscow's immediate intentions. In effect the Soviet Union would, in all probability, take such a stand only in view of a short-term aggressive plan.

B)- In the event of an acceptance-in-principle followed by inconclusive negotiations, it would be easy to maintain the internal propoganda initiative which has been set forth above, as the impellent of the negotiations would be an Allied proposal. It should not even be difficult to attribute the responsibility of a failure of the negotiations to the opponent. To the aforesaid advantages another should be added: the valuable time gained in furthering the military Atlantic preparation. The plan should,

moreover, be formulated in such terms as -without compromising its propagandistic effects- would not be easily acceptable to the USSR, owing to their binding character (the introduction of a clause on the supervision of armaments perhaps would do). The Soviet Union would thus be made to face the dilemma of losing the cold war or giving some concrete guarantees.

C)- The conclusion of the proposed pact would undoubtedly result in a more or less long period of relaxation of internal and international tension, which, apart from the possible positive developments which it is not possible to foresee now, would add the following benefits to those which have been already set forth above: the acknowledgment on the part of the USSR of the non-aggressive character of the Atlantic Pact with the consequent crumbling of the greater part of the present hostile propaganda structure; the creation, for what value it may have juridically, of a supplementary undertaking, not to be disregarded for its moral effects, on the part of the USSR and of her satellites, not to undertake any acts of aggression even against a third Power; an easier fulfilment, in the new atmosphere, of the present unaltered rearmament program and -consequently- an easier re-establishment of the international military balance. Furthermore, there would result a clear definition of the aggressor and a more precise undertaking to abstain from interfering in the internal political life of any State.

D)- The fourth possibility, i.e. the conclusion of the pact and a subsequent act of aggression on the part of the USSR, would result, in addition to all the advantages listed above, in producing an easier focussing of the various public opinions, as Russia would, in such action, violate a formal agreement concluded -the first one after the end of the war- with the Atlantic Powers as well as the principles of the San Francisco Charter.

6. Apart from the expected difficulties in the formulation

of the text of the agreement, the chief objections against such an offer of a non-aggression pact to the USSR could be summarized in the following points:

a) Preoccupations about the danger of internal and external interpretations to the effect that such an offer is an indication of the weakness of the Atlantic Community. This is a problem of some weight -perhaps not very different from that of stating plainly the low level of our armaments compared with that of the Communist States- but, after a careful examination, it does not seem so great as to nullify the positive aspects of the initiative. The propaganda aspect of the offer should, of course, be well considered, because it would be necessary from the start to express explicitly the will to carry out the rearmament plan integrally. It should also be avoided that one country or another, instead of the whole Atlantic Community, appears as responsible for the initiative or its realisation.

b) Misgivings about a possible weakening of the UNO, inasmuch as the Charter of San Francisco already contains a series of undertakings concerning non-aggression, the respect of the territorial integrity and of the national independence, the non-interference in the internal affairs, etc. As a matter of fact, such misgivings do not appear to have any foundation, just as the Atlantic Pact has not weakened the obligations already undertaken by the contracting parties in the Statute of the UNO as regards sanctions against an aggressor. The new pact would lead to a more exact definition of the aggressor and to a completion of the existing undertakings concerning the safeguarding of the internal affairs of the contracting parties, which comes within the framework of the regional agreements contemplated and advocated in the San Francisco Charter. It is obvious, on the other hand, that, in terms of the propaganda aims which are sought, the offer of a non-aggression pact should only indicate some essential principles, such as those which have been set forth above, leaving a certain margin for future negotiations.

Since no final draft of the agreement would be presented, it appears unlikely to incur any concrete criticism and, much less, contradiction as a result of a superimposition on the UNO undertakings.

c) Preoccupation about a possible juridical and political incompatibility of such a pact with the Atlantic Alliance. These, too, appear to be easy to overcome from the juridical standpoint in view of the contents of the pact itself above indicated. The treaties of alliance at present in force between Great Britain and France and the USSR are the witnesses of a positive practice in this connection. From the political point of view, any danger of incompatibility would disappear if the offer were made -as is contemplated- only collectively by all the members of the Atlantic Community which, by acting corporately, would indeed see its own personality reinforced.

d) Preoccupations concerning possible misgivings or uncertainties in some democratic countries which do not belong to the Atlantic Community. This possibility really exists, especially at the start, but it is just for this that it should be quite explicitly declared from the beginning that the non-aggression pact would be denounced in the case of an aggression against any third Power. On the other hand, different juridical positions already exist between the various Democratic Powers. Therefore this is no new problem, but a solution of the old one should be contemplated, which also takes this fact into account.

7. Notwithstanding all this, it is important to stress once more that the attempt to recover the advantages of the diplomatic and psychological initiative lies at the basis of this proposal. This move, in addition to what has already been pointed out, would also have the merit of dispelling the danger of having at a certain moment to face the serious embarrassment of a similar plan coming from Moscow. In this event, apart from any consideration of merit, all the psychological advantages would automatically go the USSR,

regardless of the reply of the Atlantic Community.

In pursuing our objective this plan has been studied as a contribution to the discussion of the most effective means of blocking the diplomatic and the propaganda action of the Communism. Although it may, at first sight, appear to be a bold and perhaps shocking move, the simple reflection on the disorientation and surprise which this move, having been made by her opponents, could arouse in Moscow, appears to justify thorough examination.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1951

My dear Mr. Minister :

Ambassador Tarchiani has sent me your letter of April 2 and your memorandum outlining your suggestion that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization propose to the Soviet Union and other Communist states a non-aggression treaty. I understand that the objective you have in mind is to seize the initiative in demonstrating clearly to the peoples of the world that the governments of the North Atlantic Community are genuinely striving for peace. I fully share your views on the importance of achieving this objective and of counteracting malicious Communist propaganda which seeks to becloud the real issues and to discredit our objectives.

Your proposal has had the most careful study in the Department of State. Since, however, it has now become public, I assume that any further discussion of the idea should take place in an appropriate international forum, such as the Council of Deputies of the NATO. I am not convinced that such a discussion would be helpful at this time.

I sincerely appreciate your having given me your thoughts, and value the friendship and confidence which your doing so reflects. As we work together with our allies for peace, I look forward to exchanging with you from time to time ideas on how our joint efforts may be most successful.

With my warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

His Excellency
Count Carlo Sforza,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Italy.



SENATO DELLA REPUBBLICA

Roma † Novembre 1950

On. Prof. Gaetano MARTINO
Vice Presidente Camera dei Deputati
Montecitorio - Roma

Caro ed onorevole Professore,

L'ho cercata quest'oggi per telefono a Montecitorio, ma - come più che giusto - la settimana di ferie, concessa dal calendario sacro e parlamentare, Le ha permesso una evasione dalla Capitale.

Desideravo parlarLe a proposito del concorso per borse di studio, da usufruirsi all'estero, indetto dall'I.N.A.I.L., e della cui Commissione giudicatrice Ella è degno ed autorevole Presidente.

Un concorrente, che è stato classificato al secondo posto - il Dott. Letterio Palmisano, che fu Suo allievo alla Università - mi ha pregato di segnalarLe come eccessivamente breve sia il tempo intercorrente fra la comunicazione data ai classificati, in uno con l'invito a presentarsi per la prova in lingua straniera, e la data di questa prova - identificantesi in realtà con la data di partenza per il Paese prescelto. Essendo trascorsi quindici mesi circa dalla prima indizione delle prove, i concorrenti - adattatisi al lento procedimento - non hanno ancora fatto alcun preparativo pur necessario per rendere possibile l'abbandono delle attività professionali per il periodo di permanenza all'estero.

Desiderio del Dott. Palmisano, il quale ritiene che altri lo condividano, sarebbe dunque che la Commissione da Lei presieduta decidesse una certa proroga alle scadenze oggi indicate; ad esempio di un mese.

Poichè mi faccio presso di Lei eco di quanto l'amico

./.

mio carissimo, il Dott. Palmisano, mi disse - riferendomi il successo ottenuto nel concorso, credo di non commettere indiscrezione se Le riferisco un ulteriore desiderio suo: quello dell'autorizzazione a potere mutare la lingua prescelta e quindi il Paese nel quale usufruire della borsa ottenuta. La indicazione iniziale in proposito venne fatta quindici mesi fa, nei confronti di certi determinati fattori della situazione generale ed anche delle condizioni di studio degli interessati. Queste mutate, non vi è da stupirsi se qualcuno degli interessati fosse oggi propenso a scelta diversa.

Mi perdoni, onorevole Professore, se caccio il naso in questioni tanto lontane da quelle di cui normalmente mi occupo. Mi vi ha determinato il sentimento di affetto che nutro per il Dott. Palmisano e quello di viva e rispettosa simpatia che nutro per Lei.

Le sarei grato se, leggendo al Suo ritorno a Roma queste mie righe, mi verrà dare un colpo di telefono.

Con la più schietta cordialità

Luigi Ferrarini